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This study is divided into Tour main Chapters# In 
the opening Chapter the relevant background information 
regarding the Pakistan economy and fluctuations in 
jute output and prices are collected# The small 
individual peasants of East Pakistan who produce the 
bulk of total jute output are found to be highly 
responsive to changes in the relative prices of jute and 
rice (the substitute crop) with a lag of one year# This 
lag structure in the price--supply relationship resu3_ts 
in cobweb type .? fluctuations of the relative prices 
of jute and rice and the production of jute# The 
statistical evidence is that year to year fluctuations 
in the total export proceeds from raw jute are more 
closely related to the fluctuations in the export volume 
than to those in the export price#
On the basis of the statistical evidence of Chapter 
the jute policies of the government of Pakistan and 
some other general stabilisation schemes proposed by 
several economists are examined in the following two 
Chapters# It was found that the Pakistan goveimment 
schemes for jute price stabilisation were ineffective 
mainly because the important relationship between the
3supply of jute in any season and the relative prices of 
jute and rice in the preceding season was ignored# For the 
same reason also the Bauer—Paish scheme was not found to
be suitable for Pakistan jute#
Xn the concluding Chapter, a Price Stabilisation 
Model for Pakistan jute is proposed and tested with empirical 
data* The object of the suggested scheme, by eliminating (or 
atleast reducing) the cobweb cycle in the relative price and 
production of raw jute, is to keep the country*s net gains 
from jute production and export at the maximum level# The 
main mechanism relied upon in the proposed model is to project 
optimum production quantity and then by setting the appropriate 
producer price, attempt to induce the growers to produce this 
optimum quantity. The producer price is to be announced well 
before the sowing starts for both jute and rice for the period 
concerned so that the jute/rice growers can make the necessary 
allocation of land and other resources between the two alter­
native crops# Any unforeseen changes in demand and/or in the 
planned output of jute are to be met from a national buffer 
stock, the operation of which will be relatively easy in the 
proposed scheme. As the supply of jute is to be adjusted to 
changing demand conditions, year to year fluctuations in the 
export price of raw jute would be comparatively small.
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Prices of many primary commodities tend to 
fluctuate more widely than those of manufactured goods 
in general because the supply of, and demand for the 
former group of commodities are relatively inelastic 
in the short-run. Shifts in supply or demand functions 
for primary commodities often result in largeJLy* price 
fluctuations of a cobweb type.
While this is so within a country, the underdeve­
loped countries, in general, face a similar problem for 
their tirade of primary commodities with the developed 
ones. This has an important bearing on the development 
process of the low income countries producing primary 
commodities. Among the various problems of price 
fluctuations of primary prodiicts in the world market 
two are very important. First, when the prices of export 
commodities fluctuate widely the import capacity of the 
exporting countries, in the absence of any sixbstancial 
foreign aid, may be adversely affected with serious 
consequences for their development process. Second, the 
uncertainties regarding the prices of primary products 
might have induced the developed countries to economise
8in the use of1 these commodities and to search for suitable
l/alternatives#” Once a substitute is found the process 
is generally irreversible.
Even without entering into the controversy over
\
tlie problem of* terms of* trade of* the underdeveloped
countries, one can reasonably conclude that the volume
of trade in primary commodities since the second World
War rose at a much slower rate than that of the manu-
2/factured goods* Thus, the G .A.T^T. study— reveals an 
important trend: While the agricultural imports of the 
developed countries from the underdeveloped ones 
declined over the periods (1 9 2 8-3 8 , 1 9 5 0-5 8 ) the desire
of the developing countries to import from the developed 
ones increased considerably. The underdeveloped countries, 
therefore, faced a tremendous balance of payments problem* 
Fluctuations in the export prices of, and proceeds from 
agi'icultural commodities of these countries make the 
problem even more difficult.
1/ Nurkse, R* Patterns of Trade and Development, Wicksell 
Lectures, 1959, p*23.
2/ Trends in International Trade - A Report by a Panel 
of Experts, Geneva, 1958"!””" *”
9The literature on problems of price fluctuations
and stabilisation policies for primary commodities have
been growing since the last World War, During 19 58-59
two long symposia initiated by Professor Nurkse and H.W.
Singer and attended by a number of economists from all
over the world were recoi'ded in the Swiss economic and
social journal - Kyklos. Various other proposals were
made by the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the
United Nations and by several other individual economists.
But until now most of the discussions have remained
more or less on an abstract plane.
The problems of stabilisation policies are very
complex and are not subject to ready generalisation.
These problems vary from one commodity to another, and
from wsosl country to country, dep ending on the importance
of the particular commodity in the economy and the nature
and stage of economic development of the country itself.
In order to narrow the gap between economic theory and
empirical research we must, as observed by Professor 
l/Tinbergen— , attempt to obtain a deep insight into the 
main influences working on both the demand and supply 
sides. When it is found that the magnitudes and effects
1/ Tinbergen, J, 'International Co-ordination of
Stabilisation and Development Policies1, Kyklos, 1959? 
fasc. 3, p.283.
to
of price fluctuations are of a serious nature, atleast 
a partial case is said to exist for a stabilisation 
scheme. An appropriate scheme can only he formulated 
when the causes of fluctuations are determined# A full 
case for such a scheme is established however only 
when one can be sure that by adopting this the specific 
object is fulfilled and no further disadvantages are 
caused as a result of the scheme.
Xn the opening Chapter, therefore, the nature, 
magnitudes and causes of jute price fluctuations and 
their effects on the Pakistan economy were investigated. 
On the ultimate analysis it was found that there was a 
cobweb cycle in the relative price and production of 
jute which led to year to year export price fluctuations# 
It appeared that year to year demand for raw jute was 
more stable than the supply of raw jute# The object of 
policy thus appeared to be the stabilisation of the 
export price of raw jute by eliminating the above 
cobweb fluctuations through production regulation.
Given the nature of the proble^h f*1© analysis 
is based on many simple assumptions# Wherever possible, 
the key propositions were tested with statistical data. 
Attempts were made to calculate the statistical demand
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and supply functions for jut© and the resultant elasti­
cities were compared with those found by other 
investigators «
As to the measure of instability I have used the
1/
methods adopted by the U.N. study. This method consists 
of obtaining the absolute difference in values from 
year to year, expressing this difference as a percentage 
of the larger of the two annual values and then averaging 
these percentages# Thus, a rise is measured as a percen­
tage of the terminal high point, rather than of the 
lower starting point, of an increase. A rise from 100 
to 1 5 0 , for instance, was not considered as an increase 
of 50 per cent, but an increase of 33^ cent. The
conventional method of measuring decreases was retained# 
As to the intra-year fluctuations, the method was to 
take the absolute difference between the highest and 
the lowest values within a year, and then expressing 
this difference as a percentage of the higher figure#
In Chapter X the statistical Tables are given in 
a summary form in the text , while the detailed time 
series data are given in four appendixes at the end of 
the tha^ isji'.
1/ Instability in the Export Markets of Underdeveloped 
Countries, N.Y., 1952* p#77#
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CHAPTER X
Jut© Fluctuations and the Pakistan Economy
1-1 Introduction
In order to examine and formulate a stabilisation 
scheme for Pakistan jute, we need some information 
about the Pakistan economy and jute fluctuations* This 
is necessary because the nature, extent and the effects 
of fluctuations of the price of jute will depend on the 
role of jute in the economy and the stage of economic 
development of Pakistan itself* We therefore propose to 
discuss in this Chapter the broad outline© of the 
following: the nature and stage of economic development 
of Pakistan; the growers' price responses; the role of 
jute in the Pakistan economy; Pakistan's place in the 
world economy of jute; recent trends in end-uses of jute 
and the extent, causes and effects of fluctuations in 
the price of jute* In the concluding section the desira­
bility of a jute price stabilisation scheme is discussed*
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1-2 The Economy of Pakistan
Pakistan is an underdeveloped country with, a
population of about 9 3 * 8 million in 1961 on a total
land area of 233 million acres, of which about 26 per
1/
cent is under cultivationT In the same year the average
per capita income was about "Rupees 261 (£20 approximately)
2/
at the 1949-50 to 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 average constant price.
Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural country with 
about 75 per cent of labour force employed in agriculture 
and about 55 per cent of gross national product coming
y
from this sector in 1959-60. During Partition in 1947 
Pakistan inherited almost no manufacturing industry, but 
by 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 she had attained significant industrialisation 
which accounted for about 14 per cent of gross national 
product in that year, the remaining 31 per cent coming
y
from services.
The role of the government in economic activities 
extends from the regulation and control of private 
enterprises in trade, industry and agriculture to a
1/ Government of Pakistan, Census of FaXcistan, 1961 , 
Census Bulletin No. 5*
2/ Government of Pakistan, (C.S.O.), Statistical 
Bulletin. July, 1964, Table 25*
2/ ibid.
4/ Government of Pakistan, Second Five Year Plan, p.4*5.
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direct participation in certain specific fields through
Five year Plans* The foreign exchange component in
development expenditure has been on average about 35
per cent over the period 1949 to i9 6 0 , but this increased
to about 53 P©** cent during the Second Plan period 
1/
(1 9 6 0-6 5 )* Haw jute, raw cotton and their manufactures
earned about 72 per cent of total export earnings
during the First Five Year Plan period (1955-60), while
in the pre-Plan period most of the foreign exchange
2/
was earned by the two agricultural commodities*
The index of terms of trade, on the 1948-49 base 
(X
rose to 125 for/short period during the Korean boom but
3/
rapidly declined afterwards and fell to 52 in 1 9 5 9*
Agricultural production in Pakistan is based on 
small and fragmented holdings by individual cultivators 
using mostly family labour. Something like of the 
normal value of Pakistan's total agricultural output 
consists of food and about -§• of that is directly consumed
1/ Government of Pakistan, Second Five Year Plan, p.8 2 * 
2/ ibid* p •8 3 #
3/ The State Bank of Pakistan, Report on Currency and 
Finance* 1 9 5 9-6 0 , JCarachi, p • 1&8 *
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by the growers themselves on; the farms; and only *3* of
the food products pass through the marketing system*
In East Pakistan the main agricultural crops
are rice and jute, while in West Pakistan these are
wheat and cotton* Underimormal weather conditions the
East Pakistani peasants can raise a food crop just
sufficient for their subsistence* In West Pakistan where
agriculture is more mechanised and less dependent on
the weather than in East Pakistan, the peasants have
normally some exportable surplus of food* The government
of Pakistan in their Five Year Plans stressed the need
for the development of agriculture in order to attain
2/
self sufficiency of the food supply* The East Pakistan 
government, however, maintains some food reserves to 
meet emergencies that may occur due to unfavourable 
weather conditions*
1/ Porter, R*C* 'The Inflationary Implication of Crop 
Failure} Pakistan Development Review, Spring, 1962*
2/ Government of Palcistan, First Five Year Plan, p* 16; 
Second Five Year Plan, pi l4t*
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1~3 The Characteristics of Jute Production In East 
Pakistan and the growers1 Price Responsiveness
The geographical factors necessary for jute
production (viz., soils of alluvial origin, a heavy
rainfall between 6 0 - 8 0 inches per year, a moist heat, etc.)
are sufficiently available in East Pakistan and, indeed,
it is the most favourably situated place in the world
1/
for jute productionT Of the total cultivatable land in
£/
East Pakistan, about 5 per cent, on average, is devoted 
to jute and about 76 per cent to rice and the rest to 
other crops, such as sugar canee, wheat, vegetable, fruits,
1/
pulses, etc* Jute is a summer crop, planted during 
February to April and harvested in Jufre to September*
The growing season for * Aus1 (summer rice) falls within 
this period and the main rice crop, 'Aman*, though 
harvested during November to January, is partly sown in 
low land areas well before the jute crop is harvested,
v
-while in high lands it may follow the jute crop. But
/-
1/ Ahmad, N* An Economic Geography of East Pakistan. 
London, 1 9 5 8 , pp. 128-42. “ " “ “
2/ In Pakistan jute is produced in East Pakistan alone*
2/ Government of Pakistan, Census of Agriculture* (East 
Pakistan Data), i9 6 0 , p. 1 7 3*
V  Ahmad, N* op.cit*, p. 123*
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such a double cropping of jute and ’Arrian* (winter) rice
is only successful under the most favourable weather
conditions and usually involves sacrifices for both the
crops* There can be no double cropping of jute and
summer rice* The only other summer crop is sugar cane,
but it does not usually compete with jute for land
mainly because of differences in soil and climatic
conditions necessary for their respective production*
The production of sugar cane has, therefore, concentrated
1/
in the non-jute area of East Pakistan* The other crops, 
being winter products, do not compete with jute for the 
growers* land,
Thus, the cultivators* decision to grow jute 
involves a conscious sacrifice of the opportunity to 
grow both summer and winter rice crops on the same land*
In fact, for most of the farmers of the jute growing 
areas of East Pakistan, the cultivation of jute is primarily 
a choice between the production of the cash crop (i*e*, 
jute) «,L 1 4. tail anadaf a staple food crop* In areas where the 
farmers can devote their land to two rice crops a year, 
they have a choice between the two crops of rice and one 
of jute* On the average, jute being produced on a small
1/ Ahmad, N, op*cit* p* 1^3 .
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proportion of rice land, the scope of variation in 
jute cultivation is potentially very wide in EhJe East 
Pakistan; and an increase of the jute crop usually talces 
place at the expense of the staple food output*
In East Pakistan jute is grown for cash income, 
whereas rice is mostly grown to meet the food require­
ments of the farmer and his family; and if much of his 
land is planted to jute, he will have to buy a part of 
his food requirements with the proceeds from jute* For 
the average farmer, the possibility of having a surplus 
of rice for sale simply does not arise, even if he 
planted all his land to rice, because the average size 
of the farm in East Pakistan is about 3*5 acres which 
normally yield a total rice output between 40-45 maunds 
(after considering the possibility of double cropping),
which is not sufficient for an average farm family of
1/
six (adult equivalent) for year round consumption* Thus, 
by planting a part of his land to jute, an average farmer
1/ Government of East Pakistan, Pakistan Census of 
Agriculture, i960 (East Pakistan Data)*
In East Pakistan, all the rice land is not under 
double cropping; only about % of the total rice land 
was, on average, under both the summer and winter 
rice crops as appears from the Government of East 
Pakistan, Agricultural Production Levels in East 
kkxx&ara Pakistan (1947-60), Dacca* 19?I *
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in East Pakistan expects to get a higher return from
1/
jute relative to that from rice7  as it may be sometimes 
cheaper to get food indirectly by producing and selling 
jute# The retail price of rice, therefore, can be con­
sidered ‘largely to determine the opportunity costs of
using land for jute production, because rice production
2/
is normally foregone in order to grow jute . 1 The retail
price which the growers expect to pay to buy rice, rather
than the price they expect to receive in selling rice,
3/
in relation to the harvest price of jute would be 
expected to influence their decision to allocate land 
and other resources between the alternative crops of 
jute and rice.
1/ Xt is shown later in this section that the price
expectation of the jute/rice growers for the current 
season is usually based on the actual prices prevailing 
in the immediate past season#
2/ Shorter, F.C., ‘Jute Production Policies of India and 
Pakistan', Indian Economic Journal, July, 1955; and 
his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: Jute Policy in 
India and Pakistan. 1947-53: An Economic Analvsfq. 
Stanford, 1957* '—  ---- *--"~
2/ small growers have.little holding power, most
of ^ the jute crop is sold immediately after the harvest 
(discussed in section 1-4 ).
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For some rich farmers who may sell both jute 
and rice, the selling price of rice should be relevant, 
but these farmers appear to produce a relatively 
small proportion of total output of jute as indicated 
below*
Table 1-1 (A)
jure our 1
Size of
Farms
(Acres)
yur uy rn© sxvs©
Percentage 
of total 
Farms
OJL JL CUL J.U
Percentage 
of total 
Farm Area
Percentage of 
total jute 
Area
Under 7*5 89 61 72
Under 12•5 96 80 85
Under 25*0 99 94 9
Source: Government of Pakistan, Census of Agriculture, 
i9 6 0 , (East Pakistan Data) , p*6£T*
In practice, however, there does not appear to
be any important difference between the expected buying
price of rice and the expected selling price of rice,
probably because the marketing of rice takes place on
1 /
a small scale*
2/
In various studies on the price responsiveness
1/ Clark, R. loc* cit*
2/ Studies cited at the foot of Table 1-1(B)
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of jute growers in Xndia and Pakistan, the relative 
prices of jute and rice prevailing in the preceding 
season have been identified as the prices to which the 
growers respond in planning their production* The generally 
accepted hypothesis is that the jute growers' decision 
to devote a certain acreage to jute is dependent on the 
past prices of jute and rice together with the price 
expectation for them, which in practice is based upon 
the level of relative prices in the immediate past season# 
Agricultural supply is usually a predetermined 
variable at time point (t) due to the influence of 
weather and other growing conditions on yields* Part 
of the influence of the factors affecting supply can 
however be attributed to economic conditions, and in 
agricultural markets this influence is transmitted 
with a time lag* The lag is inherent in the nature of 
the problem because of the time required for planting 
to mature* Acreage decisions|are therefore based on 
previous year's relative prices* The lag structure in 
supply response to price makes the relationship a 
suitable form for a regression estimate of the one way 
effect of past price on current supply* The supply function
23
of jute in East Pakistan thus can be stated in the 
following equation:
0 1 -  a  4* 4 \ “  / +  *  \ +  U .t 1 j(t-l) 2 r(t-l) t
where 0t is the current output, ^j(t-i) and ^r(t-l) 
are the prices of jute (harvest) and rice (retail) in 
the previous season, is the random factor. Except 
V^ , we can observe all the variables in the above 
equation.
By taking data for the period 1952-33 to 1 9 6 2 - 6 3  
for East Pakistan,first, the acreage and then the output 
of jute in the current period have been regressed upon 
the prices of jute and rice prevailing in the preceding 
season. The fit of the semi-log multiple regression 
equation showing the growers1 acreage response to changes 
in the relative prices is given below:
At =565.98 + 1894.26 log PJ(t.1) - 1292.40 log Pr(t_1) (1_1}
(2 7 6 ,6 6 ) (470*01)
R^ ss 0 , 8 5 4  Degrees of freedom » 8
where | =jute area in thoiisand acres in the current
period, •Pj(t-i) “ lla^ vest price of jute in Rupees per maund,
Pr(t»l) “ retail price of rice in Rupees per maund. About
85 per cent of the variance in the East Pakistan jute
2 4
area during the period studied is explained by the two 
independent variables (i.e., the prices of* jute and rice)*
Thus* the acreage of1 jute planted is inversely
related to the price of* rice and directly related to its
own price* In both cases the time lag is one year# This
is further illustrated with the help of Chart 1-1 * The
partial elasticity (at the mean) of the growers' acreage
response to the previous year's price of jute is +1.24
1/
while to that of rice is -0 .8 5 .
On the basis of the above equation, the following 
estimation is obtained. When the average jute price rose 
from one season to anothert say by 50 per cent and the 
average price of rice remained unchanged, about 540.97 
thousand acres more were sown to jute in East Pakistan 
in the following season, and the crop was about 6 . 2 8  
million maunds larger* On the other hand, when the 
price of rice x'ose by, say 50 per cent and that of jute 
remained unchanged, about 5 8 0 . 6 8  thousand acres less
1/ The partial elasticities from the equation 1 - 1 are ;
calculated by differentiating first with respect to 
the price of jute and then to that of rice. For instance,
At = 5 6 5 . 9 8  + 1894.26 log - 1292.40 log
N°W d V d Pj(t-1) = l8 9 4 -26/ Pj(t-l)
But E =£ At/d PJ(t-l^j(t-l)/Aj
Hence, E = [^894.26/P . ^  jp . ( =  l894.a6/15aa.
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were devoted to jute*
The coefficients of elasticity at the mean of 
response of acreage sown to jute to the changes in the 
relative prices of jute and rice in the preceding season 
are given in Table 1-1(B) indicating various studies#
In Pakistan licensing (allowing a maximum limit 
that an individual cultivator could devote to jute) was 
in force upto i9 6 0 * But as the acreage regulation was not 
in fact enforced* except to some extent in 1953-5^i this 
did not modify* to any significant extent* the area response 
to prices.
The primary relationship established is between 
price and acreage, because it is only the acreage which 
is directly under the control of the growers* But for 
forecasting purposes it is the relationship between the 
price and the crop which is more important. Variations 
in yield of jute in Bast Pakistan, however, appear to 
be more or less random, and hence variations in jute 
output can also be considered to be almost as adequately 
explained by changes in the relative prices of jute 
and rice as can variations in the area* The following 
multiple regression equation supports this point:
26
Ot = 1 8 0 5. 46 H3- 4971.63 log -
(1 2 0 1.0 6 )
R =. 0.684 Degrees of freedom = 8
2504.88 log 
(1340.42)
(1-2)
where, 0^ is the output of jute in thousand bales in
the current period, and pr (t-l) are the Prices
of jute and rice per maund in the preceding season as 
in equation (1-1 )•
Thus, both the equations (l-l) and (1-2) give a 
gqod fit but that of equation (l-l) is better than that 
of (1-2 ) for the obvious reason that it is more within 
the control of the growers to make any change of acreage 
than of output, a portion of which is randomly determined. 
We may, therefore, conclude that in East Pakistan there 
is a definite relationship between the jute area (or 
output) in one season and the relative prices of jute 
and rice in the preceding season* For policy purposes, 
the important point is that if it is desired to regulate 
jute output by manipulating prices this relationship 
between the relative prices of jute and rice in one 
season and the jute acreage or output in the following 
season must be taken into consideration*
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Table l-l(B)
Coefficient of elasticity at the mean of response 
of acreage aown to .jute to the relative prices of jute 
and rice in the preceding season
Study 
made by
Country Period Elasticity 
at the mean
A*R* Sinha All India 1921-39 0.65
F * A •0* (Rome) Bengal 1911-40 + 0.51
East Bengal 1931-^0 + 0.68
East Pakistan 1 9 4 7 -5 6 + 0.48
R*M# Stern All India 1893-1939 *t* 0 . 6 8
Bengal 1911-39 + 0 . 7 6
R* Clark East Bengal 1931-54 1'
Our Study
(partial elasticity with respect
to the price of jute) +0 * 6 0  
(with respect to the price
of rice) «0 # 6 0
East Pakistan 1 9 5 2 -6 2
(partial elasticity with respect
to the price of jute) +1*24
(with respect to the price of rice) -0 .8f5
Source: Sinha, *A Preliminary Note on the Effect of Price 
on the future supply of Raw Jute1, Sankhya, 
December,, 1941; F.A.O. (Rome), Jute, Commodity 
Bulletin No* 28, 1957; Stern, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, May, 1962; Clark, 'The Economic 
Determinants of Jute Production1, Monthly Bulletin 
of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, F •A.O#, 
Rome, September, 1957 nd and our equation (l-l)#
Note: The partial elasticities in our study are signi­
ficantly higher than those obtained by Clark pro­
bably because the jute/rice growers of East Pakistan 
became more price conscious over these years, as 
we studied a period more recent than that of Clark#
1-4 Marketing of Haw Jute in East Pakistan
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The marketing of raw jute in East Pakistan consists
of several stages. At the primary stage a m^jor portion
of raur jute is bought and sold in the homes of growers
where buyers go around buying small lots from individual
peasants. The price is determined by open bargaining
and the quality is assessed by examining the whole lot.
There is no proper standardisation or adequate system
of markstxHg weights and measures at this level of 
1/
marketing. The growers have little holding power, owing
to the lack of adequate credit facilities and their cash
needs to buy rice during the lean months after the jute
harvest. An inadequate transport system does not enable
sales by growers in distant markets in search of better
prices. Hence, most of the growers have to dispose of
2/
raw jute almost immediately after the harvest* All these
factors limit their bargaining power with the intermediaries, 
y Most of the sales by the primary intermediaries
|;ake place either in the village markets or in the premises 
of the balers. Most of the sales at this stage are also 
made on the basis of lot grading. At the higher stage
1/ ^acca University Socio-Economic Survey Board(DUSESB), 
jferlcetj.ng of Jute in East Pakistan. 1 9 6 1 , p.2&.
2/ ibid.
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of marketing, the open higgling diminishes and parties
on both sides^;gtt fewer and the scale of operations 
1 /
gets larger* The Dacca University study reveals that
there are about forty thousand intermediaries at the
lowest level of marketing in direct contact with the
jute growers, while at,the highest stage there are only
2/
14 domestic mills consuming raw jute* In 1959-60 the
total raw jute export was undertaken by about 75 shippers
of which only 7 shippers exported about per cent and
5/
l6 shippers over 80 per cent* These few large exporters 
who are in a better position to get bank credits and 
information regarding supply and demand conditions than 
the jute growers and the primary intermediaries can 
press hard bargains over the small peasants and ointer­
mediaries at the primary stage*
1/ Government of Pakistan, Jute Enquiry Commission Report, 
I960, p, 1 1 3, '
2/ DUSESB, op * cit *, p,3 8 .
2/ Jute Enquiry Commission Report, p*H5*
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1-5 Role of Jute in the Economy of Pakistan
The value of jute Is relatively small in comparison
with the national income of Pakistan. But it is produced
only in East Pakistan where it is the single most important
cash crop contributing about: 50 per cent of total cash
1/
earnings of the farmers of this region* As the leading 
export of the country, raw jute earned* on average, 43 
per cent during the period 1948-54 and 46 per cent during 
1 9 5 5-8 2 , while jute manufactures earned another 11 per 
cent of total export receipts during tlie latter period 
as shown below in Table 1-2*
Table 1-2
Position of Jute in Total Exports of Pakistan, 1948-62
Annual Raw Jute Jute Goods TOTAL
Average Value
million
Rupees
Per
of
cent
total
Value
million
Rupees
Per cent 
of total
Exports
million
Rupees
19^8-49
1 9 5 0 -5 1
1952-54
440
1047
573
4l: 
46 !
^ y9
43
mm 1076
2 2 8 2
1340
1 9 5 5 -5 8
1 9 5 9 -6 2
761
805
50;
43: 46
1 1 0 ;
293 s ■i*i- 16 : 11
1534  
.  1880
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistical Bulletin. 
July, 1964,Table 1 and p*1348V"
1/ Ahmad, N# op.cit*, p •131•
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For East Pakistan raw jut© and its manufactures 
are the most important sources of foreign exchange 
earnings as can be seen in Table 1-3 • During the period 
1 9 4 3 .5 4  raw jute alone contributed about 88 per cent of 
total export earnings while during 1 9 5 5 -6 2 the jute in­
dustry not only met the domestic need of jute goods 
but, together with raw jute; exports, earned about 90 per 
cent of total foreign exchange of oEast Pakistan*
Table 1-3
Position of Jute in Total Exports of East Pakistan,1948-62
Annual Haw Jute Jute Goods Total
Average Value Per cent Value Per cent Exports 
million of total million of total million 
Rupees Rupees Rupees
85 : - - 529
91 : 88 - - 1149
85 s - - 673
8 0 : 110 12 : 955
66 : (y 293 24 : J,v 1222
Source: As Table 1-2*
Jute manufacturing capacity has been rapidly 
increasing in East Pakistan over these years* However, 
raw jute is expected to remain the single most important 
foreign exchange earner for the country for many years 
to come* Table 1-4 indicates that the Planning authority
1948-49 440
1950-51 1047
1952-54 573
1955-58 761
1 9 5 9 -6 2 805
/
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expects that while raw jute is to earn more or less the 
same amount of* foreign exchange in the Third Plan period 
(1 9 6 5-7 0 ) as it did in the first two Plan periods, the 
export earnings from jute manufactures will increase, on 
an annual average, from Rupees 137 million in the First 
Plan period to Rs. 360 million in the Third Plan period. 
Actual performance in first four years of the Second 
Five Year Plan shows that the shares of both raw jute 
and jute manufactures in the total foreign exchange 
earnings were higher than what was expected* The over­
all foreign exchange earnings were lower than what was 
planned.
Table 1-4
Share of jute in the planned foreign exchange earnings 
of Pakistan during the three Five Year Plan periods
Raw Jute Jute GoodsAnnual ______
Average Value Percent Value % of0 million i^ of total million TotalRupees R
Total Total 
Jute Foreign 
% Exchange
Earnings
1st. Plan 
(1955-60)
Actual 843 44.1 137 7.2 51.3 1911
2nd. Plan 
(1960-65) 
Projection 8 2 0 36.4 320 14.2 5 0 . 6 2 2 5 0
Actual 8 ll 39.0 312 1 5 * 2 54.2 2047
3rd. Plan 
(1965-70) 850 34.6 360 14.4 *
CO 2500
Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Second Five Year Plan; Statistical
Year Booh ,1$64; Haq, M. loc•cit•, Table 60 .
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The Pakistan govei’nment ' s tax on raw jute exports 
formed,on average, about 4*4 per cent of the total revenue 
receipts over the period 1950-61 (Table 1-5)•
Table 1-5
Share of Export tax on Raw Jute in the total Revenue 
Receipts of the Govt* of Pakistan, 1950 to 196l
Annual Average : 1950-52 4953-57 1958-61 Total
(1950-6^}
Total Revenue
6Rs. million) 1561 1782 2552 238OI
Tax on Raw Jute
Exports (Rs* m*) 96 76 989
Percent of total 6 4 3 4*4
Source : Govt, of Pakistan, Pakistan Statistical Year 
Bookj 1962, table 107; Ministry of Finance, Major 
Commodities of Pakistan - A Review, Karachi, i960, p .19
Over and above this, the government of Pakistan 
earns various fees in the form of trade licences, excise 
duties, sales tax, etc* It is understood that the govern­
ment of Pakistan earns a considerble amount of revenues
1/
from these sources*
1/ Govt* of Pakistan, Jtepjort of the Jute Enquiry 
Commission, i960, pp*169-70*
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1-6_ Pakistan in the World Economy of Jute
Since 1947-48 Pakistan in the world jute economy 
has been showing very diverse trends « Thus, in 19 47-48 
Pakistan produced about 8l per cent of the world raw 
jute, but herself did not consume any as she had then 
no jute manufacturing capacity« But gradually as she 
has been gaining manufacturing facilities her share in 
the world raw jute production has also been declining 
as other countries, especially India and mainland China 
stepped up their own production of raw jute and allied 
fibres® The percentage share of Pakistan in world 
production and consumption of raw jute and allied fibres 
over the period 1947-48 to 1959-60 is shown in
^able 1-6 ,
Thus, to start with, India and the rest of the
world were heavily dependent on Pakistan’s supply of
raw jute at the time of Partition® But gradually as
India and other countries became important raw jute
( including allied fibres ) producers themselves, the
share of Pakistan fell to 43 percent in i960* Pakistan,
however, still produces more than half of the world’s
true raw jute and the world is dependent largely on
1/Pakistan for quality jute.—
1 / FAO (Rome), Postwar Trends in the Production^of _Jute 
Kenaf and Allied Fibres, (mimeo,] , luTy, 19d4. *
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Table 1-6
Percentage Share of Pakistan in the World Production and 
Consumption of* Raw Jute and Allied Fibres as compared 
with India and Rest of the World, 19.47- 60
Annual
Average
Production 
Pakistan India Rest
  Consumption
Pakistan India Rest
1947-48 
1952-57 
1959-60
81.0
49.5
43.0
19.0
37.2
34.5
13.3
22.5
7.0 
10. A
82.6 17.4
56.4 46.6
41.6 48.0
Source : Indian Jute Mills Association,; Govt, of East 
Pakistan, Monthly Summary of Jute Statistics; PAO (Rome), 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural^ EconoiMcs and Statistics, 
October, i959i p.24.
In ,1947-48, as shown in the above lable, most 
of the raw jute consumption (about 83%) took place in 
India, Pakistan's mill consumption being nil. But by
1959-60, the raw jute consumption in Pakistan and other 
countries outside India rose toft© and 48 per cent res­
pectively and that of India fell to about 4-2 per cent 
of the world total (liable 1-6 ).
Of her total raw jute production, Pakistan 
consumed in 1961-62 about 23 per cent and for the rest 
she had to seek,export markets (liable 1-7). From this 
’Table it can also be seen-that Pakistan's exports to 
India fell from 88 per cent in 1947-48 to 10 per cent
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in 1 9 6 1-6 2 ; and those to other countries rose from about 
12 per cent in 1947-4-8 to about 90 per cent in 1 9 6 1 -6 2  
partly because of Pakistan's trade diversification 
policy and partly because of India's own policy of 
self-sufficiency in raw jute production*
Table 1-7
Pakistanis Production, Consumption and Export of Raw Jute
Annual A Production Consun^t_ign_ Exports to
Average Quantity Percent .....  *  .....
of total India Rest of 
Production the World
( Million Bales ) (Percentage •••*)
1947-48 6.84 mm 8 7 . 6 12.4
1948-52 5.29 mm m • 4 5 . 4 54.6
1952-55 5.03 - - 2 6 . 3 63.7
1955-59 5.70 0.93 1 6 .3 14.5 85.5
1959-62 6 . 0 5 1 .5 1 2 5 .5 11.7 8 8 . 3
Source: Government of East R&istan, Monthly Summary of 
Jute Statistics, December, 1 9 6 2, part ii* ""
In Table 1-8 , it is shown that P<$£Lstan's exports 
to the European Common Market, the U.K. and Japan 
increased substantially over the period 1948-63*
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Table 1-8
Trends of Pakistan’s Raw Jute Exports to Main Importing 
_____Countries (in thousand tons).
Annual
Average
India U.K. U.S.A. Japan Common
Market
Total
Exports
1948-51 438 88 6l 313 211 933
1952-54 243 139 68 28 314 925
1 9 5 5 -5 8 124 138 63 32 3 0 6 835
1959-62 96 125 4i 42 2 3 0 72 IT
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Industrial 
Fibres, London*
In the export market of raw jute, Pakistan is still 
a monopolist* Over the period 1 9 4 7-6 3 , Pakistan,on an 
average, covered about 90 per cent of the world export of 
raw jute (Table 1-9)* Although India and other countries 
produced about 60 per cent of the world total in 1 9 6 1 -6 2  
they needed almost all their raw jute for domestic use* 
Pakistan started jute manufacturing in the early 
1 9 5 0 *s and by 1963 attained significant capacity for 
processing raw jute (Table 1-1 0)* During the period 1954- 
63 world jute manufacturing increased from 1628 thousand 
metric tons to 2975 thousand metric tons (Tb&i*e 1-1 0 )* 
However there has been some geographical shift in manu­
facturing from the traditional areas (India and Hestern 
Europe) to some developing countries like Pakistan and 
Centrally Planned Countries* Pakistan produced about 
11 per cent of the world total in 1963 (Table 1-1 0 )*
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Table 1-9
Ex£orts of Raw Jute from MaIn Producin£ Countries ? 1947-63 
Countries 1947-50 1951-54 1955-59 l#6o~63
. _____ (Yearly ayerage in thousand metric tons )
Pakistan : 900 983 851 721
(total)
Percentage 
of total (83) (99) (96) (85)
India 183 12
China 
(mainland)
e
- 14 4
Nepal 7 5 4 3
Thailand-™1 - - 10 116
World total IQ89 988 885 853
Source : Commonwealth Economic Committee, Industrial F:
1/ Mostly Kenaf and wastes®
Tabl e 1-10
Pistribution of World Production of Jute Manufactures^
Countries 1954 1963 1954 1963
( thousand metx-ic tons) ( Percentages
Pakistan 49 317 3 11
India 901 1259 55 42
Western Europe 517 497 32 17
Centrally Planned 
Countries 100 500 6 17
Others 61 403 4 13
Total, 1628 2975 100 100
Source : As table 1-9
,—
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1-7 Postwar Trends in End-uses of Raw Jute
The principal end-uses of raw jute are in the 
production of packaging bags, floor coverings* roofing 
felts* soft furnishings, strings* etc* Among these* 
packaging hags account for about three fourths of the 
total, the next most important use being in floor
1/
coverings in the developed countries* During the
postwar period* bulk handling methods* paper bags and
the packaging o® goods for retail sale reduced jute
requirements in the distributive trades in the developed
countries, but growth of new outlets in floor coverings*
soft furnishing* etc* took place in the Netherlands*
2/
Belgium* the UVIC# * and the U#S*A* Outside the main
industrial areas of the world* the demand for jute is
3/
still largely confined to packaging uses*
In Table 1 - 1 1 the regional trends in jute 
consumption are shown* Developed countries as a whole
1/ F*A.O*, Jute; A Survey of Markets *aManufacturing
and Product ion, Commodity Bulletin No. 2d > p* 2*
2/ F .A.O., Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics 
and StatisticsY December« i96 0 * n * 5 *
2/ F .A ,0 * f Jute* op*cit*, p *4*
T able 1-11 .
,.__,Tr^n4i?A 11. Coxxsumplidn of Jute Goods
Area's • . 1937 ’ '1953-55 ' 1959-61
( million metric tons
Developed Coraitries :
United States 0.46 0.30 . 0*38i
U.K.,France, West Germany O .36 0.32 . ’ 0*30
Other Western Europe ’0.19 .0.20 , 0.27
Canada, Australia, N.Z.,
and South Africa 0.19 0.19 0.26
Japan 0>. 03 0.02
Total 4 1,23 1*03 1.25
Centrally Planned Countries :
Eastern Europe^ U.S.S.R.y 0*07 0.11 0.l4
and Mainland China ,0.01 0 . 26 0 .40
Total 0.08 0.37 0*34
Developing Cotmtries :
India : O.lB. 0.18 0.30
Pakistan 0.0? . 0.10' 0.10*
Other Far East ■ 0.17 . 0*14 b. 20
Latin America, Middle
East and Africa . 0 * 34 A ^ 0. 4l
' Total ' 0 .76 /0.81 101
High Income Countries 1/ 1*30 1.14, 1.39
Low Income Countries 2/ 0*77 1.07 f . 1.4-1
World Total 2.07 2,21 ■ 2«8o
*  a# au4 Pvt**} M
Source : FAO (Rome) , Jute Goods Aval3.able for Home Use, 
Doc. CCP/Jute Ad Hoc S2/T/Add.iT
1/ includes Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.
2/ Developing countries and Mainland China.
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increased their consumption of* jute goods by about 25 
per cent between 1 9 5 3 -5 5 and 1 9 5 9-6 1 , but a comparison 
with the pre-war figure suggests that total jute 
consumption in these countries was only fractionally 
higher in 1 9 5 9 -6 1 than in 1937, and that demand in the 
highly industrialised co^^ntries, e#g* , the U.S.A., the 
U.K., West Germany and France failed to attain the pre­
war level* Although manufacturing output in 1957-56 was 
more than double that of the pre-war level and agricul­
tural production, part of which is packed in jute bags,
1/
was up by one third, jute consumption in the developed 
countries remained more or less the same (Table l-ll)* 
Most of the expansion in jute consumption after the 
World War II took place only in the low income 
countries as can be seen in Table 1-11*
1/ F .A .0., Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics 
and Statistics* December, I960, p • 1 •
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1 - 8  The Magnitude, Causes and Effects of Fluctuations
in Prices of Pakistan Jute
Introduction
In the following sections we attempt to measure 
the extent of fluctuations in raw jute prices, determine 
the causes of such fluctuations and their various 
effects# We have considered only the percentage changes 
within the period of a year and year to year. As explained 
in the Preface,within-year fluctuations are obtained 
by expressing the range between the highest and the lowest 
prices in the period of a year as a percentage of the 
higher figure. Similarly, the year to year difference 
has been expressed as a percentage of the higher figure 
in order to arrive at the annual fluctuations. We have 
thus, confined the analysis to short-run fluctuations 
only#
1-9 Fluctuations in Jute Growers1 Prices
During the period 19^7-62 the jute growers of 
East Pakistan experienced large annual fluctuations in 
the volume of jute production (+l8%), unit prices (*2 8%), 
and the estimated cash income from this commodity (+3 2%) 
as can be seen in Table 1-12 and Charts 1 - 2 and 1-3 .
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Thus, fluctuations in the volume of jute output and 
prices appear to have destabilising effects on the 
growers1 cash income*
Table 1-12
Fluctuations in Jute Production* Prices and Cash Income 
fromJute inEast Pakistan (1947-&2)
Annual Production Average
Average million Annual Price
bales Per can't ■ w  jRs •
Change per
maxtnd
Average 
Rice Price
Annual
percent
change
Cash Income 
from Jute
Rs • | 
per ] al 
maund
Amri* miXliofflAnnual
Rs • r
cent 
chang
%
change
1947-50 5 . 4 27 27 ± 24 25 i 17 691 t 33
1951-53 5 . 4 +M 23 23 i 29 2 2 t 23 457 t 33
1 9 5 6 -5 9 5 . 7 t :.4 30 t 13 31 ± 9 388 + 19
1 9 6 0 -6 2 5 . 9 + 15 48 +S' t 'its* 21 28 + 5 894 ± 44
Average O
Percentage + lS + 28 IS +
change
X
Source: Government of East Pakistan, Monthly Summary of 
Jute Statistics, various issues*
In Table 1-13 fluctuations, both within a year (36^ 6) 
and year to year (25%)i for a particular kind of raw jute 
(white jat bottom) at Narayanganj (the most important jute 
market in East Pakistan) were found to be very wide during
r k-0
d'7
Srs-wT*^  * A* tt'ddk I "* 1 -
c U - ‘J J  ~ 1
\ f W.'.. Cc O.
,V'
v J E &  .,
p . . .- ’ I }
J
I
i
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the period 1947-62. The wider intra-year price fluctu­
ations might be due to seasonal influences such as 
arrivals of Jute at the baling centres, etc.
Table 1-13
Jute Price Fluctuations at Narayanganj (1948-62)
Annual Iff thin-Year 
Average Percentage
Fluctuations
Year to Year
Percentage
Fluctuations
1948-92
1953-57
1958-62
39
30
35
±
t 18 
+ 26
Average for 
1948-62 36 + 23
Source: F.A.O. (Rome) , Study Group on Jute. Kenaf and
Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, Pakistan 
Basic Facts. Rawalpindi, 1 9 6 3* p.31#
Table 1-14 and Chart 1-4 demonstrate that the 
changes in the annual jute acreages were mainly response, 
sible for wide fluctuations in total jute output. 
Fluctuations in yield per acre had a relatively small 
effect on changes in the output of jute during the 
period 1951-62.
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Table l-l4
Fluctuations in Jute Acreage and Production (1951-62)
Annual Average Percentage Change in
Acreage Yield
per acre
Total
Production
1951-56 + 28 + 7 + 19
1 9 5 7 -6 2 £ ± 9 + 11
Average for
1 9 5 1 -6 2 ± 2 1  + 8 i 15
Source: Government of* East Pakistan, Monthly Summary 
of* Jute Statistics, -(various issues)*
1—10 Causes of* Jute Fluctuations in East Pakistan
Fluctuations in growers’ cash income from jute 
are the product of two variables - volume of output 
and the unit price* Such fluctuations in cash income 
become severe especially when the two variables move 
in the same direction* The changes in the volume of jute 
production, as shown in Tables 1-14 and 1-15 and Chart 
1-4, i k  are mainly due to the changes in the acreage 
made by the growers as a response to the relative 
prices of jute and rice prevailing in the preceding 
season*
Tja . ‘ Ai3t Wt umiUm
Chart 1-4 49
Fluctuations in Area, Yield per Acre and Total 
Output of Jute
Log scale
I.to dLu-Cvt irv 
1?>a
c i •
Thai; fluctuations iii acreages mainly influenced 
the annual fluctuations in total jute output and that chaiiges 
in yield per acre had little influence on total output ,
fluctuations are also Statistically supported as evident
' *'"■ ' 1 1/ ' ? •from the following two regression equations*—
■ \ ■ • Table 1-15 •”
Statistical -Analysis"-of Effects of Changes in Acreages 
and Yield Hates on Changes, in Jute Production
Log Y ’= 0.504 + 0.749 log X, . - , • -
j. • » * v- • « • * v a  /
: (0 *1 7 1 ) r
R^ ' =0.64- Degrees of freedom = 1 1
Log Y = - 0,48l + 0.106 log X ' „ . . * (-1-4)
(0 «0 6 6 ) 2
R^ = 0*09 Degrees of freedom = 11
where, Y is annual percentage change in total jute output 
and X^ and X^ are annual percentage changes in total 
acreages and yield per acre respectively.
The B coefficient of equation (1-3) is 
statisticallyvfar more significant than that of equation 
,(1-4). The coefficient of correlation in the former equation 
is highly significant while that in the latter is not*
1/ Data of table l-l4 were transformed into logarithms 
and,then year to year percentage changes of log values 
were calculated* Since the regression equations are in 
logarithm, the B coefficients measwire the percentage res-
j?- '
ponse of total jute output to a given change in jute 
acreage or yield per acre > .
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The above statistical analysis supports the point
mdde earlier that whenever the jxite growers of East
Pakistan want to make any change in jute output they
can do it only by altering the acreage under jute# The
growers are unable to bring about a planned increase in
yield per acre as the factors of production on which
they depend are traditionally known through long experience
1/
and generally are fully utilised* Hence, changes in yield 
per acre are more or less random#
1-11 Fluctuations in Raw Jute Consumers* Prices
Wide price fluctuations were experienced by raw jute
consumers as well* In Table l-l6 we have measured the
2/
jute price fluctuations in the U.K. market for the period 
1 9 3 8-6 3 $ and in Chart 1-3 the average annual prices for 
an important variety of raw jute (Export Firsts) are plotted#
l/ It does not however, mean that output per acre cannot 
fee increased in East Pakistan# This certainly can be 
done with the help of improved seeds, fertilizer and 
improvements in the methods of cultivation# Such factors 
however, must be introduced from outside. So far as the 
growers are concerned, they do their best within the 
limit of their knowledge to raise as much output as 
possible from their land#
2/ The U.K. market is chosen because this is the singly 
most important raw jute market in the world*
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The average intra-year fluctuations for the above period 
were 28 per cent, while the average year to year f luctua* 
tions for the same period were + l8 per cent*
Table i-l6
Jute Price Fluctuations in the U«K*(£ per ton,Export Firsts)
Annual Average Percentage Fluctuations
Intra-Year Year to Year
1 9 3 8-4:6 33 + 13
19^7-51 23 + 2Q
1952-39 23 + 15
1 9 6 0 -6 3 32 + 24
Average for
1 9 3 8 -6 3 28 -I- 18
Source:: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Industrial
Fibres* London*
As can be seen in Chart 1-31 raw jute prices 
in the U*I£. attained staggering heights on two occasions • 
once in 1951 and again in 1 9 6 1* Immediately after World 
War II, raw jute prices were rising and reached the peak 
during the Korean conflict* After the Korean boom the 
price abruptly went down because of large supply as a 
response of high prices. From 1953 to 1959 a steady price 
for raw jute prevailed, but in 1959 it began to rise and 
in 1961 it was almost double the average price ruling 
during the period 1 9 5 3-5 9 .
53Chart 1-5
i b
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1-12 Extent of Jute Export Fluctuations
Over the period 1948-62 Pakistan experienced
wide fluctuations in export earnings from raw jute as
shown in Tahle 1-17. Calculated on a year to year basis,
average fluctuations in the raw jute export proceeds for
Pakistan were + 20.4 per cent during the above period.
The United Nations, making a study for a longer period
(1 9 0 1-5 0 ), found the average annual fluctuations in the
export proceeds from raw jute (India and Pakistan) at
4- 22 per cent and for some majojr agricultural commodities
entering into the exports of the underdeveloped countries
1/
at + 2 2 . 6  per cent.
Table 1-17
Jute Export Fluctuations: Pakistan (1948- 6 2 )
Annual Export Proceeds Unit Prices Export Volume
Average Value 
(Rs* m.
Percent 
) Change
Rs• per 
metric 
ton
Percent Volume 
Change (000
mttric
ton)
P§r8-ent
Change
19^8-51 6 78 4* 42 1016 + 18 
mm
685 4- 38
mm
1952-55 628 ± 22 683 + 19 924 + *3
1956-59 732 924 4- 12 838 4* 12
1960-62 947 ± 8 1209 + 12 801 ± 8
Average
1948-62
for - 20.4 + 15 •2 Hh 1 6 * 6
Source: U.N., Year Book of International Trade. 
1/ U.K., Instability etc. loc. cit.
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Similarly, year to year average fluctuations in
the export price and quantity of raw jute from Pakistan
for the period 1948-62 were + 15•2 and + l6 . 6  per cent
respectively (Table 1-17)* The same study of the United
Nations found the average year to year fluctuations in
the export price and quantity of raw jute for 1 9 0 1 -5 0
1/
at + l6 and + 17 per cent respectively. The summary 
of the above statistical findings is given in the 
following Table.
Table 1 -1 8
Export Fluctuations in Pakistan Raw Jute as Compared
with the U.N. Findings
Authors Period Export
of S tudy Proceeds Price Quantity
U.N,(Average 1901-50 a/ b/
for 18 Major (Under- +22.6“ +13.7“ + 1 8 *7
Agrl. Comm. developed “ - -
Countries) a/
U»N. (Raw 1901-50 + 22.0“ + 1 6 .O + 1 7 .O
Jute) ,Pakxstan) a/
Our Study 1 9 4 8 -6 2 + 20.4 + 15.2 + 1 6 .6
(Raw Jute) (PaXcistan)
1/ U.N., Instability in the Export Markets of the
Underdeveloped Countries. N.Y., 1952, Tables 1-3
a/ In money t ernis •
b/ Average for 25 Commodities.
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1-15 Causes of Export Fluctuations in Pakistan Jute
As mentioned earlier, Pakistan dominates the export
market of* raw jute; her share being, on average, about
1/
90 per cent of the world total during 1947-63 (Table 1-9) •
Thus, as a monopolist of this raw material in the export
sloping
market, Pakistan is faced with a downward/demand function 
for this commodity#
It was mentioned earlier that the most important 
use of raw jute is still in the: production of packaging 
bags* As the packaging charge is a very small proportion 
of the total price of the packageable commodities, the 
influence of the price of jute bags should be negligible# 
But as there have arisen suitable alternative means of 
packaging (cotton and paper bags, for example) and 
handling commodities in bulk, the demand for jute is 
now influenced by its price in relation to the prices 
of substitutes *Thus, the existence of various substitutes 
for Pakistan jute - ranging from Mesta or ICenaf and other 
fibres to paper and cotton - increases the price elasti­
city of demand for raw jute over what might be expected 
for it in the absence of any substitute#
1/ Although Pakistan is still a monopolist in the export 
market, her share in the world production of raw jute 
was about 43 per cent during 1 9 5 9 -6 0 (Table 1-6 ).
The competition is* however, more direct in the 
case of jute manufactures than for raw jute. If for 
example* the prices of substitutes fall, other things 
remaining the same* the demand for jute bags will fall 
with a consequent fall in the demand for raw jute*
It is therefore of great importance for Pakistan 
to know the various elasticities of demand for raw jute 
in order to formulate any export policy for this commo­
dity* The best thing is to calculate the weighted average 
elasticity of demand for all the countries * but such an 
approach cannot be followed due to the lack of adequate 
data for all the countries importing raw jute* The U.IC. fs 
elasticity of import demand for raw jute is * therefore * 
assumed to be typical to that of the developed countries 
as the U.K. is the single most important market for 
raw jute in the world* The U.K.’s elasticity of demand 
may not be representative fox* the underdeveloped 
countries where the trends of jute consumption are 
different from those in the developed countries* For 
Pakistan raw jute, however* the developed countries1 
demand conditions are relevant as most of her raw jute 
exports are still concentrated in these countries (Table 
1-8).
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By calculating the multiple regression equation
(l~5)» it is found that the U.K.’s import demand function
for raw jute over the period 1948-63 was sensitive to
its price. The price elasticity coefficient, i.e., the
coefficient of log P is found to be significant at the
1/
5 per cent error probability level.”" The fit of the 
equation is shown below:
Log J = 2.0671 - 0.5891 log P + 0.3217 log P2
(0.294l) (0.43211
+ 0.4317 log Y + 0.0132 t (1-5 )
(0.2819) (0.0071)
2
R a 0.554:3 Degrees of freedom a 1 1 *
where, J is the total import quantity of raw jute (Export 
Firsts) in the U.IC., is the k C.I.F. price o f  Export 
Firsts*, Pg is the weighted index of prices of substitutes, 
Y is the index of production of jute using commodities 
and t is a time trend (1948a?., 1949=2 . . . .  1 9 6 3=1 6).
The data are summarised in Table 1-19*
1/ Dr* Rabbani, AK., in a statistical study ( Jute in 
the World Economy, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1964) found a slightly higher 
elasticity by taking the price of jute and that of 
substitute in the form of a ratio.
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The numerical equation is given above without an 
error term because the single best numerical value that 
can be assigned to this term, in the absence of special 
knowledge, is its average, zero# The regression coeffi­
cients are also in a sense average values# The equation 
(1-5 ), therefore, gives an average estimate.
Table 1-19
U#IC#fs Import Demand for Raw Jute, 1948-63
Annual Import Jute Price
Average Quantity (GIF, £ per 
(000 long ton, Export 
tons) Firsts)
Index of
Jute
using
Commodities
(1954=100)
Index of 
Substitute 
Prices 
(1954=100)
1948-51 124 129 109 137
1952-54 140 105 116 123
1 9 5 5 -5 8 l4l 115 121 129
1959-63 130 131 129 127
Source: U.K., Board of Trade Journal; C «S #0•, Annual
Abstract of Statistics; Commonwealth Economic
Committee, Industrial Fibres; and F •A •0«, Monthly
Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics
Notes: The index of jute using commodities is prepared 
by using the weights as Agricultural commodities 
90%, Mining 6%, Furniture and Upholstry 8%, Insulated 
Cables 6%, Linoleum 10% and WoVen Carpets 20%#
The price of substitutes is represented 
by the weighted index of prices of Kraft paper 35%, 
Cotton 25% and Sisal 40%.
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A statistical analysis indicates that fluctuations 
in the total export proceeds of raw jute are more closely 
related to fluctuations in the quantity exported from 
Pakistan than to fluctuations in unit prices as shown by 
the regression equations (1-6 ) and (1-7 )*
Total Px^oceeds and Unit Price
Log V s 1.00 + 0 *8 l log P (1-6 )
(0.45)
R2 = 0.26
Total Proceeds and Total Quantity
Log V = 0.15 + 0.91 log Q (1-7)
(0.25)
R2 =: 0.6l
where, Y is total proceeds, P is the unit price
i/
and Q is the total quantity exported.
The coefficient of determination between total 
proceeds and the total export quantity is highly significant 
while that between total proceeds and unit price is not
1/ Data of Appendix 1-D were transformed into logarithms 
and then deviations from a five year moving average of 
log values were calculated as indicators of trend 
corrected short term fluctuations*
6i
significant at the 5 P©** cent error probability level.
The regression coefficient of equation (1-7) is more 
significant than that of equation (1-6 ), which indicates 
that the percentage response of total proceeds is 
significantly accounted for by a given change in quantity 
exported as compared to that of price.
Fluctuations in current jute output and hence 
in export are the consequences of producers decisions 
based on prices of jute, given the price of rice, pre­
vailing in the preceding season. But the prices of jute 
are? the results of shifts in both demand and supply.
Shifts in supply were found to be caused by, besides 
the relative prices of jute and rice in the preceding 
season, some random factors in the current season. Thus, 
the causes of jute export fluctuations are rather complex* 
There appears to be a cobweb cycle in the production 
and the relative prices of jute. The cobweb cycle results 
from the fact that while the demand for raw jute depends 
on its current price, the supply depends on the preceding 
year * s relative prices of jute and rice. Thus in 1953, 
to give an example, the jute acreage (and output) dropped 
considerably following a severe fall in the jute/rice 
price ratio in 1952 (Chart l-l). In the year 1961 the 
jute acreage (and output) shot up following a considerable
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rise in the jute/rice price ratio in I960 (Chart 1-1).
The supply of jute may, however, fluctuate because of 
fluctuations in the price of rice alone prevailing in 
the preceding season. The fluctuations in the supply of 
jute, in its turn, affect the price of jute even if the 
demand is stable# Similar effects on the price of raw 
jute, of course, can originate from fluctuations in demand.
It, however, appears that fluctuations in supply 
were more responsible than those in demand for fluctua­
tions in the export price of, and proceeds from Pakistan 
jute over the period (19^8-62)# It seems plausible that 
year to year fluctuations in the supply of raw jute are 
greater than in the industrial demand for it for paclcaging 
and other purposes. It was found by an F.A.O. study that 
during the inter-war period the magnitude of fluctuations 
was significantly greater in jute production than in 
industrial demand for it. The study showed that for every
1000 tons by which production varied, the industrial
1 /
demand varied by only kOO tons.
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l-l4 Effects of Jute Fluctuations on Pakistanfs 
Import7 Income, etc*
In Tables 1-20 and 1-21 on the following page, 
we have calculated the annual fluctuations in exports 
and imports and national and regional income for Pakistan 
and East Pakistan respectively for the period 1 9 4 8-6 2 • 
Although Pakistan’s exports and imports fluctuated, 011 
average, by + 18% and +2 0% respectively, the nation’s 
income fluctuated by only +3% (Table 1-20)* Similarly, 
in Table 1-21 it is found that year to year fluctuations 
in East Pakistan's exports and imports averaged about 
+17% and +25% respectively, but the regional income (for 
1949-30 to 1939-60) fluctuated by about +4% only* These 
are sketched on semi-log paper (Chart 1-6 ) and on a natural 
one (Chart1-7), but no significant relationship was 
noticed between export-import fluctuations and income, 
either for the nation or for East Pakistan* That national 
and regional income should remain unaffected by their 
export and import fluctuations is obvious from the fact 
that foreign trade forms only a small part of their 
respective income* We can, therefore, conclude that jute 
export being a part of the total export, also does not 
affect the national or regional income to any significant 
extent#
Table_lr2q
Animal Percentage Change in Total Exports, Imports and 
National Income of Pakistan ( 1948-62)
Annua1 A verage
194:8-53 
1 9 5 58
1959-62
 Percentag e _Change in ____
Exports Imports National Income
t 27 
i 13
+ 15
Average % Change + 18
+ 23
± 19 
- ! -  20
+ 21
+ T
4- 2
+ 4 
+ «
Source : Govt e of Pakistan, Statistical Bulletin, July, 1964;
Table 1-21
Annual Percentage Change in East Pakistan's Exports, Imports 
and Income
Annual Average Percentage Change in
Exports Imports Income
1948-93 + 26 ± 30
a/
+ 3
1954-59 + 15 + 23 + 5
1960-62
1948-62
+ 7 + 21 
+ 25 ±"4 V
Source : Govt* of Pakistan, Foreign Trade Statistics of
Pakistanvol. I, 1961; S ta. ti st ical Bulletin, July, 1964;
Haq, M. ojo* cit*; Appendix B, tcible B- 1.
a/ Average for 194-9-53 • 
b/ Average for 1949-59*
( .A '- c t
‘— \ ■") i * i
{.. c*vO- ’ - (v_ y.{*tl v~

6?
Fluctuations in imports, however, appear to be 
significantly associated with those in the previous year1s 
exports* As can be seen in Charts 1 -6 and 1-7, the national 
and regional imports fluctuated in sympathy with the 
fluctuations in national and regional exports with a one 
year lag. That fluctuations in raw jute exports should 
account for most of the fluctuations in total exports 
of Pakistan is evident from the fact that raw jute is 
a significant portion of total exports of the nation and 
the region.
In Pakistan, the average foreign exchange component
of total gross investment, as mentioned earlier, is very
high and hence fluctuations in exports may significantly
affect investment in Pakistan via fluctuations in imports*
Besides, Pakistan has to maintain a large amount in
foreign exchange in order to cope with fluctuations in
1/
export earnings* However, foreign aid and loans financed 
a great deal of the domestic imports, both for the purpose 
of development and consumption, which might have segre­
gated to some extent the full effect of export fluctua-
2/
tions on the country®s development expenditure*
1/ State Bank of Pakistan, Report on Currency and Finance. 
December, 1962, Table 7^ indicates that, on average, 
Pakistan maintained about Rs. 1053 million per annum 
in gold and foreign exchange during 1 9^8 - 6 2  which was 
about 70 per cent of the average annual export earnings 
of the country*
2/ Haq, M. op * cit * p.2^0.
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1-15 Effects of Fluctuations on Long-run Demand for Jute
Xt was noted earlier that consumers as well as
producers of raw jute experienced wide fluctuations both
seasonal and year to year, in prices of raw jute. Fluctuc\-
tions in supply, and prices of raw jute naturally affect
the commodities produced out of this raw material since
the raw material component of the total cost of jute
1/
manufactures is over 50 per cent. Rapidly changing raw
jute prices place a high premium on skill in buying on
2/
the part of the manufacturers of jute goods. It is 
natural that a stable price would be an important aid 
to the jute industry.
Other main factors likely to affect the demand 
for raw jute are the trends of the production of jute - 
using commodities in the consuming countries nd and 
possibilities of substitution for jute. If the prices 
of substitutes fluctuate less than those of jute, the 
users of these commodities would tend to prefer them 
to jute, ceteris paribus*
&xi
1/ F •A ,0•, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics 
and Statistics. ± March,1$ 62, p.4.
2/ MacBean, loc♦ cit« p.|i 2 5 8 .
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As a packaging materi&l, jute first faced, 
competition from cotton bags, bui since the last World 
War paper bags swamped both jute and cotton# Although 
their respective prices might be expected to determine 
their ultimate demand, paper bags are especially suitable 
for retail marketing as these can be attractively tailored 
to suitable sizes and can carry printed advertising on 
the container itself# Furthermore, the prices of paper 
bags appear to be more stable than those of jute as 
indicated by Table 1-22 and Chart 1-8# During the period 
19^8-6l both jute and paper prices in the U#S.A# rose 
compared to the level of 1939-4:0, but the rise in the 
price of jute was far more pronounced than that of 
paper (Table 1-22)* It is plausible that, among other 
factors, the favourable change in the relative price 
of paper induced an increase in the use of paper sacks#
But the. market that paper bags gained from jute in the 
U.S.A. was not reversed although since 1932 jute prices 
became relatively stable# An investment in the paper 
industry might have committed the manufacturers to the 
new techniques and thus, could not be scrapped even if 
jute prices subsequently fell#
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Between 1947 and 1951 the prices of raw jute and
hessian were 4 - 5  times the pre-war level9 whereas the
world indices of agricultural and manufactured goods
1/
prices were only 2-3 times higher* The price of jute
rose especially because export supplies dropped with
the: disruption of trade between India and Pakistan
following sterling devaluation in 1949 and again because
to
of the Korean war* According/an F*A*0. study, during
the period of relatively high hessian cost (1948-31) the
turning over to paper involved technical adjustment and
possibly capital expenditure which militated against
reversal; certain sectors of the market were lost more
2/
or less permanently*
Dr* Chacko found an asymmetry of the
elasticity of demand for increases and decreases in jute 
1 /
prices* In other words, the response to higher prices 
is greater than the response to lower prices, i*e«, the: 
market cuts down the import of jute more readily when 
prices rise than it increases the purchase when prices 
fall from the mean level*
1/ F •A*0*, Monthly Bulletin etc*, December, i9 6 0*
2/ F * A * 0 • , Jut o $ p * 14 *
2/ Chacko, G.K* International Trade Aspects of Indian
Burlap; An Econometric Study, N.Y.1 9 6 1, p.1 0 9.
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Table 1-22
Consumption and Prices of Packaging Bags in the U.S.A.
Annual Consumption(OOOBales) New Bag Prices
Average Cotton Jute Paper Total Cotton
per
Jute
0 0 0
Papwr 
flour bags
1939-40 525 431 386 1341 87 104 67
1948-51 366 365 1291 2027 269 2 76 108
1952-54 2 7 0 4oi 1521 2 183 233 190 118
1955-57 190 4i6 1791 2397 240 l68 122
1958-61 165 398 1752 2 3 1 6 244 180 129
Source: Textile Bag Manufacturers Association, Boston*
Note: Material consumption in *000* bales of cotton
equivalent as reported in Container and Packaging.
The relatively large increase in the proportionate 
use of paper bags in the total packaging materials was 
mainly due to technological factors and developments in 
the- system of retail marketing in the industrialised 
countries* Decisions to invest in the paper sacks industry 
or in bulkhandling methods must have been based on long- 
run considerations* High jute prices or short-run fluctua­
tions might have been the final incentives required to 
induce the manufacturers to invest in the equipment necessary 
to handle either bulk deliveries or paper packaging.
By taking data (summarised in Table 1-22) for the 
U.S.A. over the period 1948-61 a regression of the propor­
tion of jute in total consumption of packaging materials (J)
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is made on the relative prices of jute and paper (P^ , 
the relative prices of jute and cotton (^2  ^ and a time 
trend (t). The resulting equation is as follows:
Log J = 0,594: - 0.364: log P. + 0.218 log P9 - 0.012 t. (1 -8
(0.304) 1 (0.447) (0.003)
s 0 . 5 5  Degrees of freedom - 10
I11 the above equation (1-8 ), a negative sign for
the coefficient of (t), which is statistically significant,
indicates a trend away from m jute. The coefficient of
Pg has a sign contrary to the expectation on an 1 a priori'
reasoning, but this is however statistically not different
from zero* The coefficient of P. is also not significant
1/
when its standard error is considered.
By expressing the equation (1-8 ) in its first 
2/
differences, the regression coefficient of improves 
to some extent as shown in equation (1-9 ).
1/ Dr. Maizels, A., however, obtained a higher and more 
significant coefficient (0 *7 2 6 ) for P^ (the relative 
price of jute and paper) in a similar demand equation 
for the U.S.A. over the period 1948-58. See F.A.O., 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statis­
tics . January, 1 9 6 1, P.15.
2/ The regression of first differences of the log variables 
is in fact a regression of the log of year to year 
percentage changes of the variables.
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Alog J =* 1.513 - 0.54lAlog P. + 0.132 A  log P (1-9)
(0.273) (0.371)
2R =- 0.1^8 Degrees of* freedom =- 10
Thus, when the variables are expressed in their 
first differences the regression coefficient of A log 
indicates that in the case of U« S•A« the annual fluctua­
tions in the price of jute bags (relative to that of 
paper) influence the relative use of jute bags* This 
implies that stability in jute pricesj^may^favour the 
demand for jutejto f^evct
Although the possibilities of handling commodities 
in bulk pose a constant threat to jute packaging, there 
are some commodities like raw cotton and wool which are 
likely to remain outside the scope of bullchandling 
because it is economical to compress these fibres into 
standard bales in order to save shipping space* Again, 
bulkhandling methods require lai-ge capital outlays and 
steady flows of large volume of commodities between 
fixed places* Hence, in underdeveloped countries it may 
not be economic to introduce this method in immediate 
future•
PrC<LJUi CerHS<*n^JkffH v f ^ v«J£
Cbr^ L $ d U lJ k J tid  tkjL (j-S.A •
O
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I-l6 Summary and Conclusions
Pakistan is a developing economy with agriculture 
as her main source of income and employment* Her exports 
mostly consist of a limited range of agricultural products 
such as jute and cotton* Jute manufacturing has recently 
become important as an export commodity*
Jute is produced on a small scale by individual 
peasants in East Pakistan which is climatically the most 
suitable place in the world for the production of quality 
jute* Jute competes with rice fox* the growers1 limited 
land and other resources which are transferable year to 
year between these two products* For the purpose of produc­
tion regulation through the price mechanism9 the most 
important relationship established is that the lagged 
reaction of the jute cultivators to a change in the 
relative prices of jute and rice is positive and when 
measured as a response of acreage or output of jute to 
the relative prices of the preceding season gives a high 
elasticity*
There are several stages in the jute marketing 
system* At the primary stages it is done on a small 
senile by the growers and small intermediaries* At the 
higliest stage, the marketing is on a large scale and 
concentrated into a few firms. Lack of credit and storage
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facilities put tlie growers and the primary intermediaries 
at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the few shippers 
and exporters in bargaining the price of jute*
Over the period 194=7-62 jute has been very important 
in the Pakistan economy as the main foreign exchange 
earner and as the most important source of cash income 
for the peasants of East Pakistan* The dominant position 
of Pakistan in world jute production has, however , changed 
as other countries, especially India and Mainland China, 
now produce a large quantity of raw jute and allied fibres. 
Pakistan has mainly concentrated on quality jute production* 
In the export market of raw jute Pakistan is still the 
dominant supplier* In the field of jute manufacturing 
there has been recently a geographical shift from the 
traditional areas such as India and the U.K. to Pakistan 
and some other developing countries*
The main uses of jute are still in the production 
of packaging bags, the second most important use being 
in floor coverings. In the former sector jute is confron­
ted with serious competition from bulkhandling methods 
and paper bags in the industrial countries where (excluding 
the Centrally Planned Countries) the consumption of jute 
in S 1 9 5 9 -6 1 was not much higher than that of 1937 although 
agricultural and other industrial outputs substantially
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increased during this period* Most of the increase in 
jute consumption since the lasttofrrld War took place only 
in the developing countries*
Both the Pakistan jute growers and world jute 
consumers experienced wide fluctuations in raw jute prices* 
Fluctuations in export proceeds from raw jute mostly 
accounted for the instability in overall export earnings 
and affected, with a one year lag, the import capacity 
of Pakistan*
There is a definite cobweb cycle in the volume of 
current jute production and the relative prices of jute 
and rice in the preceding season. It is statistically 
found that fluctuations in the supply of raw jute were 
more closely related than those in unit prices to fluctua­
tions in the export proceeds from Pakistan jute. Most 
of the year to year changes in acreage under jute as a 
result of the growers* price response led to fluctuations 
in the volume of output. The effects of yield per acre 
on total output were relatively small*
As most of the fluctuations in the export price 
of, and proceeds from raw jute were caused by supply 
fluctuations over the period 1 9^8-6 2 , there is a case 
of supply regulation of jute in such a way that Pakistan*s 
net gains from jute production and export remain at the
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maximum level* (Indeed it is a rational object of any 
export policy)• This would need the elimination or 
minimisation of the cobweb fluctuations in the export 
price of raw jute (both by manipulating the annual jute 
production and through the operation of a national buffer 
stock)• From the discussion of the background information 
it appears that the export price of jute is the most 
important object for a stabilisation policy*
In the domestic market, it would greatly help the 
growers if they could know for certain before the sowing 
starts the price: they were going to get for their current 
jute crop, as in that case they would be in a position 
to allocate their land and other resources between the 
alternative crops of jute and rice without much uncer­
tainty *
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CHAPTER II
Problems of Stabilisation Policies : The Pakistan 
Government * s Jute Policies
2-1 Introduction
In the preceding Chapter it was noted that jute, 
both in its raw and manufactured form, is very important 
in the Pakistan economy especially as the dominant foreign 
exchange earner# As wide price fluctuations of raw jute 
led to various problems, the government of Pakistan adopted 
several policies to cope with them# It is, therefore, of 
considerable importance to review these policies, since 
such a study should give us some idea about the complexi­
ties of the problems of stabilisation policies as experienced 
by the Pakistan government# This in combination with 
Chapter I will help us guard against mistakes already 
made and will be useful in our attempt to formulate a 
possible price stabilisation scheme#
The first serious problem of the country's jute 
trade arose from the Pakistan government's non-devaluation 
decision of 19^9* Among other problems of this decision, 
the country was faced with a huge stock of raw jute. In 
order to maintain the price level, the government started
So
a buffer stock operation and introduced a price support
scheme which, however, failed in 1951 immediately after
the Korean boom. Another stabilisation policy of the
government in terms of jute acreage control was also
mostly a failure. At present the government has adopted
a general plan to give the jute growers some minimum
price and to develop the domestic jute industry so that in
the course of time the country will be in a position to
compete in jute manufactures in the world market and make
raw-jute export subsidiary. In this Chapter we therefore
intend to study the following: i) the Pakistan government's
1/
non-devaluation decision of 1949; ii) the government1s 
buffer stock and price support scheme for raw jute5 iii) 
the jute production regulation, and iv) plans for jute 
manufacturing.
2 - 2  Pakistan’s Non-Devaluation Decision of 1949
Before we go into an examination of the reasons which 
led to Pakistan’s non-devaluation decision in 1949 and 
the problems thereof, it is necessary to know the country’s
1/ The study of £ki; Pakistan’s non-devaluation decision 
is interesting because, in the ultimate analysis, it 
appears that the decision was mainly influenced by the 
country’s position as a producer and exporter of raw 
jute. It is relevant here because this decision resulted 
in a serious problem in the country’s jute trade which, 
in its turn, led to a buffer stock policy.
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position vis-a-vis India, the then main trading partner,
with respect to jute# At the time of* Partition in 19^7,
the area where the jute mills were located went to the
Indian side while almost all the jute growing area came
to the Pakistani side# Thus in l9^7-^8, about three
quarters of raw jute constimpt ion-needs of the Indian jute
mills were met from Pakistan#
Until the trade deadlock between India and Pakistan
in 19^9» almost all raw jute grown in East Pakistan went
to Calcutta both for the Indian mills and for exports#
After Partition, Calcutta still remained the centre for
the export trade of raw jute as East Pakistan at that
time had no adequate port facilities# Over and above
this, East Pakistan had no baling facilities to start
with# In 19**7 there was a * standstill' agreement between
the governments of India and Pakistan, which tended to
preserve essentially free trade between the two countries
1 /until some permanent policies were worked out# Raw jute 
exports were subject to an Indian government export 
duty at the port of Calcutta although most of it was 
grown on the Pakistan side# India was in a special
1/ Shorter, P#C. op# cit#, gives a detailed discussion
of the two governments' jute policies during this period#
.■$. position ip press , hardbargains against 'Pakistan in ‘1./-:^- 
determining' rawtjute- prices# In the mean- time, the 
-Indian, government/ started a vigorous campaign to. "grow .more 
jute" within the country in order to.attain self-.
■ 1 /  "  ■ ■ ■ i ; : - ; . .  " •  ■ ■ . ■■■■
sufficiency ♦ "': ■ ;
On the other side, Pakistan naturally wanted to be 
economically independent and to derive most o.f the advanta- v 
ges associated with the jute trade;# Foreign exchange 
earnings, tax revenues, and better-prices for,;..jute- growers hh; 
were her ^ important- concerns.. ■ When a negotiation with; ihdiai’^;';'. 
to share-the -export . dut^ : . imposed at Calcutta on the raw i 
jute exports originating from East Pakistan had; failed, the ^ i; 
Pakistan government imposed a duty In November, 19*1-7 on raw 
jute destined to India# Thus, :;raw from /
Pakistan via Calcutta were subject to: two governments 1 / '.'d
taxation - making raw jute quite expensive .for^  thd; foreign 
consumers# : .
>. Th’A • serious crisis in'“the..Pakistan, jute trade, occurred ; . 
when India following Great Britain 'and other .-sterling area\ ;/: ’
1/ Indian Central Jute:Committeev Annual Report# Calcutta,.
1948, p. 12.
countries devalued her currency in September, 194-9, while
The
Pakistan did not follow suit./ Indian rupee was, thus,
the
devalued by 50.5 per cent as compared to/Pakistani rupee. 
India, the main trading partner of Pakistan, immediately 
reacted adversely to the Pakistani decision and stopped.all 
traded transactions with Pakistan. Among others, jute, 
Pakistanis major export to India, suffered significantly*
As a,result, Pakistan was,faced with a-big disposal 
problem. During this period, India put a price ceiling oh 
rawjutd and ;an .embargo on raw jute, exports and imports.
The Pakistan government, on the other hand', .created a Jute 
Board and adopted price support schemes for raw,jute. How 
effectively’the government of Pakistan flte this
stabilisation scheme^ will be discussed;in the following 
section. Let us now briefly examine the basis and effects 
of the non-devaluation.decision.
The basis for changing the rate of exchange of a 
country*s currency with that of the rest of the world 
mainly depends on i) the country*s balance of payments 
position, and ii) the elasticities of demand for the 
country*s imports, and for its exports. Let us discuss 
these two points with reference to Pakistan*s case in
Table 2-1
Pakistan’s Balance of Payments Position 194-8-50 
(Rupees in million)
Account J/J, 194-8 J/D, 194-8 J/J, 194-9. J/D, 194-9 J/J, 195Q ,
Balance 
of Trade:
Private ■
A/c +316.3 +23.0 +25.8 +35.2 +155-5
G'O'V'tj
A/c -104.^ -247.6 -186.5 -156.4 -183.8
Others + 4.9 - 22.3 - 47.8 - 49.2 - 80.6
Total
(Gross) +216.8 -246.9 -208.0 -240.8 -108.9
Error,
etc. - 31.8 + 38.1 - 85.4 +22.3 + 12.7
Total +185.0 -208.8 -293.9 -218.5 - 96.2
Source : Manager of Publication, Karachi, Pakistan Balance , ' 
of Payments, Table III.
Rote : J/J means January to June, and J/D June to 
December.
Prom Table 2-1 it appears that after experiencing a 
surplus during January to June, 194-8, Pakistan was having 
deficits in her balance of payments, and the deficits were 
increasing during the two half.yearly periods before the 
government *s non-devaluation decision of September, 194-9* 
,Even then the government did not consider it alarming■ 
probably because the country’s gold and foreign exchange
reserves were rising during thdsd period^ (Table. 2-2). The
rise in her gold and foreign exchange reserves was mostly 
obtaining
due to/her share of reseuye^^ as a consequence of the 
Partition.
Table 2-2
Gold and Poreign Exchange Reserves held by the State Bank 
of Pakistan (January, 194-8 to December, 1950)
(In million rupees)
As on : Total. Rupee Value Changes in. Reserves
1 Jan, 194-8 f?9*9 (Estimates), --
30 .June, 1948 '• 517*9 . r . +4-58.0
31 Pec.., 1948 14*16.1 , >898.2
30 June ,1949 , 1655*1 , +239 *0 - v.:-; p
31 Dec.,1949 . \ 980.2 ^674.9* T: ;
30 June, 1950 958.5 ' \ -,21.7 v.; :
31 Dec., 1950 .939*6 >r -18.9 !
.. •-1 ................ . I — ■■■' 1 ■ ir~Trj-— ^Tl— |-*f—"irMimti—*—*-^rirrn w i«.wL.iii| iiiWTlHinrfiili « ■ ■ ... ■.MpiniM. mm nwnima.i hih.mihiiim ■ iH. iniiiiW ^ in I I I I . .  I I !■■■. ! I uhii m .m i . ii i i  m i  rirn-ft-rn—rrrmni.
.Bqhrbe> Manager of Publication, Karachi v; Pakistan Balance I
v-;'' •/' of Payments ,1948-50. ,,,. - \>r; ' v ’ •!.'*! ' I
* Of which* Rs.. 433*0 . m>/was oh account/.of /
. - ■ / depreciation of* sterling and other assets. />
There might|haye been serious difficulties in Pakistan 
balance .of payments position. this period, as the country, 
had substantial gold and foreign exchange reserves. But it
is difficult to come to any judgement on the trend of the :
, during . ; . ;
balance of payments <§£ a short period of a country's
existence. The non-devaluation decision then must have
been influenced by a consideration of elasticities of
the rest of the 
demand for Pakistan's imports and/world's imports from
1/
Pakistan
It was argued that foreign demand for Pakistan's 
main exports was price-inelastic as most of them consisted 
of agricultural commodities such as raw jute, raw cotton, 
tea, and hides and skin. No comprehensive calculation of 
elasticities of demand for Pakistan's imports and exports 
is yet available. But. on 'a priori' grounds it may be said 
that the world demand for a particular commodity may be 
inelastic, but in so far as the demand from a particular 
source is concerned, it is likely to be elastic, unless 
such a commodity is not supplied substantially by other 
countries. So far as cotton, tea, hides and skin are 
concerned, world demand for these commodities from Pakistan 
cannot be said to be inelastic as Pakistan is a small 
supplier of these goods in the world market. And even the
1/ The Marshqll-Lerner condition is that devaluation does 
not bring any improvement in a country's balance of 
payments position if the sum of elasticities of demand 
for the country's imports and exports is not greater 
than one.
8?
demand Tor jute which is regarded as a monopoly commodity 
of Pakistan, may be inelastic in the short-run (within 
certain price range only), but given a sufficiently long 
period, over which production of both jute and its 
substitutes could be increased elsewhere, it should be 
considered fairly elastic*
On the other side, as Pakistan's imports consisted 
mostly of manufactured goods, it is reasonable to assume 
that the elasticity of import demand was quite high* Thus, 
the sum total of elasticities of demand for Pakistan's 
imports and exports tended to be greater than unity* :
In other words, according to Marshall-Lerner condition, 
Pakistan should have devalued her currency in 19^9 when 
most of her trading partners did so*
It is moreover of paramount importance to consider 
the possible reactions of the trading partners to any 
change in the country's commercial policy. It is especially 
so when the country concerned is economically weak in 
relation to her trading partners* Thus, in 19^9
Pakistan was too dependant on India, for her vital exports 
and imports and she did not have enough time to develop 
trade relations with other countries*
The immediate consequence of Pakistan’s nonr-devalua-
cl ■ , / ,
tion decisionwas/trade deadlock between India and Pakistan
as India refused to accept Pakisihri’s rate of exchange* 
Legitimate exchange transactions stopped between the two 
countries, and though it was not possible to prevent 
smuggling of goods and currencies acro'sb the long land 
frontier, the volume of normal trade &11 considerably 
after Pakistan’s decisiop. as can, be::;.seen in Table 2-3 •
Table 2-3 -v'^., V ■ ■ '
Pakistan1 s Trade Position  ^with .India (1948-52 ) , '
(million rupees)
Tear Pakistan! s ;p3q|6rts:t :
‘ ‘-.to Ztndin "% 9 
Tot al ; ‘ pf which ! Jute
Imports from
194-8-4*9
194-9-50
1950-51
1951-52
I Total
1092.9 !712.4 
440^ *4 1211.7 
f 4*38.7 1274- .8  
875.0 S670.81t?1_ *
’percentage
"T“I I 
f I f I I 1 I » 
f »I 
f I 
I I
4*8
63
77
tI“T*1II
tII
tII1IIII
fI
J
Total
.1
414*'. 3 
304.3 
452.6
Balance
!-f-342.8 
}4* 26.1 
{4-134.4 
{4-422.4
1ft»1
Source : Reserve Bank of India, Bombay,  ,Currency and 
. J$iSS52S.> 1953-54. V
Thus, it appears that Pakistan relied a great deal- pn 
her own strength as the main producer and exporter of raw 
jute while arriving at the non-devaluation decision in 194-9.
89
She could not probably apprehend that India would react 
so adversely. * - r-
Portunately for Pakistan,, the Korean boom introduced 
a new factor in-the world*s raw commodity markets. The . 
demand for raw materials was greatly stimulated and the 
strategic stockpilings of different nations pushed up 
primary commodity prices all round* Pakistan*s jute and 
cotton - the.two major exports of the country, found strong 
outside markets while India had been experiencing an acute 
shortage of these materials during a period when the demand 
for their manufactures was high abroad. It was mentioned
earlier that India was heavily dependant on Pakistan*s.
1/supply of raw jute and cotton . Hence, in view of this*:
radical change?;? introduced by the Korean boom, India, on
her own initiative, resumed negotiations with Pakistan, and
in Pebruary, 1951? sl trade agreement was reached between
the two countries and India accepted the official par value
2/
of the Pakistani rupee”. As can be seen in Table 2-5, the
3/ While India could obtain raw cotton from other known 
sources at a higher transport cost, she could not get 
raw jute from any other source in the short run.
2/ Government of Pakistan, Proceedings of .Indo-Pak Trade 
Agreements, Karachi, 1951*
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trade between the two countries rose somewhat in 1 9 5 1-5 2 ,
but it was far less than the 1948-49 level* Pakistan,
mostly aided by the Korean boom, diversified her foreign
trade and her imports from India were far lower than her
exports to India( mostly raw jute) in 1951-52 (Table 2-3)*
Looking back, it thus appears that the Pakistani
non-devaluation decision in 1949 was not well considered,
although the subsequent events (the Korean boom) turned
out in her favour* India ultimately came to terms with
Pakistan; Pakistan*s foreign trade was diversified and
during 1949-51 Pakistan's net barter terms of trade
1/
were favourable as mentioned in Chapter I* Nothing 
can be said precisely whether R££istan could have done 
better had she devalued her currency along with other 
countries unless elasticities of demand for Pakistan's 
exports and imports were calculated and the index of 
her income terms of trade is prepared*
It appears/the Pakistan government's non-devalua­
tion decision of 1949 was mainly influenced by her 
monopoly position in r&xr jute export* This shows how 
important was raw jute in the Pakistan economy* a short
j/ This, however, does not say whether the nation's total 
welfare (income terms of trade) increased or decreased*
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study of* Pakistani non-devaluation decision thus gives 
us the background history of the country*s experiences 
in jute policy^ such as buffer stock operation to support 
growers* and export prices and attempts to increase the 
jute manufacturing facilities within the country#
2-3 The Pakistan Government’s Buffer Stock and Price 
Support Schemes for Raw Jute
............. i  -   ■- —— ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- — ----------------------------------------
Immediately after the non-devaluation decision 
of the government of Pakistan, and the consequent trade 
deadlock between India and Pakistan, there arose, as 
mentioned earlier, a serious disposal problem for raw 
jute in Pakistan. In the absence of baling and manufac­
turing capacity within the country there was no domestic 
demand for raw jute and the diversion of the jute trade 
from the Indian market to other countries needed some 
time. As a result, raw jute prices were bound to fall 
considerably. In order to maintain the price, the Pakistan 
government set up a Jute Board in October, 1949 to buy
raw jut© at a floor price of Rs# 23 per maund, ,fwhite
1/
jat bottom1* basis. A commercial bank (the National Bank
1/ Government of Pakistan, Dpartment of Trade Promotion 
and Commercial Intelligence, ’Pakistan Trade, Karachi, 
1955 (March). .
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of* Pakistan) was founded on government initiative mainly
to ensure credit facilities to jute traders* The jute
Board appointed agents to buy raw jute from the growers,
and in 1949-50 the Board bought about 179 thousand bales
of raw jute at a cost of about Rs* 20 million (Table 2-5)*
As during this period the Korean boom resulted in a
the
strong demand for raw jute, the diversion of/raw jute 
trade became comparatively easy.The Jute Board, therefore, 
successfully maintained the floor price of Rs. 25 per 
maund during the period from October, 1949 to June, 1950.
As shown in Table 2-4, raw jute production was very 
low in 1949-50 because in the previous season the price 
of rice had risen significantly from the level of the 
season before (1947-48). Jute prices also rose from 
1947—48 to 1948—49, but adverse weather conditions, 
political unrest as a consequence of Partition, etc., 
might have contributed towards low production of jute 
during this period. Xn 1949-50 the export of raw jute 
also fell considerably as a result of the disruption of 
trade between India and Pakistan.
In 1950-51, jute production came to its normal 
level and the export was actually higher than the produc­
tion, the excess being met from the stock (Table 2-4).
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Xn this period production was double the quantity of 
the previous year in spite of* the f*act that the growers, 
on average, received a low price for jute in the previous 
season. This is probably because a higher price (than 
what the growers actually received) offered by the Board 
at the end of 1949-30 season induced them to produce more 
in the following season. As exports were higher than 
production this year, the year-end stock of raw jute fell 
considerably in 1950-31* The export price was also higher 
in this period than that of the previous year. As a larger 
quantity was sold at a higher price, it obviously indicates 
that the foreign demand function for raw jute shifted to 
the right.
While the export quantity and the price were rising 
and the domestic stock of raw jute was falling in 1 9 5 0-3 1 , 
it is surprising to notice that the Board offered a very 
low price for raw jute (Table 2-4) during this period as 
compared to that of the previous year. The government 
also ^licensed a smaller area as compared to that of the 
previous year. The growers, however, ignoring this, devoted 
more land to jute than that licensed because, the market
1/
price of jute was higher than the guaranteed floor price."*
jL/ The government1s action (licensing a smaller area) might 
be justified on the ground that as they had to support
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Table 2-4
rroaucx ion, is:spores ctnu 
and Bice in East
UJ. ACIIV auuc auu i
Pakistan (1947-52)
W0 UJU w V4, w
Year
(July
Produe 
tion
Export Stock Export
Price
Free
Price
market
of
Jute 
Board* s
to
June) ( million bales 
(1) (2 )
)
(3)
Rs./
matrnd
(4)
Jute
(RS./
(5)
Rice
Maund)
(6 )
minimum 
Price: Rs. 
per maund. 
(7) ' ”
1947 6 . 8 6 .1
1/
1 .3 33 25 20
1948 5.5 5*7 1 . 8 4i 3 0 2/
19
29 -
1949 3*3 3.4 1 . 7 31 29 2 3 . 0
1950 6.0 6.8 0 . 9 33 28 21 18.5
1951 6*3 4.9 2 . 3 37 25 23 24.0
1952 6.8 5.3 3 . 8 17 10 26 —
Source: Column 1} 5 and 6 are from Table 1-12; 2 and 4 are 
from Table 1-7 and 7 from Table 2-5(A); CoTumn 3 is 
calctilated*
Notes: 1/ includes carryover of 0 * 6  million bales from the 
previous season;
2/ Average free market price is lower than the Jute 
Board*s guranteed floor price because, the Board was 
created in October, 1949 which started functioning 
probably one or two months later. It is, therefore, 
natural that some jute was sold at very low prices 
before the Price Support Scheme came into effect as 
1949 season starts from July* Hence, the average free 
market price is lower than the guaranteed minimum price 
of the Board*
Similarly, free market prices of jute in two remainin 
years were higher than the Board*s minimum prices, becaus 
private traders bought jute at higher prices itaresponse 
to strong export demand*
(continued from the previous page) the growers * price in the 
previous season, they would naturally discourage the growers from 
producing more in this season.
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But why did the Board fix the minimum price so low? Did 
the Board foresee the collapse of the Korean boom? We 
cannot answer affirmatively from the subsequent pricing 
policy of the Board and the licensing policy of the 
government* That the government wanted a larger jute 
output in 1 9 5 1 -5 2 is evident from the fact that the govern­
ment increased the area licensed in this year compared to 
that of the previous year (Table 2-6 )* The Jute Board 
also offered a substantially higher (floor) price in 
1 9 5 1 -5 2 in spite of the fact that the production was 
still higher in this year than that of the previous year 
(Table 2-4)* Thus, p while production increased, a higher 
price meant that the Board desired a larger quantity still 
in the following year* As exports fell a large stock 
accumulated (Tahle 2-4). In 1952-53 » the Board did not 
offer any price, and thus went off the buyers* market* 5 
The production of raw jute again rose in this year as 
the growers were encouraged to produce a large quantity 
by a higher minimum price offered by the Board. Although 
a larger quantity was sold at a substantially lower price 
in 1 9 5 2 -5 3 as compared to that of the previous level, there 
still appeared a huge stock at the end of the season (Table 
2-4). As the Board no longer operated as a buyer, but 
continued to sell its previous stock, both the export and 
growers* prices were substantially depressed (Table 2-4)4
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It appears that the Jute Board stopped its operation 
at the wrong time especially when the Korean boom had 
collapsed. It may be argued that the Board would have 
incurred still more losses if it bought jute in 1952-53 
at a price higher than the ruling one* This is probably 
true as the Board did not regulate the jute output in 
accordance with the trend of* demand* But the Board was 
primarily intended to operate a buffer stock and the price 
support scheme in 19^9 when the growers' prices were 
falling* If it did not intend a permanent or a long-run 
operation, it should have stopped buying raw jute immediately 
after the recovery of the market in 1 9 5 0-5 1 *
It therefore appears that the minimum prices offered 
by the Board in 1950-51 and 1951-52 were wrong. In fact, 
given the demand and supply conditions, these two prices 
should have been reversed in order. In 1950-51, the Board 
offered a price which was very low under the circumstances 
(viz., a larger quantity was being demanded at a higher 
price in the export market compared to that of the previous 
year). On the other hand, a higher minimum price in the 
following year was unreasonable because the production of 
raw jute rose considerably in this year, and a very low 
quantity was being detsfttu&Udl $|t the previous year’s price
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in the export market• As the minimum price guaranteed by
the government was relatively higher in this season, the
growers were induced to produce n. still a larger quantity
of raw jute in the following year, which resulted in a
sharp fall of the export price as well as the growers *
prices* It may be emphasised that the Jute Board was
intended to perform primarily an open market operation,
i*e*, to buy raw jute when the price tended to fall below
a certain minimum, and to sell when it tended to rise
beyond a certain maximum* From this point of view, as
mentioned earlier, the Board had no business to buy raw
jute during 1 9 5 0-5 2 , but as it did, it incurred a heavy
loss ultimately*
After 1951-52, the Board does not appear* to have
been very active* In 1957, another government organisation
known as the East Pakistan Jut© Marketing Corporation was
set up. These two together have undertaken to stabilise
jute prices both in the export market and at the growers'
level. In the export market, the Board's activities seem
to have been concentrated in helping the government of
1 /
Pakistan to fix the minimum export price.- Ia the domestic
market the Board and the Corporation have been operating a
1/ Government of East Pakistan, Monthly s Summary of Jute 
Statistics"* November, 1 9 6 2, p. 5 4 *
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Table 2-5(A)
Purchases and Sales of the Pakistan Jute Board (1949-51)
Year Purchases Sales Profit Prices
*000'
bales
Million
Rupees ( Million Rupees ) (Rs. per Purchase
maund)
Sale
19^9 179 20*0 20.1 +0.1 2 3 . 0 2 3 . 1 2
1 950 *189 44.1 62.5 + 17.9 18.5 26.19
1951 1^21 1 6 6 .0 77.7 -8 8 . 2 24.0 11.19
Total 2089 2 3 0 . 1 160.3 -7 0 . 2 -
Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Trade, Karachi, 
March, 1955 and Shorter, F.C., op.cit.
Note: Year begins in July except 1949 which started in 
October,(1949)*
buffer stock on the basis of some minimum prices since 
1962*
1/
The Jute Enquiry Commission made the following 
two recommendations on jute price stabilisation policy: 
a) price fluctuations should be kept within a range of 
10 per cent through buffer stock operations and b) policy 
should be designed to assure a fair and m equitable price 
of Rs• 26 per maund to the growefs*
These two recommendations, although much desirable, 
appear to be quite arbitrary. It was not explained how
1/ Govt# of Pakistan,Report of the Pakistan Jute Enquiry 
Commission, i9 6 0 , Chapter, VI*
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price fluctuations would be kept within a range of 10 per 
cent with the help of only buffer stock operation without 
regulating production. As no reference was made to the 
relative prices of jute and rice or to the optimum alloca­
tion of land and other resources between jute and rice, 
these recommendations made by the Commission are extremely 
vague and unsatisfactory.
In the domestic market, the government guarantees a 
floor price for the current crop and this minimum price 
is determined probably on the basis of current demand and 
supply conditions* As the government did not specify any 
other criterion to fix the minimum price, it is likely 
that this price would tend to fall when the current supply 
exceeds the current demand, and vice versa. Though this 
type of price fixing would allow the government to guard 
against any loss, it does not guarantee the stabilisation 
of the growers* price. As the prevailing market prices 
have been above the minimum set by the Jute Board and 
the East Pakistan Jute Marketing Corporation (Table 2-5(B)), 
the operation of the buffer stock and the price support 
scheme did not create any difficulty as yet for these 
organisations•
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Table 2-5(B)
Government Floor Prices of Haw Jute as Compared with
those prevailing in the Market
Year Area Yield Output Govt • Market Prices
*0 0 0 '
Acres
Maurids
per
Acre
'0 0 0 *
tons
Floor Jute 
Price
(Rs. per maund; 
jat bottom)
Rice
white
1 9 6 1 -2 2061 16 12 44 - 4l . 6 3 0 . 6
1 9 6 2 -3 1723 14 919 22 3 2 . 8 51.5
1 9 6 3 -4 1700 16 1049 23 3 0 . 1 27.9
1964-»5 1660 15 951 23 3 2 . 0 -
Source: Government of* Pakistan, Statistical Year Book, 
1964 and Economic SurveyT 1964^»63 ♦
The Pakistan Planning Commission planned for
an average annual output of* raw jute of* 1304 thousand
tons during the Second Five Year Plan period (1 9 6 0-6 5 )
but the actual average annual output during this period
was only 833 thousand tons which is only 64 per cent of*
1/
the planned target. This was bound to occur as the govern­
ments jute price policy was not at all encouraging for 
an expanded production. Hits While yield per acre
1/ Government of Pakistan (Planning Commission), Preli­
minary Evaluation of Progress during the Second Five 
Year Plan, Karachi, 1965, Table ?-lT
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fluctuated more or less randomly, the minimum prices 
for jute set by the government, given the price of rice, 
would have induced the growers to produce far less if the 
free market prices of jute were not higher than the 
guaranteed minimum prices (Table 2-5(B))• The jute/rice 
growers however responded to the market prices of jute 
prevailing in various years as these prices were higher 
than these guaranteed by the government# In order to 
induce the growers to produce the planned quantity, the 
guaranteed prices for jute should have/much higher than 
those set by the government#
As the minimum price is fixed by the government
for the current crop when it is already planted, the
government scheme does not appear to eliminate the
cobweb fluctuations in the relative price and production
of raw jute. The jute policy (including the minimum price)
is normally announced in July every year for the current
1/crop, while the plantation starts in February. The 
jute/rice growers' decision of resource allocation is 
based, as explained in Chapter I, on the relative prices 
of jute and rice prevailing in the preceding season.
1/ Government of East Pakistan, Monthly Summary of Jute 
Statistics. August, 1963 and 1 9 6A.
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Hence, if it is intended to regulate jute output in
the current season according to the trend of demand, the
authority should adjust the price of jute with the price
of rice prevailing in the preceding season and announce
this guaranteed price well before the sowing starts for
1/these two crops.— By fixing the minimum price well below
the market price, the government is not helping much in
stabilising the growers1 price of jute. Again as the price
offered by the government is announced for the current
crop when it is already sown, the problem of cobweb
fluctuations in the relative price and production of
jute is not solved.
The government's buffer stock operation, however,
may stabilise the jute growers' prices to some extent
if a special care is taken to buy o t jute when the
growers' price tends to fall below a certain minimum
and release jute from stocks when it tends to rise
beyond a certain maximum. But a buffer stock operation
may lead to serious problems (including its ultimate
breakdown as happened in 1952 in East Pakistan) if it
2 /
is not combined with production regulation.
%/ This is fully illustrated in the proposed price 
stabilisation model in Chapter IV.
2/ A possible scheme of a buffer stock operation is 
proposed in Chapter IV.
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In the export market, the government sets minimum
1/
prices and never places an upper limit on them. It is 
not certain whether the minimum price which Pakistan, 
being a monopolist in the raw jute export market, can 
enforce by acting on supply^, is optimum from the point of 
view of the country's net gains from jute production and 
export* The policy objective which would seem to be most 
desirable however, is the regulation of the export produc­
tion of raw jute in such a way as to equate as nearly as 
possible marginal foreign exchange earnings from exporting 
jute with marginal opportunity cost (in terms of rice 
sacrifice)* This is fully elaborated in Chapter IV*
In conclusion it may be said that the Pakistan govern­
ment's policy of buffer stock operation for raw jute was 
not effective as it was not combined with production 
regulation. When the jute/x~ice growers are responsive to 
the relative prices of these two products with a lag of 
one year, jute production can be regulated by adjusting 
the price of jute with that of rice prevailing in the 
preceding season and announcing the guaranteed price well 
before the sowing starts for both the crops.
1/ Commonwealth Economic Committee, Industrial Fibre, 
London, 1 9 6 2, p* l86.
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2—4 Production Regulation through Acreage Control
The earliest attempt at stabilisation, through a 
partial control over supplies was represented in a 
programme of* jute acreage control in Undivided* Bengal 
in 1940 following the recommendations of the Bengal Jute 
Bnquiry Committee, 1939* Acreage control remained in 
effect in Bast Pakistan from then till 1959-60 when it 
was abolished according to the recommendations of the 
Pakistan Jute Enquiry Commission*
It was intended to control the supply of jute by 
licensing a certain area to individual growers for the 
so%tfing of jute at the beginning of the season in accordance 
with the expected level of demand* In East Pakistan a jute 
grower was given a license for each plot of land and a 
provision was made for the destruction of crops grown on 
unlicensed land. As can be seen in Table 2-6 , jute acreage 
in nine out of thirteen years was more than that licensed, 
but the destruction of planted crops was seldom made 
probably in consideration of the growers* welfare.
During the first three years after Partition, the 
acreage sown under jute was well below the total area 
licensed, probably because of food shortage and unfavourable 
prices of jute as compared to those of rice, the substitute
10 5
crop. Further, us can be seen in Table 2-4, the prices 
which they received from the sale of jute during 1947-50 
fluctuated so violently that it was too risky to commit 
too much land to this crop. Excess planting first appeared 
in 1 9 5 0-5 1 , but the destiuxction of crops on the unlicensed 
land was probably thought unwise on the ground that high 
prices were ruling for raw jute in the world market during 
the Korean boom (Table 2-4). In 1951-52, the area licensed 
was raised (Table 2-6), but planting was again below the 
upper limit permitted because the Jute Board offered a 
lower price for raw jute in the previous season as com­
pared to that of the season before (Table 2-4)• In sub­
sequent years, continuous over planting (compared to the 
licensed area) took place until 1 9 5 9 -6 0 when the acreage 
regulation was given up.
Production regulation through acreage control
was, thus, quite ineffective. Further, this type pf
control, if successful, could put an upper limit and not
1 /
a lower limit to acreage planted to jute. By simply
if Acreage control is not very effective as a method of 
output control since the growers can increase output 
by employing the best land available under jute or by 
improved methods of production. In Pakistan these problems 
however, are not very important as firstly, the acreage 
license was issued for a particular plot of land and 
secondly, the growex~s employ their best methods of produc­
tion in any case.
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licensing a certain area to the growers for the sowing 
of jute, it was not enough to induce the growers to plant 
accordingly. Where the growers have a choice between the 
production of the alternative crops of jute and rice, and 
where the growers* land and other resources are mostly 
transferable between the two crops at the beginning of 
each season, their decision to produce either jute ord 
rice largely depends on the prices they expect for the 
two crops# This price expectation, as explained earlier, 
is based on the actual prices prevailing in the immediate 
past season# This empirical analysis of the government1s 
experience of production regulation through acreage control 
once again supports our earlier hypothesis that the farmers 
in East Pakistan make a high positive response (with a 
one year lag) of acreage to the previous season*s prices 
of jute and rice.
Two important conclusions emerge from the above. 
First, any forecast of the jute crop in any season must 
take account of the relationship between the production 
of jute in the said season and the relative prices of jute 
and rice in the preceding season# Second, if it is desired 
that jute production is to be regulated by the price 
mechanism, it is necessary to adjust the price of jute 
to that of rice prevailing in the previous season#
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\ Table 2-6
Jute Area Licensed and Cropped and Production in East
Pakistan
Year Area('000 
Licensed
acres)
Actually
cropped
Area cropped 
as '/. of 
licensed area
Production 
('0 0 0' bales)
/ .7-'-. t V ’-v
•194.7-4.8 22 07 2059 93.4 6843
194-8-4-9 2133 1877 8 8 .0 ' 5479
194.9 .5 0 1861 1561 , 83.7 3353 • Vff!
1950-51 1310 1711 % 1 3 0 .6 6007
1 9 5 1 -5 2 -1-869 1779 ' 95.2 --7; 2. . 6331
1 9 5 2 -5 3 .1717 1907 2 1 1 1 .1 6823
1-953-54 . 811 ' 965 118.5 3610
1954 .-55 . 1231 1243 1 0 1 .1 4662
1955-56 ,154:6', ' 1634 105.5 5592 %
1 9 5 6 -5 7 120%. 1230 1 0 2 .1 5514
1957-58 11-02 1563 111.5 5701
1958-59 ■ 1101 ' 1528 1 3 8 .8 6001
1959-60 991 1575 " 1 3 8 .6 5554
1960-61 1518 - 5625
1 9 6 1 -6 2 — 2061 ,'* - 6969 .
Source : Government of'East Pakistan, Directorate of Jute, '"27 
• Monthly Summary of Jute -Statistics, December, .'2
1 9 6 2, No. 1 7 9. ■* ~ ~ ;
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2-5 P aids tan1 s Plan for Jute Manufacturing
It is generally accepted that domestic industria­
lisation is the best way of attaining rapid economic 
development in underdeveloped countries* This is kspeciqlly 
so as there is now little chance of reliance on traditional 
export-led growth. This is the familiar Prebisch-Singer—
Nuricse-Myrdal hypothesis* Singer maintains that the dynamic 
contributions of domestic industrialisation are its * effects 
on general level of education, skill, way of life, inventive­
ness, habits, store of technology, creation of new demands,
1 /
etc *
In her quest for industrialisation, jute has been 
Pakistan*s obvious choice as she has the best supply of 
raw material which is the most important component of 
final manufactures (Table 2-7)* In this Table it can also 
be seen that the import content which is likely to fall 
in Pakistan in the long-run is also not very high in this 
particular field. Moreover, Pakistan has got an abundant 
labour supply which can be trained in a relatively short 
period for the textile industry.
JL/ Singer, H.W., ‘Distribution of Gains between Investing 
and Borrowing Countries1, The American Economic Review, 
May, 1950, p. 4?6. ”  ~ “
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Table 2-7
Composition of Gross Value of Output and Import Content
of Jute Manufacturing in Pakistan, 1959-60
Items
Total
(Percentages)
Import Content
Raw Material k2
Fuel and Power k 6
Other Net Inputs 7
Total Ihput s 53 6
Labour 20
Depreciation Interest 
and Profit 27 9
Gross Value added lZ 9
Total Value of Output 100 15
Source: Government of Pakistan, (C.S.O.), Census of* 
Manufacturing Industries, 1959-60* 1961,
Note: The various types of jute goods are treated together*
The Pakistan government1s long-run policy is to 
export jute goods instead of raw jute• Pakistan's Second 
Five year Plan made a provision for an output of 3&0 
thousand tons of jute goods in 1 9 6 5, compared to 2 70 thousand 
tons in 1959-6l and 150 thousand tons in 1 9 5 3-5 5 ; by 
1970 production is expected to reach 600 thousand tons 
which will absorb about 50 per cent of the domestic raw
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1/
jute production* Domestic demand is expected to rise to
110 thousand tons, leaving an exportable surplus of about
2/
490 thousand tons in 1970. The long-run policy of
exporting jute manufactures instead of raw jute is justified
on, among other things, the fact that Pakistan can earn
more foreign exchange by exporting value added in jute 
2/
manufactures *
In Chapter I, it was noted that world jute manufac­
turing in 1963 increased by about 84 per cent over that 
of 1954 (Table 1-10). Most of this increase took place in 
developing countries* Pakistan starting in the early 1950's 
accounted for about 11 per cent of the total world production 
by 1 9 6 3* The competition for the share of the world market 
of jute goods is, however, mainly among India, Pakistan 
and Western Europe (Table 2-8). Pakistan, entering the 
world jute goods export market in 1954, captured about 17 
per cent of the world total. As the main competition of 
Pakistan lies with India, Pakistan's* gains were mainly at 
the expense of the latter. Between the two, the main area 
of competition lies in the markets for sacks and common
1/ Government of Pakistan, Outline of the Third Five year 
Plan, (1965-70), 1964, p” ?297  :------------ --
2/ ibid.
2/ MaiIon, H., 'Export Policy in Pakistan', Pakistan 
Development Review, Spring, 1 9 6 6.
Table-:: 2-8
Goods by the Major Countries 
(excluding the Gentrally Planned.Countries)
Yearly
average
India, Pakistan . 
Percent of, i
U.K. Other
Western 
. 4;/ ; ;  Europe. . 
tforid total)
World Total 
(  * OOO .metric 
. tons)
1937 85 7 .. . 1237 7
i 9 4 8 - 5 0 . 90 ; '• 4/a 921
1954—56 ■:■■ , 8 i ; : -  V  : 1078 ;
1960-61 68 17 : 1 - v ‘ a 4  11A6 C
Source PAO,(Rome)y;Jute Goods Available for- Home Use , 
: XStatisVicaT Supplement}, GOP/Jute.,' Ad Hoc . 
62/A/Add* 1 . (mimedgraphed’3 : :  ^v / m - .
. V Table 2-90 " . -
Export of Sacking from Ihdla/,and:Pakistan
Year ■ /Total/., .••Prom India . - Prom Pakistan
(000 metric' tons/' (Percent)
1957 f . . . .  - A90 . \  77'"..; ■ 8 7 * 6 : ‘ ' 12.4 ;1
1958 : . 424- -4 81.5 7 18.5
1959 490 -■ 72,5 '2 7 . 7
1960 456 ' \ 5 7 1 * 6 28.4
1961 : 424 * : 66*9 33*1
1962
•r’
457 64.0 : a 3 6 . 0 V
Source : IJMA, Annual Summary oP Jute and Gunny Statistics,
Calcutta. ’
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hessians (Table 2-9').* India has been the traditional 
supplier of these products; and in view of the competitive 
position of India and Pakistan, the European Industries 
have been increasingly concentrating on specialised products 
such as yarn for carpet backing, leaving1 sacks and common 
hessians to Indian and Pakistani manufacturers(Table 2-10)*
Table 2-10.
ion of; Various Types of Jute Goods made in the 
Countries / ;
Type s Pakistan India JJ.K* E»E.C- Other West Europe ■
179627 r “ ”  1959 " ~ . 7
Yarn 
Hessian 
Sacking 
Others
Total
28 *4 
68.4 
3*2
4-3*5 
48*. 0 
8.5<
57*5 2 5 * 2
62.5 74*8*
100.0 100.0 100.0 . 100.0
14.5 
85 * 5 *
. 0
Source : F AO, ‘ rMonthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics , V
arid • St at is tics, Marc h, 1962, p i:6;/pak i s t an C ent r al
Jute Committee, Jute and Jute Fabrics, July,
’  * '- - - — r ‘ r ‘ - - - - - r r  -  r  ir —  m u m  i r n  n iiin i r .  . i . n   . . . .  . . . . . . « i * i . i m i r n i m i i i n i i r  a i w i . m * * i  *
- .. 1963* . “ 4 : ■ *7“ ‘
* cloth. •
With their low labour costs and "abundant supply of
locally produced fibre, jute mills in India.and Pakistan 
are fully competitive with mills in Western Europe in the
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manufacture of* sa.clcl.ixg and common hessian, though not in 
the production of* high quality goods such as yarns for
1/
floor coverings*
Thus, as Western Europe is giving up the production
of sacks and common hessians, Pakistan is at present
competing with India for an increased share of the world
market of these goods, while India competes with Western
Europe in the high quality hessian cloth sector of the 
2/
world market. While India is self-sufficient in the supply 
of common varieties of raw jute, she is still dependant 
on Pakistan for quality jute. India is trying to attain 
self sufficiency also in this sector of raw jute supply 
but climatic and retting facilities are sufficiently 
available only in East Pakistan. About 90 per cent of total 
raw jute requirements of Western Europe is at present 
met by Pakistan.
In order to capture an increased share of the world 
market of jute goods, Pakistan has to quote a price which 
is competitive with that of India. Thus, in Table £
2-11, it can be demonstrated that in the U.K. market, to
1/ F.A.O., Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics 
and Statistics. March, 1963 , p. 5 .
2/ ibid. p . 6.
I l k
4 give an example, Pakistan1 s/"share of :'oute'-good;s export has 
if. been increasing while that of Ih^ia,^\hi;as^.iheen falling as 
. , Pakistan Was * all . along of fering;competitive, fpr ices with
•v; thPs;^  :of India* ■ ' f "ft i : 1 W’ V ' Cf
■ ■’ • - ^ahle 2 - 11 v-J'' V
- import s. of Jute Fabrics in the, U,K, from India .had i
.^.Pakistan *Vf ;v- i  ^ff t ■ --M.'t \ ft- '*
Year Volume. (000 long ton) Price per ton
+. h.- India Pakistan , i? India ' .js-.i Pakistan.
1956 '39.? 1.9 . v g,■ V ; ' 122 120
1957 3 0 .6 1.44-r-V, 4 / /, : 132 : 128
1958 - ' 31.7 - 1.7 121 ■ ; 119 ...
1959 36.7 « . 5.7  ^- ’ _ f" _ 118 4.;: 119
I960 56.4 • 7.8'. ;■ i^ * ' . 134 jg 129 ’
1961 .. 23.9 i, .. . 7.8 i 64 .,g; 162
Source i C.E.(3.(London) , ■' Industrial (various issues
But the Pakistani ;:guteT; industry; is rtodoubtodly not 
_  ^.as^ppiicient; as that of India,, As iahlohP-IS' indioates,
the cost of prp&;Wp.tio'n‘,, other fthan 'that of rawWjutd^ as 
signaficantly ’highOf ; in Pakistan than in India, A lower 
:‘;aaw^nte coat in Pakistan,' however, more than off sets" her 
r r disadvantages .over J^dia iin other respepts”",' Higher costs
i f 1 ;  PA0, Hohthiy Bulletih' of Agricultural Beonomics ' and 
1 v - Statistics, March, 1 9 6 2 p, 5• ■ ' 5 - a ' ^  v
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in Pakistan are due to the high price of power, to high 
capital and depreciation charges, and to low productivity 
of labour* Although wage rates are lower in Pakistan than 
in India, output per worker is much lower in Pakistan so 
that the wage bill per ton of jute products is higher. . 
Indian mills.owe their greater efficiency ifcopm long tradi­
tion of jute manufacturing, while Pakistan-lacks the nece­
ssary'' infrastructure, . P.P-v : :-P • . ’ ; ’ P-p;
7;- ■ vlable^ 2 - 1 2 . /Vv:p 'P.*' ' - -■
Comparative Costs of Production in 1958 : A Sample, of 
Indian and .Pakistani Mil Is"' "• P . ^
Items India (average) . Pakistan (most efficient)
' ■ Pv'P '"■& ■ U.S. $ per.
Depreciation 3*7? - 19*55
Wages 35*00 - 4-5.94-
Power ,3*25 10*09
Head Office
establishment 1 1 *7 6 14.?0
Insurance 0.63 2*52
Interest , 0.97 3*4-9
Total 55*38 96.29
Source : Ihe Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, ■ ' 
Pact Pinding Committee of 1958, Comparative Cost^#; . 
of Industrial Production in India and Pakistan, ,
Karachi, 1959.
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In order to develop the jute industry, the Pakistan
govex-nment has been giving many incentives, such as easy
credit, tax concessions, duty on imports of jute goods
and raw jute exports (an indirect protection of* the
domestic jute manufactures)* Over and above these, the
government introduced an 'Export Bonus Scheme* in 1959
as an additional incentive to exports* According to this
scheme, an exporter of certain specific goods receives a
voucher which entitles its owner to buy foreign exchange
(to the extent of 20 per cent in the case of jute goods
exports) and which can be used for imports of a wide range
of goods or sold in the free market at a price which is
1/
usually 150-200 per cent higher than its face value* Such 
a voucher is not allowed in the case of raw jute exports*
In the long-run, it is expected that Pakistan will be in 
a position to compete in the world market without any 
subsidy or protection to the domestic jute industry*
The Pakistan government's policy seems to make raw 
jute expensive for the foreign jute manufacturers in order 
to give competitive advantages to the domestic jute industry 
in the world market* For this purpose, the government
X/ Bruton H*J. and Bose, S*, The Pakistan Export Bonus
Scheme, Institute of Development Economics, Karachi, 1963.
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occasinally fixed the minimum prices for raw jute exports 
whenever these tended to go beXow a certain leveX and 
contimxousXy taxed raw jute exports* The following TabXe 
indicates changes in the export taxation of raw jute made 
in response to government estimates of varying demand 
conditions*
TabXe 2-13
Changes in Taxation on Haw Jute Exports from Pakistan
Period Taxes(Rs* per Bale) on
Jute Cuttings
From l4 November, 
to 31 March, 1948
1947
15*0 4.3
1 April, 1948 to 
31 October, 1951 20.0 6*0
1 Nov*,1951 to 30 June,152 55*0
0•0t-4
1 July, *52 to 24 Mar*,*33 15.0 5.0
25 Mar. * 53 to 22 Aug* *58 £0 O m 0 5.0
23 Aug# *58 to date 20*0 10.0
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Report on Currency and 
Finance, 1962-63* TabXe ¥ 3 .
Thus, during the Korean boom taxation on raw jute 
exports from Pakistan was at its maximum* When, after 
this boom, demand felX, the government lowered the tax, 
but raised it again in 1953* Oifcen the long-run policy
Il8
of Pakistan to compete in jute goods instead of raw jute, 
it is reasonable to give some incentives to the domestic 
jute manufacturers. One of these incentives, as mentioned 
earlier, is in the form of taxation and fixing of a floor 
to the export price*
As mentioned earlier, most of the yarn produced by 
the Western European manufacturers is used in the woven 
carpet industry and other industrial uses where the 
possibilities of substitution are still very low* The yarn 
production needs superior varieties of raw jute which are 
only available from Pakistan* Because of low possibilities 
of substitution and the absence of competition from the 
supply side, Pakistan is in a position to utilise her 
monopoly power with respect to quality jute. In other 
varieties where competition is keen and substitutes are 
available, foreign demand should be sensitive to the 
relative price of common jute and its substitutes.
In conclusion it may be said that Pakistan's plan 
for jute manufacturing is justified on economic grounds* 
Although demand for jute in the developed countries may 
remain static, it is likely to increase substantially in 
the developing countries7 where Pakistan should be able
1/ F.A.O., 'Agricultural Commodities Projection for 1970*, 
Commodity Review* Rome, 1962, pp. 21-22*
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to capture an increasing share of the market* At present 
Pakistan is the main supplier of raw jute in the world 
market, but in the course of time it would be a great 
advantage both in terms of foreign exchange earnings and 
stabilisation policies if she can export most of her raw 
jute in the form of finished products*
2-6 Summary and Conclusions
At the end of each section the conclusions were 
noted* Here the main conclusions of this Chapter are given 
in a summary form.
Discussions on Pakistan's non-devaluation decision 
in 19^9 and her plan for jute manufactui'ing, although not 
directly related to our main topic, x i.e## stabilisation 
policies, are interesting and important as allied problems* 
It was found that the government1s non-devaluation decision 
was mainly influenced by the unique position of Pakistan 
in the world of jute* The plan for jute manufacturing 
indicates that in the course of time an export price 
stabilisation scheme for Pakistan jute may not be necessary 
when almost all her raw jute would be processed within 
the country.
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Of direct relevance and importance are the schemes , 
i.e., buffer stock operation and acreage control, intro­
duced by the government of Pakistan. The experiences of 
the government in these directions are very useful in 
our attempt to formulate a possible price stabilisation 
scheme. The important lesson is that the operation of 
a buffer stock without production regulation would be 
very difficult. The most effective method of production 
regulation appears to be the price mechanism. Thus,, the 
policy objective should be an annual adjustment of the 
price of jute with that of rice prevailing in the preceding 
season, around a level which would induce the jute/rice 
growers to produce in such a way as to equate as nearly 
as possible marginal foreign exchange earnings from 
exporting jute with foreign exchange savings from producing 
rice. Audetailed analysis of this problem is given in 
Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IXX
Problems of* Stabilisation Policies;
Some Schemes Considered
3-1 Introduction
The literature on stabilisation policies - both 
national and international - has been growing especially 
since World War IX. Xt is not possible to give a compre­
hensive discussion of* the literature here. We therefore 
intend to consider only those schemes which appear to 
be relevant to our case study. We shall not consider any 
international stabilisation scheme mainly because first, 
there has been, until now, no such scheme for jute and 
secondly, international schemes for other primary commo­
dities have not, in spite of various efforts, made any 
real progress*
Wide fluctuations in primary commodity prices gave 
rise to an increasing interest which even before World 
War XX led to a concerted action for international 
stabilisation of the primary commodity trade. After the 
World WarXXX various international stabilisation schemes 
were put forward. Thus, in 1951 a United Nations Committee 
of experts in a report on ’Measures for International
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Economic Stability, 1 came out strongly in favour of 
international commodity agreements and called upon the 
World Bank to finance buffer stocks of primary products.
It emphasised the interest which both the exporting and 
importing countries have in promoting such stocks - for 
the importers in cheapening the average cost of imported 
commodities by making purchases in times of recessions 
and releasing reserved stocks in boom periods, and for 
the primary exporters in securing stable foreign exchange 
earnings•
However, a new committee of experts set by the
United Nations in 1953 took a cautious line with respect
1/
to international commodity arrangements. It pointed to
’the tendency of such measures to break do mi as soon as
£heyif&il to serve the immediate national interests of
the members.* Besides, the World Bank did not receive
favourably the suggestion of financing such an operation.
Thus, Professor Myrdal concluded from his experience of
international trade of primary commodities that for the
time being no substantive progress would be made in
solving the problems of international price stabilisation
2/
of primary commodities of underdeveloped countries.
3/ Commodity Trade and Economic Development, p. 43*
2/ Myrdal, G. , jj^&^Xnternational Economy, London, 195&, p#253•
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Similar views were expressed by the experts of the GXTT
report that 'one should not expect any great dramatic
change in international commodity policy* • • Experience
in the post World War period suggests that there are
real difficulties in the way of rapid international
1/
progress in this field . 1
WW may, therefore, conclude that international
action, if any, would be very slow in achieving desirable
results in this field* Under these circumstances, the
various nations will have to design their own policies
to suit the particular characteristics of the commodity 
2/
in question* Hence, we propose to examine some of the 
schemes offered by several eminent economists and see 
if these are suitable for Pakistan jute.
1/ GATT, op* cit*, p. 79*
2/ It is not, however, suggested that international
measures are not necessary. Such measures are desirable 
as being, at least, complementary to national policies.
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3-2 The Bauer-Paish Scheme; Reduction of Fluctuations 
In the Incomes of Primary Producers
Professors Bauer and Paish proposed the above named 
scheme mainly as an alternative to the operation of the 
West African Marketing Boards. The authors thought that 
these marketing Boards had drastically reduced the incen­
tives of the growers of several primary commodities by 
paying them far less than the world market prices* They 
held that these Boards even did not attain their ultimate 
objective, i.e., the stabilisation of the growers1 incomes. 
Though Professors Bauer and Paish had the West African 
Marketing Boards in their minds, they held that* their 
scheme was also suitable to many underdeveloped countries 
producing primary commodities.
The publication of their scheme in the Economic
Journal (December, 1952) was followed by a number of
1/
articles criticising the scheme. Professors Bauer and 
Paish however, vigorously defended their scheme in their 
subsequent writings. We shall not go into the details of 
the long controversy but shall only describe the scheme 
very briefly so as to consider whether it is suitable 
for Pakistan jute*
1/ Hill, P., Economic Journal. June, 1953; Ady, P., ibid., 
September, 1953; Friedman, M., ibid., December, 1954 
Nurkse , P., ICyklos , vol.XI, Fasc.2, 1958.
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T he Bauer-Paisli scheme aims at r e d u c i n g  the v i o l e n c e  
a n d  m a g n i t u d e  of t e m p o r a r y  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  the incomes 
of p r i m a r y  p r o d u c e r s  , w h e t h e r  due to v a r i a t i o n s  in p r i c e s  
or in  the size of the crops , w i t h  as l i t t l e  effect as 
p o s s i b l e  on the rate of a d a p t a t i o n  of s u p p l y  to lo n g p e r i o d  
chan ge s  in demand# T h e i r  s cheme claims to b e  self a d j u s t i n g  
in the sense that there c an be no loss of c o n t a c t  w i t h  
the t r e n d  of p r i c e s  or incomes; and its a d p t a t i o n  w o u l d  
r e n d e r  p o s s i b l e  more a c c u r a t e  f o r e c a s t i n g  of the f l o w  of 
p r o d u c e r s  * i n c o m e s  f o r  a y e a r  or two ahead#
T h e r e  are two c o m p o n e n t s  in the scheme a c c o r d i n g  to 
w h i c h  a p r o d u c e r - p r i c e  is d e t e r m i n e d  each season# The 
first c o m p o n e n t  is a f r a c t i o n  of the e s t i m a t e d  market 
p r i c e  f o r  the current year# The sec o n d  c omponent, w h i c h  
p r o v i d e s  the s m o o t h i n g  element in  the scheme, is d e r i ^ v e d  
f r o m  the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  the r e a l i s e d  p r o c e e d s  in 
the past y e a r s  a n d  the a mounts p a i d  out to p r o d u c e r s  in 
th ose y e ars o n a c c o u n t  of the first c o m p onent# T h ese  
an n u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  are a v e r a g e d  over a g i v e n  n u m b e r  of 
pa s t  y e a r s  a n d  t h e n  d i v i d e d  by  e x p e c t e d  q u a n t i t y  of the 
current year# This gives the s econd c o m p o n e n t  of the 
p r o d u c e r  p r i c e  in the c urrent year. T he two c o m p o n e n t s  
t o g e t h e r  c o n s t i t u t e  the p r i c e  to foe r e c e i v e d  by the 
p r o d u c e r s  in the current y e a r  f o r  ea c h  u n i t  (presumably 
d e l i v e r e d  to the O r g a n i s a t i o n ) .  A  m o v i n g  a v e r a g e  is to
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be used In determining the second component of the price# 
The scheme is claimed to be self adjusting in that an 
over (under) estimate of the first component of the price 
to be received by the growers for the current season 
automatically reduces (increases) the second component 
of the price paid over the relevant number of ensuing 
years* The algebraic formulation of the scheme is as 
follows:
P t i  <*4,1 +  • •
a
where, S= producer price per unit;
P =market price;
P = expected market price;
1^ s fraction of the expected price paid to producers; 
Q =3 volume of the crop;
Q s= expected volume of the crop and 
t S3 current period and hence, t- 1  is the preceding 
period and so on#
Here we shall attempt an examination of the Bauer- 
Paish scheme with Pakistan jute data to see if the specific 
object of the scheme, i•e•, the reduction of fluctuations
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of the growers' incomes from the particular crop, i ♦ e •, 
jute# The testing of the Bauer-Paish scheme with Pakistan 
jute data is based on the following simple assumptions: 
a) The generally accepted hypothesis (explained in 
detail in Chapter I) is that the jute/rice growers' 
decision to devote a certain area to jute is dependent 
on the prices of jute and rice ruling in the preceding 
season# The price response of the jute/rice growers of 
Bast Pakistan over the period 1952-62 was given b y .equa­
tions (l-l) and (l-2)# Here we shall use the equation (l-l)
showing the growers' acreage response to the relative
1/
prices of jute and rice in the previous season#
b) It is assumed that rice prices in East Pakistan
are not affected by the changes in jute acreages# The basis
of this assumption is that the jute area is a very small
proportion of the rice area# Thus, during 1955-60 the
total jute area was about 6 per cent while the rice area,
on the average, was about 83 per cent of the total culti- 
2/
vated area# Hence, one half of the average jute area, if 
devoted to rice, will increase the rice area by less than 
4 per cent# The assumption is necessary because in the
1/ For ready reference the equation (l-l) is cited here:
At= 565.98 + 1894.26 log - 1292.40 log Pr(t_l)#
2/ Govt, of East Pakistan, Agricultural Production Levels
of Bast PakistanT Dacca ,1961 #   —
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testing of the Bauer- Paish scheme we have taken the 
rice prices as given and unaffected by the changes in 
the jute area#
c) While examining the applicability of the Bauer- 
Paish scheme to Pakistan jute, we could not clearly say 
what might have happened to total revenue from jute under 
changing demand and supply conditions# In our testing of 
the scheme it is, however, assumed that total proceeds 
from jute 9 on an average, would have remained the same 
as those actually earned if the scheme were in operation
1/
during the period studied here#
On the basis of the above assumptions, we now
investigate the effects of the Bauer-Paish scheme when
applied to Pakistan jute over a period of five years
2/
starting in 1955-56# The results are summarised in Table 
3-1#
To start the scheme in 1955-56, the Organisation 
would have considered the following factors: a) the jute 
price in the previous year (1 9 5^-5 5 ) went up by about
%/ This is a questionable assumption, but it does not
affect the operation of the scheme if run over a number 
of years*
2/ We have chosen a back date in order to see the difference 
between what actually happened in the free market condi­
tions and what would have happened if the scheme were 
in operation#
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5 per cent while the price of rice went down by about 
24 per cent over the previous year* From the regression 
equation (l-l), the Organisation could calculate the 
likely acreage and the production quantity of raw jute 
in 1955-56. The production quantity would have been about 
29 million maunds which the growers would have produced 
as a response to the relative prices of jute and rice 
prevailing in the preceding season*
Let us now assume that the Organisation has estimated 
the expected price at Rs* 20 per maund in 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 of which 
say, 50 per cent is given to the producers on account of 
the first component. As the scheme starts for the first 
time, let us take the 50 per cent of the average proceeds 
for the preceding three years (1 9 5 2 - 5 5 to 1954-55) and 
divide these by the expected quantity for 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 to get 
the second component of the producer price* Thus, in 
1 9 5 5 - 5 6 the estimated jute
acreage e- 5 6 5 . 9 8 + l894.^1og 22 - 1 2 9 2 . 4 0 log 16 
- 1554.$7 thousand acres;
production « 2 8 . 6  million maunds; and
producer price = Rs• 18 per maund under the scheme*
The unit price of Rs. 18 per maund received by the 
growers in 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 is lower by about 18 per cent compared
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to that of the previous year* As the market price of rice 
also has gone up by about 56 per cent in this year over 
the year before (Table 3-1), the net change in jute produc­
tion would be a fall of about 7 million maunds in 1936-37 
from the levels of the previous year (calculated as before 
with the help of the regression equation l-l)* Thus, the
total supply of raw jute in 1956-37 would be about 21
1/
million maunds*
It is to be noticed that the fall in jute output 
in 1956-57 was accentuated by a sharp rise in the price 
of rice in the previous season* Had the price of jute 
alone gone down by 18 per cent and the price of rice 
remained unchanged, there would have been far less of a 
decline in jiite production than this due to the growers1 
positive response to the relative prices of jute and rice# 
Calculated as before, we get the following estimates:
Year Acreage Production Producer Price
(000 acres)(million mds.) (Rs* per md*)
1956-57 1137*2 2 0 * 9 42 • 6
1957-58 1707.3 31*4 3 0 . 2
1958-59 1479.5 27*2 31*3
1959-60 1489*9 27*4 30*4
(For details see Table 3-l)•
1/ We have ignored the effects of random factors on jute 
output and considered only the results of the growers1 
price responses mainly because we do not know which way 
the random factors would affect jute output. In the 
absence of any special knowledge it is assumedj¥ge effects 
of random factors are their average, zero*
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By running the Bauer-Paish scheme for a period of 
five years starting in 1 9 5 5-56, we find that not only the 
growers' and the ultimate buyers' prices but also the 
growers' incomes (which the scheme intended to stabilise) 
are destabilised and the scheme sometimes led cobweb type 
fluctuations. This is because the average price paid to 
each jute producer might bear such a relationship with 
the price of rice (which also fluctuates) that the jut© 
producers might be induced to devote sometimes more (less) 
land to jute in any year as compared to that of the pre­
vious year for any jute price. This may happen even though 
the receipts from jute are averaged over a number of 
years because the price of rice may fluctuate. Thus, the 
fall in jute output in 1 9 5 6-5 7 , as mentioned before, 
was accentuated by a sharp rise in the price of rice 
in the previous season. Here the rise in the price of 
rice has increased the cobweb effect on jute production.
On the other hand, the jute output in 1957-38 has 
tremendously increased from a level of 21 million maunds 
to 3 1 . million maunds because, the growers have received 
a very high price for jute in the previous season. Xn 
this year the cobweb effect was retarded to some extent.
because of the rise in the price of rice in the previous 
year.
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In the Bauer-Paish scheme, it appears that they
have tacitly assumed that the production of an agricul—
1/
iural commodity is dependent on its price alone# But 
this appears to be an exception rather than the rule*
In almost all cases an agricultural commodity competes 
with one or more alternatives for land and other resources 
of the peasants; and in the case of Pakistan jute it 
certainly does with rice* Thus, if the price of jute is 
left unadjusted with the price of rice in any season, 
there may appear an excess or shortage in jute output in 
the following season which may lead to cobweb type fluctua­
tions in the price of jute and possibly in incomes from 
this commodity* By running the Bauer-Paish scheme for 
Pakistan jute over the period 1955-56 to 1959-60 it was 
found that the growers' and consumers' prices fluctuated, 
on average,by + 43*3 per cent and + 2 8 * 3 per cent respec­
tively as compared to average free market fluctuations of
1/ Professor Bauer while commenting on an earlier draft
of this Chapter, expressed the view that Professor Paish 
and he had considered the x'elative prices (the price of 
particular product and that of substitute) in their 
model* Their model, however, cannot work as the two prices 
(of the particular product and that of substitute) may 
not move in the desired direction* There is no provision 
in the Bauer-Paish model for the adjustment of the price 
of the particular product with that of substitutes so 
that the growers are induced to produce the right quantity 
of the particular product*
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+ 11.4 per cent for the both. The jute growers' incomes 
(which the scheme intended to stabilise) fluctuated, on 
an average , by 24 per cent under the scheme as opposed 
to the average free market fluctuations of + 9 * 6 percent.
Incomes from rice can be smoothed as complementary 
to jute, but this would mean an operation almost through­
out the whole economy of East Pakistan, since rice is 
grown by innumerable peasants. Further, even assuming that 
smoothing the incomes from rice is possible, it does not 
guarantee that the two prices (of jute and rice) would 
move in the right direction to induce the growers to 
produce the desired quantity of jute.
Finally, the Bauer-Paish scheme introduces a certain 
degree of rigidity in the peasants' resource allocation
y
between the two alternative crops. The authoiars themselves 
admit that how much a producer ultimately realises from 
his current crop depends not only on the size of that crop 
but also what happens in the future to his share of the 
total output. Producers may lose (gain) under this scheme, 
if they decide to switch over from this particular crop
1/ The above calculations are very rough and based on
many simple assumptions $ but nevertheless are indicative 
of the results that the scheme would have produced*
2/ This point was also raised by Professor Friedman.
(Friedman, M*, op.cit).
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*to other crops when they are creditors (debtors) on 
account of* the first few years# For instance, if in any 
year there is not an early rain in any particular area 
of the country, the jute/rice growers of this area may 
switch over to winter rice crop later# But in this case 
if a producer is a creditor to the Organisation, he may 
not feel like making this adjustment in resource allocation* 
This is because if he switches over to other lines of 
production (rice in this case), and comes back to this 
particular line pf production (jute), he may find himself 
a debtor instead of a creditor because of the adjustment 
in the second component made in the scheme with the help 
of the moving average* This may happen, for instance, if 
the Organisation pays a higher amount to the growers on 
account of the first component (because of over estima­
tion of the expected market price) which would reduce 
the second component of the producers* price.
The important point about the Bauer-Paish scheme 
is that fluctuations in incomes from jute would be reduced 
if the prices of jute and rice remain stable as this 
would lead to a stable jute output (other things remaining 
the same). As the price of jute and that of rice remained 
stable, in the present illustration, during 1 9 3 8 - 9 to 
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 there was little fluctuation in the quantity
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produced and hence in the incomes from jute (Table 3-1) *
But as the jute/rice growers are responsive to both of 
jute and rice prices while making decisions about jute 
acreage, fluctuations in either or both of them lead 
to fluctuations in the volume produced and thereby in 
incomes from jute as appeared to happen during 1 9 5 5 -5 6  
to 1957-58 (Table 3-1) • The crucial point is that if 
the price of jute is not adjusted to that of rice, fluc­
tuations in incomes from jute are bound to occur via 
fluctuations in output due to the growers* acreage changes 
as a result of the changes in the relative prices of 
jute and rice. In the Bauer-Paish scheme there is no 
provision, as mentioned earlier, to adjust the price of 
jute with that of rice, and hence it is difficult to smooth 
fluctuations in the jute growers* incomes.
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3-3 The Bauer-Yamev Scheme; Organised Commodity 
Stabilisation with Voluntary Participation
The most recent stabilisation scheme was put for-
1/
ward by Professors Bauer and Yamey • The authors claimed 
that their scheme was particularly superior to compulsory 
buffer fund scheme and its application would be practi­
cable under any situation* The above claims and the 
comparatively recent formulation of the scheme deserve 
a detailed comment* Our main concern, however, is to see 
if the scheme is suitable for Pakistan jute*
The main object of the Bauer-Yamey scheme was to 
smooth the receipts per unit of a product or, by allowing 
for variations in output, the total receipts of member 
producers of particular commodities* The scheme, according 
to the authors, could equally be applied to a number of 
countries exporting a particular primary commodity* The 
various advantages, as claimed, were that the scheme 
was voluntary; it did not require any control over 
capacity, production, sale, stocks, exports of y
and it did not directly affect the price of the commodity 
in question (and hence relative prices)*
1/ Economic Papers, vol* l6 , No. 1 , March, 1964*.
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In the Bauer-Yamey scheme the producers of* a 
specific commodity would participate in it according 
to a fixed quantity (to be known as the participation 
quantity) which the producers themselves would decide*
The participation quantity would not necessarily be 
equal to the quantity produced or marketed* There would 
be a ‘smoothing Organisation1 to announce the smoothing 
payment every year (to be known as the smoothing adjust­
ment) per unit of the commodity that it would make to 
members or receive from them* Bach member would receiveo 
or pay the smoothing adjustment as announced by the 
Organisation in respect of his participation quantity 
regardless of his actual output or the price obtained 
by him in the market* (The members themselves and not 
the Organisation would market their crop)* The Organisa­
tion would do no more than decide the appropriate 
smoothing adjustment and handle the buffer fund finances* 
It would broadly resemble a Savings Bank in which the 
participants would have individual accounts, with the 
sole difference that the Organisation and not the 
depositor would determine the amount of his annual 
deposit or withdrawal* Receipts and payments would be 
managed so as to ensure that a member did not during 
his membership receive more from the buffer fund than 
he had actually paid into it.
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Professors Bauer and Yamey claimed that their scheme
was useful for a producer who might wish to stabilise
or smooth his expenditures through time. He could not
do so because as they held, he lacked the * self restraint
necessary to build liquid balances in good years , especially
when he is under strong social pressures to spend up to 
1/
the hilt *•
Our main objection to the scheme is that if a producer 
lacks the necessary * self restraint* to build up liquid 
balances in good years, he may not voluntarily participate 
in the scheme# To assume that he will voluntarily join 
the scheme is to suggest that he has got the foresight 
and self restraint; and if so,why should he join the 
scheme instead of keeping his surpluses (arising during 
good years) in a savings account (thereby avoiding the 
expenses that he would have to pay if he had joined the 
scheme, but on the other hand,earning some interest)? 
Moreover, in the above scheme, the amount to be deposited 
or withdrawn is decided not by the participant but by the 
Organisation# This loss of freedom in operating the 
savings would undoubtedly make the scheme less popular 
than an ordinary savings account•
1/ Bauer and Yamey, op.cit# # p* 105.
l4o
The authors themselves realised that many people
would probably not join the scheme voluntarily* Hence,
they suggested that the scheme could be 1 grafted on to
1/
a compulsory buffer fund1* Our point is that when it 
is made compulsory, its greatest advantage (arising from 
its voluntary nature) is already assumed away* Moreover, 
a compulsory scheme, as the authors visualised, would 
mean the fixing of production shares (participation 
quantity) for individual producers, the making of an 
elaborate list of innumerable jute growers (as is the 
case in East Pakistan) and the maintenance of individual 
accounts. These are undoubtedly very difficult tasks 
and administratively not practicable in the case of East 
PaldLstqn*
The next criticism of the Bauer™Yamey scheme is 
about the timing of its start. The authors had the 
following idea about this: where participation is confined 
to credit worthy producers, a voluntary scheme could be 
started any time* Otherwise, it has to be started at a 
time when it is to receive payments, i.e., when expected 
market prices were considered favourable in relation to 
the chosen smoothing objective.
1/ Bauer and Yamey, op.cit* * p. 112.
l4i
Let us examine "this with respect to the conditions
of the jute growers in East Pakistan* Th.es© peasants are
very poor and generally they live in debt• They have a
continuous credit need for the purchase of basic needs
1 /
and the maintenance of agricultural activities# Incomes
from jute help to meet the cash requirements for all these
purposes to a great extent# Most of the jute growers are
left with practically no surplus after meeting these
expenses# It is ^ therefore, likely that they could not
afford to join the scheme• If this is so, the scheme
would have to be started in a year when the Organisation
itself would have to make payments to the participants•
But this is not a business proposition as the number of
credit worthy peasants in East Pakistan is very low# Thus9
if the scheme is started with government finance, it is
very doubtful if the advances could be recovered in the
2/
subsequent years• It therefore, appears that the Bauer- 
Yamey scheme is not suitable for Pakistan jute as condi­
tions in East Pakistan are not right for the operation'/* 
of such a scheme#
1/Government of Pakistan, Credit Enquiry Commission Report, 
1959, Chapter 3. and Khan, M.I., Pakistan Development 
Review, Spring, 1 9 6 2#
2/Growers* lack of adequate security and their inability to 
make timely repayments are the principal reasons why the 
commercial banks are reluctant to advance credit to the 
East Pakistani agriculturists. See the Credit Enquiry 
Commission Report. Chapter 1 . " " “
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3-4: National Buffer Fund Scheme by Professor Nurkse
Governments in the underdeveloped countries have 
adopted various schemes which usually take either of1 the 
following forms: A central marketing agency (such as the 
West African Marketing Board) guarantees a certain mini™ 
mum price to domestic producers and operates a buffer 
stock# The agency sells the products abx'oad and gives 
the producers an average smoothed price - creating a 
surplus when the export price is high and subsidising 
the producers out of this when the export price is low#
A scheme essentially for the same purpose may operate in 
the form of variable export taxes (when the export price 
is high) and export subsidies (when it is low)• This type 
of scheme is usually practised in South East Asia* An 
exchange control cc^',;roI agency can do the same by lowering 
and raising the official buying rates of foreign exchange 
(known to be practised in Latin America)* All these methods 
are intended to break the connection between variations 
in external prices and export proceeds,on the one hand, 
and the net prices and incomes received by the primary 
producers, on the other#
Professor Nurkse has questioned the wisdom of such 
stabilisation schemes, whatever form they may take, on the
lk$
ground that they tend alternately to limit and to support
*/
tiie volume of export production just at the wrong t ime • 
Professor Nurkse has based, bis arguraont on th© assuinptiou 
that the supply of the primary products does respond to 
prices in the normal way. If this is so, the above policies 
according to him, interfere with the incentives to produce 
more when export prices are high and serve perversely
to keep up production for export when export prices are 
low*
Thus, in his ’National Buffer Fund Policy’ Professor 
Nurkse suggested that the domestic price of the export 
crop should be allowed freedom to follow the world market. 
His scheme would be like this: General taxation (excise 
revenues, income taxes, import and export duties, etct.) 
should be increased in the country during the export 
boom and reduced during the slumps. The export sector 
should not be relied upon entirely to provide revenues 
from taxes. Primary producers (of the export sector) 
should get some of the increased export prices so that 
they are encouraged to produce more. Alternatively, when 
the export prices are falling, they should not be subsi­
dised as this tends to keep up production for export 
when the production should actually fall. By checking both
1/ Nurkse, R., 'Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of 
low income Countries', Kyklos. vol. XI, Fasc. 2 , 1 9 5 8.
tkk
the expansion of incomes and increases in -In imports in 
this manner, a budget surplus could be achieved in boom 
periods so as to accumulate the essential buffer fund of 
foreign exchange available for expenditure in depression 
years# The crucial point, according to Professor Nurkse, 
is that in this case it would be done without interfering 
with incentives to shift resources into or away from the 
production for exports in response to varying market 
conditions* In terms of national income magnitudes, Professor 
Nurkse maintains, this policy would aim at stabilising 
aggregate disposable income and not solely the disposable 
income arising from export production*
The immediate objection to the Nurksian plan of 
stabilisation is that this is a technique suitable only 
for the developed countries. As monetary and fiscal tools 
in the underdeveloped countries are relatively poor, it 
is likely that these countries would be unable to conduct 
ac counter cyclical fiscal policy in the way suggested by 
Professor Nurkse•
In the case of Pakistan, we have seen in Chapter I
that export earnings form only a very small part of the 
national income, and fluctuations in the former have
little effect on the latter* A counter cyclical policy
along the lines suggested by Professor Nurkse is therefore,
1 k5
of limited use in the Pakistani context, even assuming
that this could he conducted successfully. In the absence
of any direct measures raw jute prices would fluctuate
widely and this in combination with fluctuations in the
prices of rice would lead to fluctuations in jute output.
Finally, Professor Nurkse was probably thinking
of those export crops the production of which could be
1/
readily adjusted to the varying market conditions. In the
case of agricultural commodities the world prices might
well go down before the next stream of supply is ready.
This may happen even when an annual crop like Pakistan
jute is being considered. Indeed in 1953 this is exactly
2/
what did occurT
The peculiarity of the jute marketing system in 
Fast Pakistan also accentuates the problem. As there exists 
a long chain of intermediaries between the growers and 
the ultimate consumers, the growers do not immediately 
get a share of any high price paid by the latter. In other 
words, the existence of this long cliain of intermediaries 
extends the time period required to pass the market 
developments to the growers. The jute producers can ill
•rnnmmmmimr-j--  n .  - nr . i      «wn.     —        
V  fhis point was taken up in detail by Professors Bauer 
and Paish. Kylclos t op. cit.
2/ Following the Korean boom prices, the growers employed 
a large area under jute, but when the crop was ready for 
marketing, the expected prices collapsed.
Ik6
afford to store any jute in the hope of '& better prices 
later# Their cash needs (to buy rice, etc*) in the lean 
months following the jute season and the absence of proper 
storing facilities force them to sell most of their crop 
as soon as it is ready for marketing. Hence, if a favourable 
price for jute develops later in the season, most of it 
goes to large exporters of raw jute. When the jute growers 
get a share of increased prices and are ready to market 
their product after a crop year, it may be too late. iH 
this way a cobweb cycle may well develop. All this points 
to the conclusion that the Nurkse plan is inappropriate 
in the case of Paltistan. At best, a plan for stabilising 
national income through contra-cyclical fiscal policies, 
as suggested by Professor Nurkse, could be used as comple­
mentary to commodity stabilisation schemes*
14?
5-5 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter no international stabilisation 
scheme was considered because it is thought that such an 
action in achieving stabilisation through international 
measures would be very slow. The primary producing under­
developed countries would do better to seek solutions to 
the problems of instability for the specific commodity 
with which they are concerned#
I have; therefore, examined three specific proposals 
in this Chapter. The Bauer-Paish and the Bauer-Yamey schemes, 
aimed at reduction of fluctuations in the incomes of primary 
producers, were found to be inadequate for Pakistan jute* 
Professor Nurkse rightly visualised the fact that the 
producers of primary commodities positively respond to 
price incentives and hence found fault with several stabilisa­
tion measures# The Nurksian scheme to stabilise national 
income by a method of contra cyclical fiscal policy was,
however, found to be limited in its scope in the Pakistani 
context#
148
CHAPTER IV
A Price Stabilisation Model for Pakistan Jute
The lagged relationship between the relative prices 
of jute and rice and the growers* supply of jute is a 
very crucial one* The various stabilisation measures 
for jute taken by the government of Pakistan (namely, 
the buffer stock operation, acreage control, etc.) were 
not successful because this important relationship was 
not taken into consideration. On the same ground the 
Bauer-Paish scheme, as examined in the previous Chapter, 
is not found very useful for Pakistan jute. The experiences 
of the government of Pakistan, in combination with the 
background information of Chapter 1, will help us guard 
against mistakes already made and will be useful in our 
attempt to formulate a possible price stabilisation 
scheme.
Let us first define the particular object of our 
proposed model. We found that there were wide fluctuations 
in raw jute prices in both the domestic and export markets. 
These fluctuatxons were of a cobweb type. The cobweb 
cycle arose from the fact that while the demand for jute
1^9
1/
depends on the current price, the supply of* jute In 
any season depends on, among other factors, the relative 
prices of* jute and rice in the preceding season* A statis­
tical investigation has revealed that fluctuations in the 
supply of jute were more responsible than those in demand 
for the short-run instability in the export price of, and 
proceeds from, Palcistan jute. The object of our proposed
scheme is, therefore, the stabilisation of the export
2/
price of raw jute.
By insulating the relative price of jute and rice 
received by the jute/rice growers from the export price 
of raw jute, it is hoped to eliminate as far as possible 
the cobweb cycle in the price and production of the 
commodity. The maintenance of a national buffer stock 
of raw jute would make it possible to reduce short-run 
fluctuations in the export price caused by unforeseen 
changes in demand and/or in planned output. The price
1/ This is the ceteris paribxis type demand function#
Demand for jute is, in fact, a function of the current 
jute price, the price of substitutes, the current out­
put of jute-using commodities, etc# as incorporated 
in the U.K. demand function for raw jute in Chapter I.
2/ Mr. MacBean also came to such a conclusion, but he 
did not show how it was to be done. See *Problems of 
Stabilisation Policy in Underdeveloped Countries1 in 
Oxford Economic Papers« October, 1962 . "™
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mechanism to be followed in "the proposed model would
make it relatively easy to operate such a national buffer
stock of raw jute* It is however to be remembered that
the intention is not to permanently stabilise the export
price at a fixed level, rather the export price of raw
jute would vary according to changes in demand for this
commodity, or changes in the cost of production* The
criterion of the export price stabilisation is to keep
the country's net gains from jute production and export
at the maximum level by adjusting supply to changing
1/
demand conditions•
In the following sections, w© shall first discuss 
the problems of determining the optimum export quantity of 
raw jute under a given demand condition and then how to 
regulate the output of jute in order to meet the optimum 
export quantity* Supply regulation, both with the help of 
a price mechanism and a national buffer stock opex-ation, 
is mainly relied upon in the proposed model to reduce 
cobweb fluctuations in the export price of raw jute* In 
Appendix 4-A the scheme is tested with empirical data*
%/ Stabilisation for its own sake is meaningless; it is to 
serve some purpose which is here to optimise national 
gains from the production and export of raw jute* Since 
demand for raw jute is not within the control of Pakistan, 
we can act only through supply by regulating output in 
order to minimise cobweb fluctuations*
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4-2 Optimum Allocation of Resources between Jute and Rice
It was explained in Chapter I (Section 1-3) that 
jute and rice in East Pakistan compete with each other 
for the same scarce resources (mainly land) of the peasants* 
The rapidly increasing domestic demand for food has made 
East Pakistan a net importer of food grains. Since rice 
can be obtained directly through domestic production or 
indirectly through the production and export of jute, it 
is an important problem to determine the optimum point of 
jute and rice production for both the individual producer 
and the nation as whole*
The familiar concept of comparative (cost) advantage 
can well be applied to the Pakistani case of jute and rice 
production and trade* The following exposition is, however, 
based on certain simple assumptions such as that the world 
can be represented by two economies, each of which has 
given tastes and given quantities of factors of production; 
that only two goods are produced; and that perfect competi­
tion prevails in all, markets* On these assumptions we can 
represent the given techniques of production of jute and 
rice and given quantities of factors of production by the 
transformation curve TT (Figure 4.1) showing the maximum 
amount of either of the commodities, or any combination
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of them that can be produced. The transformation curve,
TT, ±a assumed to be concave to the origin and therefore 
indicates increasing opportunity cost.
The demand side of the economy is represented by
a set of community indifference curves the construction
1/
of which involves a number of difficulties. In a closed 
economy the equilibrium point will be P (C$ where both 
the community indifference curve 1 and the price ratio,
HR, are tangential to the transformation curve, TT, indi­
cating the equality of the rates of substitution between
y
commodities in production and consumption.
Now if we introduce international trade on the 
assumption that the country can exchange its goods at a 
different price ratio than the closed economy price ratio, 
it will indicate that the country is better off with trade, 
since it will be able to move to a higher indifference curve.
1/ Economists usually employ a number of restrictive
assumptions while using the community indifference curve. 
We shall not go into the details as in the ensuing 
treatment of the problem we intend to avoid the use of 
the community indifference curve.
2i/ The optimum allocation of the given resources between 
the two outputs of jute and x^ ice/^ la^ r^ he equation:
MSU. MSU j = r
MSC . MSC 
J  r
i.e., the ratio of the marginal social utility of jute (MSU.)
to the marginal social cost of jute (MSC.) must equal the **
corresponding ratio for rice. J
15k
In the open economy equilibrium, the world price line,
±8 tangent to both the country’s transformation 
curve at and tics the community indifference curve 2«
In other words, the country will now move from the produc­
tion point P to P^ and consumption point C to C^, exporting 
AA^ of jute for of rice*
It was noted in Chapter I that Pakistan, being a 
monopolist in the export market of raw jute, can influence 
the world price of raw jute by changing the export 
quantity* On the other hand, as Pakistan’s import of rice 
consists of a tiny portion of the world rice trade, she 
cannot influence its price# In these circumstances, a 
restriction of the volume of raw jute export by Pakistan 
will imply an increase in the export price. In this case, 
Pakistan need not fear retaliation in terms of a higher 
import price of rice, as rice is supplied by many countries* 
Thus, since the elasticity of foreign demand for Pakistan 
raw jute is not infinitely great (within the relevant 
price range) and since no retaliatory measures need be 
feared, it would be in the interests of the country to 
restrict export and production of raw jute as this would 
release land and other resources for the production of 
rice# The above problem, therefore, closely approximates
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the optimum tariff case* The formula for an optimum
1/
tariff is, in the words of Professor Haberler, 1 that
marginal terms of trade, i*@*, marginal revenue or marginal 
receipts from exports, should be equated to the marginal 
rate itransformation, i.e., marginal opportunity cost in 
domestic production* f
We shall, however, enunciate the problem at hand in 
a way different from the usual theoretical treatment of 
the optimum tariff casef^ mainly because the proposed
3/
treatment enables empirical testing to be carried out*
The determination of the optimum export quantity of 
raw jute from Pakistan is, therefore, based on the follow­
ing assumptions:
i) First, it is assumed that changes in jute output 
are mostly sit; determined by the variations in land input 
alone ( equations 1-3 and 1-4) and that land is very
1/ Haberler, G*, A Survey of International Trade Theory, 
Princeton, 1 9 6 1, p, 3 3 .
2/ The determination of optimum tariff involves the
use of the community indifference curves which makes 
empirical testing difficult*
3/ See Appendix 4-A*
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1/
scarce in supply. This being so, we can further assume 
that the real costs of production per acre of jute and 
rice are more or less similar*
1/ There is no information with respect to the use of 
labour or capital inputs for individual crops in East 
Pakistan. Given the nature of production and ownership 
of factors of production, etc.^ the question of labour 
is one of allocation of time by the peasant and his 
family which may be determined by the allocation of his 
land to either crop. Under these constraints the total 
output of jute (0 .) in thousand maunds was regressed 
upon land under jilte (L.) in thousand acres by taking 
data over the period 1 9^2-6 2 , the resulting equation as 
shown below, indicates a high degree of correlation 
(about 91 per cent of the variance is explained by the 
independent variable* The introduction of a time trend, 
t, -Ui Qc\'k (yvh^ i , does not modify this result.
Log 0. as 1 .8 7 8 + 0.8l4 log L.
J (0.084) 3
R = 0.913 Degrees of freedom = 9
Log 0. = I . 8 5 7 + 0.824 log L. ~ 0.0016 t 
3 (0.088) 3 (0.0025)
2R as 0.917 Degrees of freedom as 8
The regression coefficient of log L . is so high 
because the production of jute is very laild intensive.
Between jute and rice, the former is slightly more 
labour intensive than the latter. Hence, in the course 
of time when more and more labour is drawn off to urban 
occupations, labour as an input cannot be excluded 
from the production function. We, however, assume that 
this economic development leading to rural labour 
shortage, will take some time.
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ix) For the moment we assume that the whole quantity
of raw jute is exported* (This assumption is made for ease
of exposition* We shall relax this assumption in the
following section when the domestic consumption of raw
jute will also he considered)*
iii) It is assumed that the government is the sole
authority with respect to jute export and rice import*
Thus, for the jute/rice growers, only the domestic prices
of jute and rice are relevant* In the case of jute, the
harvest price and in the case of rice, the retail buying
price are used as explained in Chapter I*
If the domestic price of rice (which the average 
1/
jute growers pay) is equal to the import price of rice,
the opportunity cost of export production of jute for the
country as a whole and that for the growers would be the
same* Let us for the moment assume that these two prices
(domestic and import prices of rice) are the same* Having
made these assumptions, we can now demonstrate the problem
in a partial equilibrium diagram*
*
±J It was explained in Chapter I why the buying price 
as opposed to the selling price of rice is relevant 
to calculate the growers* marginal opportunity cost*
/[**
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In Figure 4*2, DD is the foreign demand function 
for raw jute from Pakistan* Along the Y axis price is 
measured in Rupees per maund at the official rate of 
exchange; and along the X axis the export quantity of 
raw jute is measured* DM is the relevant marginal revenue 
curve and MC (=SS) is the marginal opportunity cost curve 
(the marginal cost of producing one more unit of raw jute 
export being equal to the import price of rice multiplied 
by the number of units of rice which could alternatively 
be produced on the same land necessary to produce the 
marginal unit of jute)* As an expansion of jute output 
can take place on land progressively more suitable for 
the production of rice, the marginal opportunity cost 
curve will be rising*
In Pakistan as raw jute is produced by innumera-ble 
small peasants, conditions would approximate those of a 
competitive model. Each individual producer considers 
the price of jute as given and hence each tries to equate 
his marginal(opportunity) cost with marginal revenue (not 
shown in Figure 4*2)* But marginal revenue under competi­
tive conditions is equal to price* As each peasant tries 
to maximise individual profits, they would, therefore, in 
competition produce among themselves 0 Q1 quantity when
1^1 is the price* In other words, in the absence of any
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Figure 4 .2.
l6o
intervention by the government the equilibrium is estab­
lished when supply is OQ1 and the price is P1Q1*
But since the country as a whole is faced with a 
downward sloping demand curve for raw jute* the country’s 
net gain is not maximised when 0Q1 quantity of raw jute 
is produced and exported* because at this quantity the 
marginal opportunity cost is higher than the marginal 
revenue (which at OQ^ is less than zero). It would then 
pay the country as a whole to cut down the export production 
of raw jute to OQ where the marginal revenue is equal to 
the marginal opportunity cost. Thus* OQ would be the national 
optimum export quantity and PQ is the optimum export price*
In order to induce the growers to supply this optimum 
export quantity it would be sufficient to give them a 
price equal to HQ, given the price of rice*
Let us now consider a case where the import price
of rice is different from the domestic price of rice
which the jute growers pay, thus giving rise to two
different opportunity costs - on© for the country as a
1/
whole and the other for the jute growers* This is important
1/ The import price of rice mfcy be different from the 
domestic price of rice and the evidence is that the 
former is lower than the latter* Over the period 1957-61 
the import price of rice (CIP)* on the average* was 
about Ks* 24 per maund (including marketing costs, etc.),
(continued)
l6i
because we are considering the net gains from jute export 
for the country as a whole* If the import pricB of rice 
is lower than the domestic price, as the evidence suggests, 
the marginal opportunity cost curve relevant for the 
country, Me/ (sS^ would lie at the right of the one 
relevant for the jute growers, MC (=SS) in Figure 4.2*
It appears from Figure 4*2 that the optimum export 
quantity for the country as a whole would be 0Q/when 
Mt'(s's'J is the marginal opportunity cost curve (or supply 
curve for the icoUnjb'ryy- ))♦•
Thus, when the import price of rice is lower than 
the domestic price of rice, the optimum export quantity
(continued from page l6o)
whereas the average domestic price of rice over the same 
period was about Rs• 29 per maund* (Calculated from the 
Government of East Pakistan, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics)* 
Although the U.S. PL480 rice has been procured somewhat 
more cheaply, it is limited in supply and cannot be relied 
upon* In Pakistan the government is the sole importer of 
rice and the imported rice is sold through rationing mostly 
in the urban areas• There being a physical control on the 
quantity of rice that one can buy from ration shops and the 
rationed rice being a small portion of the total quantity 
consumed in a given period, one might take into consideration 
two prices of rice -* the government controlled ration shop 
price and the open market price* For the purpose of calculating 
the jute growers' opportunity cost, we shall however ignore 
the controlled ration shop price of rice•
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of raw jute is larger by QQ> Tbis is obvious because 
we are equating marginal export receipts with, marginal 
opportunity cost* This would mean that the jute growers 
are now to be given ifof price (instead of RQ) in order to 
induce them to produce the national optimum export 
quantity which is Oc/here* When there is a difference 
between the import price of rice and the domestic one, 
an adjustment has therefore to be made in the national 
optimum export quantity and the price to the producers*
The price mechanism necessary to regulate the optimum 
export production is explained in the following section.
4^3 Implementation of the Scheme
In Figure 4*2 it was demonstrated that in the 
absence of any intervention by the Pakistan government, 
the jute growers in competition among themselves tend 
to supply an export quantity which is larger than the 
national optimum* But as the government of Pakistan 
imposes a fixed tax per unit of raw jute export, the 
jute growers receive a price less than what the ultimate 
buyers, i.e., foreign importers pay (the cost of processing 
and marketing of jute excluded)* The growers therefore, 
with a lag of one year, supply a quantity lower than
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what they would do in the absence of the export duty 
imposed by the Pakistan government* There is no reason 
however to believe that as a result of the export duty 
on raw jute* only the national optimum quantity is 
produced and exported where the marginal revenue is 
equal to marginal opportunity cost. Moreover, this export 
duty does not seem to eliminate or minimise the cobweb 
fluctuations in the relative price and production of jute* 
This is because the export duty on raw jute is a revenue 
raising device rather than one for regulating the export 
production of jute since once a tax is imposed it is 
hardly changed for a few years although the factors deter­
mining the supply of jute might change over time. As the 
jute/rice growers plan their current jute production 
according to the relative prices of jute and rice prevailing 
in the preceding season, fluctuations in the average price 
of rice alone, given the price of jhte, can lead to year 
to year fluctuations in the jute output. Thus, even if 
we assume that the demand function for raw jute remains 
stable from one year to another, fluctuations in the export
price will occur via fluctuations in supply due to changes
1/
in the relative prices of jute and rice. The export
1/ In Chapter I we produced evidence that the demand for 
raxir jute was more stable than the supply of raw jute*
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taxation of* raw jute therefore is not suitable for 
optimum production regulation or for reducing the cobweb 
fluctuations as it is difficult to adjust this tax on 
raw jute export every year with the changes in the price 
of rice or in demand conditions*
It would thei'efore be an advantage if we can project 
foreign and domestic demand for raw jute from which we 
can calculate the optimum quantity of jute production 
before the sowing of jute and rice starts every year 
and by setting the appropriate producer price for jute 
attempt to induce the growers to produce this optimum 
quantity# It is expected that the cobweb cycle in the 
export price and supply of raw jute will be eliminated 
or largely reduced as in the proposed scheme the producer 
price of raw jute is adjusted every year with the price 
of rice prevailing in the preceding season in accordance 
with the required (projected) production quantity.
Let us now explain this possible method of optimum 
production regulation in detail* A 11 Jute Price Stabilisa­
tion Board11 (or Stabilisation Board in short), let us 
suppose, is given the responsibility for ascertainingy 
well before the sowing starts, the approximate quantity 
of raw jute that Pakistan will have to supply to meet 
the domestic needs and the optimum export quantity.
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With regard to the domestic needs* the government has
got a definite poXicy objective! which is to manufacture
1/
domestically as much jute as possible. The domestic
demand for raw jute is* therefore, more or less known
and is determined by the capacity of the domestic jute
processing industry* With the help of supply and demand
elasticities, estimated by the multiple regression equations
1 -2  and 1 -5 respectively, we can calculate so far as is
practicable, the national optimum export quantity for
2/
a particular period* Over and above these two quantities, 
it is proposed that the Stabilisation Board should maintain 
a buffer stock of raw jute to cope with any short-run
3/
changes in demand and/or in the planned output of jute*
All these three components will constitute the projected 
production quantity which is expressed in the following 
equation:
°t = xt + ct ± ut 
where, 0 .^ is the projected production quantity; is the
1/ Government of Pakistan, Outline of the Third Five 
Year Plan (1965-70), p. 129". “  — ~
2/ The methods of estimating the national optimum export 
quantity are discussed and worked out in Appendix zl~A*
3/ The buffer stock in the proposed model is to be used 
only as a second line of defence; its special features 
are discussed in the following sections* The main device 
for the optimum supply regulation is the price mechanism*
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national optimum export quantity; is the domestic 
consumption and is the necessary adjustment in the 
buffer stock to be maintained by the Board; ail in the 
c \ t  period (t) for which the projection is made.
After determining the projected production quantity 
the important task of the Board is to fix the appropriate 
producer price for raw jute (which the Board will offer 
to the jute growers for the current period) and to announce
it well before the sowing starts for this period. The 
announced price which will remain unchanged during the 
whole period is to be determined in relation to the 
prevailing price of rice in the preceding season. This 
can be done with the help of either regression equation 
1 -1  or 1-2. These equations, calculated and discussed in
2
detail in Chapter 1 , are reproduced here for ready referenceT 
As both the equations provide a good fit, we shall use 
equation 1 -2 as it gives a direct relationship between 
output in the current season and the prices of jute and 
rice in the preceding season. As we know the projected
1/ This must be given widest publicity so that the jute/rice 
growers can know the offered price for jute when they 
plan their resource allocation between jute and rice.
1/
2/ At = 5 6 5 . 9 8  + 1894.2,6 log - 1292.40 log Pr(t_l} (
°t = l8°5.46 +49 7 ^ 6 3 log Pj(t_1) - 2 5 0 4 . 8 8
16?
quantity to be produced in period t (0^) and the price 
of rice prevailing in period (t-l), we can get the value 
of* log P^ . ^   ^^ by substituting the values of 0^ and
log P /, .v in equation (1-2 ). If we now take the anti-log
in } 1/ 
of this, we get the appropriate price of jute per maund
which is to be paid to the growers in period (t) in order
to induce them to produce the projected quantity.
The jute/rice growers will, therefore, consider the
Board*s guaranteed price of jute for the current season
(which was announced before the start of the sowing )
instead of the actual price of jute prevailing in the
previous season in relation to that of rice in the immediate
2/
past season as a basis for their production decision* The 
price of rice would vary according to free market conditions 
while that of jute would be adjusted every year with the 
price of rice prevailing in the preceding season. Thus, 
jute production can be regulated either by changing the 
price of jute or that of rice (to which also the growers 
respond); but rice production being almost the entire 
agricultural activity in East Pakistan, it would be very
1/ Given the price of rice, the jute/rice growers would 
have px'oduced this quantity, (0 , ) if this price of jute 
prevailed in period (t-1 ).
2/ The Stabilisation Board, as explained later, will have 
a statutory power to act as the only buyer of raw jute 
in the domestic market and only seller in the export market*
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difficult and costly to control rice price for the 
purpose of regulating jute output.
Thus, if the Board finds that the projected produc­
tion quantity should be larger (smaller) than the likely
a
quantity which will be produced by the growers as/response 
to the relative prices prevailing in period (t-l), the 
Board will offer for the pdriod (t) a higher (lower) price 
for jute than the one prevailing in the preceding period* 
The extent to which the price of jute is to be changed 
in relation to that of rice will depend on the extent 
of variation that the Board desires to attain in the 
quantity of raw jute to foe produced in a particular period. 
The appropriate producer price of raw jute, given the 
price of rice and the projected production quantity, is 
to be calculated with the help of regression equation 1—2 
as explained earlier.
Let us illustrate this further with the help of a 
diagram. In Figure 4.3 let us measure domestic jute and 
rice prices in the form of a ratio along the Y axis and 
the total quantity of jute output along the X axis. SS is 
the growers1 supply curve of jute. Let us assume that 
the Stabilisation Board has estimated that in a particular 
period (t) 0Qq is the projected production quantity. The
Figure
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jute growers will produce this quantity onXy when the
jute/rice price ratio is • If the Stabilisation Board
finds that the jute/rice price ratio in the preceding
season was 3, or 30 , it will set a price for jute in
such a way that the ratio becomes J so that the projected
1 /
quantity is produced#
It is to be noted that the projected quantity, 0Qq ,
will be produced if the jute/rice price ratio is JQ,
provided that there is no other factor except the relative
prices of jute and rice that affects the total output of
jute* Since there are some random factors that also influence
the output of jute, the exact projected quantity will not
be produced even if the relative prices are appropriate
(J^ in this case)* The following section will discuss
how this problem (and also other related problems arising 
unforeseen
from/is-oo^factors) can be tackled with the help of a 
buffer stock operation* The important point which we want 
to emphasize here is that since we do not know which way 
the random factors will affect total output of jute, it 
will be an advantage to control those observable factors 
(i*e«, the relative prices of jute and rice) that are
1/ The ratio is determined by dividing the Board*s set 
price for jute in period (t) by the actual price of 
, rice in period (t-l).
j
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important determinants of jute supply* To safe guard 
against the random influences we can adopt other measures, 
such as the buffer stock operation suggested in this 
scheme*
k-h Export Price Stabilisation through Buffer Stock 
Operation
In the preceding section it was argued that by 
inducing the jute/rice growers through the price mechanism 
to produce the projected quantity of raw jute it would be 
possible to largely reduce the fluctuations in the export 
price (due to cobweb fluctuations in the relative price 
and production of raw jute) and at the same time to keep 
the country*s net gains from jute production and export 
at the maximum level* Although the Stabilisation Board , 
by setting the appropriate producer price, will attempt 
to induce the jute/rice growers to produce the projected 
quantity of raw jute, the actual output may be smaller 
or larger than the planned one because of the presence
of random factors, such as weather, etc*
On the demand side also it is likely that the 
forecast as to the foreign demand may not be completely
correct; actual demand for the current season may not
1 7 2
be the same as expected* This may be so because the above
forecast will be made on the basis of the multiple regression
\)y UAfoxtj
equation (U.K. import demand function) calculated /past
1/
time series dataT In the meantime, the various factors, 
such as prices of substitutes, production of jute-using 
commodities, etcaffecting import demand for raw jute 
might have changed. As a result, the foreign demand 
function for raw jute for the current period (for which 
the projection is made) may be different from what the 
Stabilisation Board had anticipated.
Thus, shifts in current demand and/or supply functions 
may lead to a new equilibrium position requiring a different 
quantity of raw jute than what was actually planned* To 
cope with such unforeseen changes either in actual demand 
or in supply or in both, it is proposed that the Board 
will operate a buffer stock (wEich may be within .the 
range of per cent of the normal annual output of
jute).
While initiating the scheme, the Stabilisation Board
1/ As will be shown in Appendix A, the optimum export
quantity is calculated with the help of long-run supply 
and demand elasticities for raw jute and hence, this is 
some sort of an average quantity* The year to year 
optimum export quantity would however vary around this 
average quantity.
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will set the producer price in such a way that a total 
of three quantities is produced* These are quantities 
for export, domestic consumption and buffer stock (less 
the stocks existing with the private dealers to be acquired 
by the Board)* At the end of the projection period the 
Board should be left with only the quantity produced for 
the buffer stock provided every thing else remains the 
same as planned• But every thing may not turn out as 
expected and hence at the end of the projection period, 
after meeting the optimum export quantity and the domestic 
consumption needy the Stabilisation Board may be left 
with either a shortage or an excess in the planned buffer 
stock* Xn the following year's projection of production 
quantity this will be taken into consideration by setting 
thea appropriate producer price to adjust the buffer stock* 
This will be further illustrated in the following section*
We shall now illustrate a case where the operation
of a buffer stock would enable the Stabilisation Board
to reduce export price fluctuations arising from short-run
changes in demand and/or supply. In Figure 4.4 let us
assume that a parallel shift in the foreign demand curve
1/
from DD to occurs * Let us also assume that the
marginal opportunity cost curve for the growers (which £s
l|— *— ii '   ■■'■I' 1    — r T^ -in-n „ m — V1 j,,,, _ — — ,—  j
i,j 1/ The demand function mpy shift in various ways. This
particular one is shown only for illustrative purposes.
V
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also assumed here to be the supply curve for the country 
as a whole), MC=SS, is constant. When DD shifts to D . ^  
the optimum export quantity would be anc  ^the optimum
export price would rise from to 3?2^2# assume that
this excess demand, » could not be foreseen and hence
the producer price of jute could not be adjusted to 
induce the growers to produce the excess quantity required 
by the shift of the demazid curve. In these circumstances 
the excess demand quantity would be met from the buffer 
stock. In the absence of the buffer stock, the export 
price would have risen to NQ^ and the country’s net gains 
from jute export would have been sub-optimal.
Conversely, if the foreign demand curve were to 
shift from to DD, it would pay the country to contract
the export quantity from 0 Q2 to 0 Q1 (where the marginal 
export receipts from jute equates the marginal opportunity 
cost), the rest being withheld in the buffer stock. ( In 
the next year’s projection of production quantity, the 
buffer stock is to be adjusted as the old stock has gone 
up over the preceding year). Thus, the operation of the 
buffer stock helps, in this instance, to maintain the
export price somewhat(from falling to LQq) at P .Q ..<& 1 1
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It will bo however very difficult to precisely 
calculate the optimum export quantity for the current 
period and to obtain the exact point of intersection 
between the marginal foreign exchange receipt and the 
marginal opportunity cost# In practice we can only estimate 
the average optimum export quantity (also very roughly) 
by taking data over some past years# On the basis of this, 
(i#e#y by extrapolation), we can project the export quantity 
for a future period# If demand changes for this period, 
the operation of a buffer stock would be useful# For 
example, if it is found that the quantity demanded is 
rising at a given price, the Stabilisation Board would 
expand export and at the same time raise the export price 
as shown in Figure 4#4• This may not lead to the exact 
optimum position, but nevertheless is a useful rule of 
thumb #
Thus, the operation of a buffer stock would be an 
£xauQj3:i3x important aid to the proposed price mechanism in 
achieving some stability in the export price of Pakistan 
jute*
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4-5 Special Features of the Proposed Model
The specific object of the proposed model is to 
maximise net foreign exchange receipts from jute by 
reducing export price fluctuations which arise due to 
the cobweb fluctuations in the relative price and produc­
tion of raw jute. The main device adopted for this purpose 
as explained so far is to project the optimum production 
quantity and then by setting the appropriate producer 
price for jute (in relation with the price of rice pre­
vailing in the preceding season) to induce the jute/rice 
growers to produce this optimum quantity in the current 
season* The maximimsation of the net export receipts from 
this commodity would provide the criterion for regulating 
the production of jute. The operation of a national buffer 
stock would enable the Stabilisation Board to cope with 
any unforeseen changes in demand and/or in the planned 
output of jute#
When the jute growers make large responses to the 
relative prices of jute and rice with a lag of one year 
(thus price - output relationship results in a cobweb 
cycle)) the proposed price mechanism to adjust supply to 
changes in demand appears to be an appropriate policy in
1?8
order to attain the specific object (i.e., maximisation 
of the country1^  net export receipts from raw jute), and 
at the same time reduce export price fluctuations# The 
proposed method is superior to the existing policy of the 
Pakistan government (i*e., to guarantee a minimum price 
to the growers irrespective of the price of rice, etc, 
explained in Chapter XI)* It was found that the minimum 
price as announced by the government after the crop is 
already planted is not intended to regulate the supply 
of jute and does not therefore reduce the cobweb fluctua­
tions •
Another usual method of price stabilisation as 
adopted by the West African Marketing Board, is to 
withhold part of the proceeds from the producers in 
times of high prices and pay out the accumulated funds
1/in years of low prices, thus evening out peaks and troughs*
This policy is wrong also because it gives incentives to
the growers to produce more or curtail production just 
the
at/wrong time* This type of scheme even in its improved 
version as proposed by Professors Bauer and Paish, is not 
useful for Pakistan jute as shown in Chapter III*
1/ For details of the West African Mar Zeeting Boards see 
Bauer, P.T., West African Trade, Cambridge, 195^ t and 
Professors Bauer and Paish, op* cit*
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In the proposed model, therefore, if* the Stabilisa­
tion Board foresees a rise in demand for raw jute, it would 
be appropriate, ceteris paribus, to offer a higher price 
to the growers relative to that of rice (and must be 
announced before the sowing starts) to induce the growers 
to supply the projected quantity* Xf the favourable demand 
.develops later in the season after the sowing of the crop 
the excess is to be supplied from the national buffer 
stoclc to be maintained by the Board*
Let us now examine how effectively the proposed 
scheme can handle the usual problems of buffer stock 
operations and the problems of internal price adjustment 
as required in the proposed scheme#
Experiences show that operating a buffer stock 
involves difficult problems unless
i) it can be limited in size and used primarily 
to smooth out short-run fluctuations in supply;
ii) deterioration and wastage in storage may be 
caused if the stock is kept for long and if the old stock 
cannot be cleared in short intervals; and
iii) there may be a tendency for a buffer stock 
to grow beyond the limited storage capacity or funds, if 
the operating agency cannot cut back supply when it is 
necessary#
i8o
In formulating the proposed scheme, care has been 
taken that these problems do not arise or are minimised* 
The buffer stock in this scheme, as explained earlier, 
will be operated only to meet short-term changes in 
demand and/or supply; and the main device for reducing 
the cobweb fluctuations would be the production regulation 
through the price mechanism. As the buffer stock is to 
be adjusted every year, it is likely that the size of 
the buffer stock and the funds necessary fox'* its operation 
would be fairly manageable. As the annual output would 
be regulated, it would not be a great problem to cut back 
stock or increase it as the case may be. For instance, 
if the total quantity of raw jute actually demanded in 
any period is less than the projected one, or if the 
actual output is larger than the planned one, there will 
arise an excess supply of raw jute. Xn the projection 
of the following period, this is to foe taken into consi­
deration. Other things remaining the same, the Stabilisa­
tion Board will now lower the price to the jute growers 
in relation to that of rice, so that the projected 
production quantity is reduced as there is already an 
excess in the stock*
Xn an opposite situation, if the actual quantity 
demanded is greater than the pi^ojected quantity, or if
l8i
there is a shortfall in the planned outpuj?, the shortage
will now be met from the buffer stock. In the following
year, the buffer stock is to be adjusted by offering the
growers a higher price for jute in relation to the existing
price of rice, ceteris paribus. This is the way the
Stabilisation Board in this model will check the rise
beyond or a fall below what it considers to be a 1 normal1
buffer stock for a particular period® The flexibility in
the buffer stock adjustment would enable the Board to adjust
the export quantity (to the optimum level) under changing
demand conditions. It is the inability of a buffer stock
organisation to cut supply when demand has fallen which
1/
leads to its breakdown.
Let us now examine whether the proposed Stabilisation 
Board will be in a position to make the necessary price 
adjustments without any political problem or disadvantage 
to the jute/rice growers.
2 /
The political problem may arise as a result of the 
dissatisfaction of the growers following a downward
of the price
adjustment (lowering one price when the other has fallen) £
1/ The experience of the Pakistan government in 1951 when, 
after the collapse of the Korean boom, it had to abandon 
the support price to the growers, is a case in point•
2/ Given the existing set up of the rural economy of Bast
Pakistan, where jute aiJd rice are produced by innumerable
will1 beeaaanV  H itriS Unlikely that any political problem will be created. (continued)
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of jute with that of rice. Such a necessity may arise 
because of either or all of the following reasons:
i) the foreign demand function for raw jute might 
have shifted to the left;
ii) the domestic price of rice might have fallen; and
iii) the Stabilisation Board might have accumulated 
a large stock from the previous period.
When the price of jute (relative to that of rice) 
is to be lowered because the foreign demand function has 
shifted to the left (case i) , or the Board has accumulated 
a large stock from the previous year (case iii), this 
would be disadvantageous for the jute growers provided 
they had already sown a large area to jute because in 
this case their combined income from jute and rice would 
fall. But as the producer price of jute in the proposed 
scheme is to be announced well before the sowing starts 
for both the crops, the peasants would be able to make 
the necessary and timely adjustments in their allocation 
of land and other resources between those two crops. Thus, 
an early announcement of the guaranteed price of jute may 
act as a warning or an advice to the growers as to an
(continued from previous foot note)
Under the existing political system the small growers 
in East Pakistan do not exercise any real political power*
We are therefore concerned with economic merits and demerits 
of any action taken by the government.
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optimum allocation of their land and other resources 
between the production of these two crops. In the absence 
of such a scheme the growers would have probably produced 
a larger quantity of raw jute, but as the demand function 
has shifted to the left, they would not get a price as 
high as they had expected; and hence they would become 
worse off as they have also a lower supply of rice. In 
the proposed scheme, as the jute/rice growers are told 
about the possible price for jute before the sowing starts 
they can now maximise their income from these two crops 
by making the necessary allocation of resources between 
them.
The other downward adjustment of the price of jute
with that of rice may be necessary when the domestic
price of rice (which gives the growers* opportunity cost)
has gone down. In this case if the price of jute is not
lowered (relative to that of rice), the growers would be
induced to produce a large quantity of jute which, demand 
*
remaining the same, will bring them a lower price than 
they expected.
That the disadvantages of a downward adjustment
of the price of jute with that of rice when the latter
are not great
has gone dmm^ecomes evident if we examine what the 
peasants normally do with their earnings from jute.
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It was mentioned in Chapter I that jute is produced in
East Pakistan by innumerable small peasants and most of*
1/
them spend their earnings from jute on rice*
Hence, if the price of jute is lowered because 
that of rice has gone do™, these growers are lightly
2/
affected as far as the jute earnings are spent oh rice. 
For an average jute grower the possibility of having a 
surplus rice for sale simply does not arise, even if he 
planted all his land to rice. The average size of
farm in East Pakistan is 3*5 acres, whereas the average 
size of the family is 6 (adult equivalent). Considering 
some possibility of a double crop of rice, the total 
rice output of 40-45 maunds per average family is not 
adequate for year round consumption*
1/ This is likely to be so as most of the peasants live
Ojfc a bare subsistence level. About 73 per cent of total 
income is spent on food of which about 70 per cent is 
on cereals. Govt, of Pakistan, National Sample Survey, 
1959, p. l6 .
2/ The analysis is rather hypothetical. In the proposed 
scheme the guaranteed price of jute is adjusted with 
that of rice prevailing in the preceding season. The 
growers will undoubtedly be worse off if the price of 
rice rises in the current season because they will get 
a low price for jute as guaranteed by the Board. Snt 
In the following year, of course, there will be an upward 
adjustment in the price of jute.
However, the jute/rice growers may not at all like 
a downward adjustment in the price of jute. Given the 
nature of the growers1 price responsiveness, this cannot 
be helped* It may be noted that if the Board earns some 
profits, these could be spent agricultural development
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There are however some rich farmers who may sell 
both jute and rice, for whom the lowering of the price 
of jute means making them worse off when the price of 
rice also has gone down® Most of raw jute in East Pakistan 
is, however, produced by small peasants as about 7^ per 
cent of total jute area in the farmstthe maximum
size of which is 7*5 acres (Table 1-1(A))•
Thus, if the Stabilisation Board makes some profits 
by offering a low price for jute in any season (as the 
price of rice was low in the preceding season) and selling 
jute at a higher price in the export market, this would 
mean an indirect taxation of the peasants* But this is 
not something new as under the existing system of export 
duty on raw jute the peasants do not get the full price 
paid by the ultimate buyers of raw jute (costs of marketing 
and processing apart). Whether taxing the peasants this 
way is right or not depends on the fiscal policies of the 
government and other considerations* Xn the proposed model 
it is provided that if the Stabilisation Board is left 
with any surplus after meeting the necessary expenses, 
this is to foe paid back to the growers indirectly in the 
form[agricultural development measures. The surplus cannot 
be handed over directly to the peasants because this will 
disturb the desired balance between the two prices of jute 
and rice. The special feature* of the proposed scheme is
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that we do not now have to worry about exploitation of
1/
the peasants by the shippers and exporters of raw jute*
Thus, starting from a given situation, if the aaverage 
price of rice goes up (down), the average price of jute, 
ceteris paribus, is to be raised (lowered), so that the 
projected quantity of raw jute is produced* As far as the 
earnings from jute are spent on rice purchases, the adjust- 
ment o£ the price of jute in the same direction with that 
of rice will generally have a neutral effect on the growers* 
total income from jute and rice. In any year, for instance, 
if the growers receive a higher cash income from the sale 
of jute, their total income from jute and rice does not 
increase if they have to spend it on rice the price of 
which also has gone up. Thus, in the proposed scheme, 
the income from these two sources for an average farmer 
is more stabilised than in the absence of such a scheme 
when the two prices tended more often to move in opposite 
directions (Appendix 1«A)•
This however presents a static view of the situa­
tion. In the course of time when economic development
1/ It is alleged (see The Dacca University Socio-Economic 
Survey Board, op♦cit.) that a small number of powerful 
exporters and shippers of raw jute usually have a large 
profit margin at the cost of the peasants and the primary 
intermediaries in the system of jute marketing in E&st 
Pakistan (noted in Chapter I).
l8?
takes place, labourers shift from rural occupations to 
urban jobs, the peasants will no longer produce only 
for subsistence* More and more rice will be produced 
for markets and incomes from jute and rice will be 
increasingly spent on manufactured goods* Hence, the 
adjustment of the price of jute in the same direction 
with that of rice may destabilise the peasants1 real 
income•
Such an economic development in East Pakistan 
will, however, need a considerable period of time* When 
such a development has taken place, an export price 
stabilisation scheme for raw jute may become unnecessary 
probably because almost the whole raw jute output will 
then be manufactured within the country*
The other special features of the proposed scheme 
are that as the growers will be able to know and be sure 
of the future price of their jute crop, atleast one source 
of uncertainty is eliminated* Of the two major crops, 
accounting for about 8 0 - 8 5 per cent of the total cultivatable 
land, jute being the cash crop (whereas rice is mainly 
produced for self consumption), it will be a great adwvantage 
to know the price of jute before the allocation of land 
and other resources dffe made between the two crops. As there 
will be one fixed price for a particular grade of jute
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1J
throughout the whole season (thus intra-seasonal fluc­
tuations are completely eliminated)<, the growers can b l  
market their prodxtce any time without a risk of any loss*
4-6 Changes in the Jute Marketing System
The successful operation of the propsed scheme 
requires some changes in the system of jute marketing* 
First| the Stabilisation Board must have a monopoly of 
the export of raw jute from Pakistan. This is necessary 
in order to maintain the export price at the optimum 
level and a fixed price for the growers throughout a 
season* If the private traders are allowed to operate 
the jute trade, it may be difficult to maintain these 
desired prices*
The second most important reason why the Board 
should have an export monopoly is that tie there would 
remain a surplus over what is paid to the growers t this 
could be used as the necessary fund to carry on the 
buffer stock operation. Otherwise, it may be difficult 
to collect the required fund through taxes*
It is necessary to grant the Stabilisation Board
1/ Except for some premium for private storage of raw 
jute as explained later.
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a statutory power over raw jute exports on yet another
ground• As at present the official rate overvalues the
1/
domestic currency in terms of the foreign currencies* 
some private exporters have a tendency to under-invoice 
and deprive the country of full foreign exchange earnings* 
The Pakistan government has been trying to stop this mal­
practice through a mechanism known as the 1 Export Price 
Check'• if the Stabilisation Board undertakes the full 
responsibility for raw jute exports* this problem will 
be eliminated*
In the domestic market the Board will buy raw jute 
through its agents, such as Cooperative Society and 
individual employees of the Board. The guaranteed price 
fixed for each grade of raw jute will be widely publicised 
throughout the country so that the growers can know it 
in time* The agencies of the Board will be distributed 
widely in the country in such a way that these would be 
in easy reach of the growers.
At present there are two government organisations- 
•^ he Jute Board and the East Pakistan Jute Marketing 
Corporation - to look into the affairs of the jute trade
1/ The proof of overvaluation of the Pakistan rupee in
terms of,foreign currencies is the successful operation 
of the 'Export Bonus Scheme1 explained in Chapter XI.
ict rationing of foreign
*
At present, there is a «t: 
exchange f p T
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and stabilisation of* jute prices# Instead of two, only 
one organisation with the necessary power and facilities 
can do the desired job# Already these organisations 
employ agents to buy raw jute from the interior of the 
country# Hence, in this respect, the proposed scheme 
does not entail any more difficulty than an expansion of 
activities in existing directions#
From tfie side of administration, this scheme is
comparatively easy# It does not require any physical
control over production or the maintenance of individual 
accounts. Operating a buffer stock requires facilities 
for storing# The government has built up a number of 
godowns in different parts of the country# Buffer stocks 
can be Isept near mill areas which are also the points 
of jute export# In the proposed scheme, as a fixed price 
is to be maintained for each grade of jute for a complete 
season, the growers would usually like to sell their crop 
immediately after the harvest, although some rich growers 
can afford to wait. In order to utilise the private storage
facilities the Board can induce the growers by offering
some premium over the fixed price to use their own 
storage•
191
4-7 Summary and Conclusion
The object of the suggested Price Stabilisation 
Model Tor Pakistan Jute, by eliminating (or atleast 
reducing) the cobweb cycle in the relative price and 
production of* raw jute, is to keep the country's net 
gains from jute production and export at the maximum 
level# The main mechanism relied upon in the proposed 
model is to project optimum production quantity and then 
by setting the appropriate producer price, attempt to 
induce the growers to produce this optimum quantity#
The producer price will be announced well before the 
sowing starts for both jute and rice for the period 
concerned so that the jute/rice growers can make the 
necessary allocation of land and other resources between 
the two alternative crops# Any unforeseen changes in 
demand and/or SMpp&y. in planned output of jute are to 
be met from a national buffer stock, the operation of 
which will be relatively easy. As supply of jute is to 
adjusted to changing demand conditions, year to year 
fluctuations in the export price of raw jute would be 
comparatively small#
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APPENDIX 4-A
^"A• 1 Statistical Calculation of the National Optimum
Export Quantity of Raw Jut©
Xn the Appendix 4-A.l we shall attempt a quanti­
tative measurement of* the national optimum export quantity
1/
of* raw jute with the help of* demand and supply elasticities. 
We would then calculate the projected production quantity 
(by including the domestic consumption need and changes 
in the buffer stock and of* course the optimum export 
quantity) and then by setting the appropriate producer 
price for raw jute attempt to induce the growers to produce 
accordingly *
As explained in Chapter I the U.K. import demand 
elasticity for raw jute is assumed to approximate the 
world import elasticity lor raw jute. The U.K. import 
demand function for raw jute, estimated in Chapter I by 
taking data over the period 1948-63, is given by the
%/ Similar methods of calculation of the national optimum 
export quantity with the help of supply and demand 
elasticities were also used by Hansen, Bent, Cotton Vs. 
Grain, National Information and Documentation Centre, 
Cairo, U.A.R., 1964.
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following multiple regression equation;
Log J = 2.0671 - 0.5891 log P + 0.3217 log P2
(0.2941) 1 (0.2271)
+ 0.4321 log Y + 0.0132 t fA 1 )
(0 .2 8 1 9 ) (0 .0 0 7 1 )
The coefficient of log (which is the price 
elasticity of import demand for raw jute for the U.K) 
indicates that other things remaining the same, a 10 per 
cent change in the price of raw jute will lead to about 
a 6 per cent change in the opposite direction in the 
quantity demanded. The coefficient of log , however, 
gives an average estimate only*
Xn the export market of raw jute, Pakistan is 
still the dominant supplier, although in total world 
production her share is less than a half. Thailand, India 
and other countries are potential suppliers of substantial 
quantities of raw jute in the world market in the near 
future. Hence, although before i9 6 0 , it was reasonable 
to assume the world import demand schedule for raw jute 
as the oxae faced by Pakistan, it im.Hunlikely Ito;.v:h<r true 
now or in the near future.
19 k
Given the world import elasticity of demand, the
price elasticity of demand for raw jute faced by a
single country like Pakistan, therefore, depends on
the proportion of raw jute supplied by the rest of the
world and its elasticity of supply. The formula to
determine the elasticity of demand for this commodity
faced by Pakistan , a single supplier, is given by the
1/
following formula;
E *= 1 , E , b ( K x p — ( w ) - — ( a ) ,A a a 1
where, is the elasticity of demand for Pakistan jute;
(a) is Pakistan*s average share in the world supply; (b)
is the share of the rest of the world: E is the world* w
elasticity of demand and IC is the elasticity of supply 
of the rest of the world.
Given Pakistn * s share in the total world production 
of raw jute equal to 0»k (Table 1-6 ), the elasticity
2/
of supply of raw jute by the rest of the world equal to aero,
1/ Shorter, P.C., op. cit.
/ ,s2/ ThisLan extreme assumption, but not unrealistic because 
though more than a half of world*s totifei raw jute is 
produced outside Pakistan, most of it is at present 
used by these countries for their domestic consumption.
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and the world elasticity of import demand equal to 0 * 6
(as found for the U.K. which was assumed typical for
the world), we get the elasticity of demand for raw jute
1/
faced by Pakistan, E , equal to 1*5*
P
Similarly, the supply function of raw jute as 
estimated by the equation 1-2 in Chapter I by taking 
data over the period 1 9 5 2 - 6 2 is reproduced below:
0t = 1805.46 + 4971.63 log “ 2 5 0 4 . 8 8  log Pr(t_l)
(1 2 0 1.0 6 ) (1340.42)
( A-2 )
where, 0 , is the output of jute in thousand bales in 
the current period, Pj an<* ^r(t-l) are Pr:*-ces
of jute and rice respectively in rupees per raaund in the 
preceding season. The equation is in a semi-log form 
and the partial elasticity of supply of raw jute with
1/ For the purpose at hand, it is important to know
the numerical value of the price elasticity of demand
for Pakistan jute, but as it is difficult to calculate
the elasticity of supply of raw jute by the rest of
the world and the world elasticity of import demand
for raw jute, an accurate measurement of the price
elasticity of demand for raw jute faced by Pakistan
cannot be made* Xn these circumstances the numerical
value of E ~ 1*5 is very rough*
P
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respect to its own price (with a lag of one year) is 
1/
0*9, The lag is inherent in the nature of the problem 
because of the time required for plantings to mature# 
Acreage decisions on which total output of* Jute depends 
are, as explained in Chapter I, based on the previous 
season’s relative prices of jute and rice* In the proposed 
model however, as the current period’s guaranteed price 
of* jute will be announced well before the sowing starts, 
the growers are expected to base their acreage decision 
(and hence total output) on the guaranteed price of jute 
announced for the current period in relation to the price 
of rice prevailing in the preceding period instead of 
the previous period’s (actual) relative prices of these 
two products* Hence, we can rewrite the equation (A~2) in
1/ The price elasticity of supply can be calculated
from a semi-log regression equation by differentiating 
in the following way:
Y =■■ a + b log X
dY b 
dX “ X
Therefore, since the elasticity of supply is
E. dY X . b b
Y ~dX ” Y X ” Y
Hence, from the regression equation (A-2) and Appendix 
(1-A), the partial elasticity of supply with respect 
to jute price is , j
$5 = o • 9 ( J  -
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the following form:
0t = 1805.46 + 4971.63 log Pj(t) - 2504.88 log
?A-3)
where, the current output of jute (0 .) is dependent on
the guaranteed price of jute in the current period (P^^)) 
and the price of rice in the previous period (Pr (£_^))#
Now by abstracting the supply and demand elasticities, 
we can formulate a simple supply - demand model for Pakistan 
jute in the following linear form:
Qt = “ 1 ptE (A”4)
Q.® = m2 (A-5)
(A-6)
where, quantity demanded (Q^) in the current period 
depends on current price, quant ity supplied( )  is 
made to depend, as explained earlier, also on current 
price and in equilibrium the market is cleared# In equations 
(A-4) through (A- 6 ) we have mot\deliberately^used error 
terms simply for ease of exposition in the subsequent 
development of the model# Equations (A-4) and (A-5) are 
the ceteris paribus type demand and supply functions, but 
the elasticity of demand, E, and that of supply, K, which
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are crucial for the purpose at hand,, were statistically 
estimated by dropping the ceteris paribus assumptions 
and explicitly taking other observable factors into 
account as can be seen in the numerical equations (A-l) 
and (A-2 )•
Equation (A-k) can be written as
«*-7>
Similarly, equation (A-5) can be written as
i I 
/ QZ \ K
P t = 7 ^ )  ( A - 8 )
in.
It was explained earlier that when an individual 
peasant acts independently, he takes the price of jute
as given and therefore produces upto the point where the
supply price equates the demand price in order to
maximise his individual profits. In equilibrium,
iSquantity supplied, ( ) ,  is equal to quantity demanded, 
d and hence obtain from equations (A-7l and (A-8 ), 
the following identity;
where, Q is the quantity (supplied and demanded) in 
equilibrium.
Equation: ( A-9 ) gives the equilibrium quantity
demanded and supplied in the absence of any intervention 
by the government. This is the quantity which is equal 
to GQ^ of Figure (zi.2). But it was argued enrlier that 
by restricting the quantity supplied in the export
market (to the point where the marginal revenue/for the 
country as a whole intersects the marginal opportunity 
cost curve), the country as a whole can increase her net 
gains from jute production and export. Hence, the national
1/ Equation (A-9) is calculated in the following way:
Taking the right hand sides of equations (A-7) and (A-8 ),
curve
we get 1
* * cl £3writing Q for both and which are equal at
equilibrium, we get
zoo
optimum export quantity can be obtained by equating the 
marginal revenue (export receipts from jute) with the 
marginal opportunity cost* We know that
, 1 /
MR =.. P ( 1 - -g ) (A-10)
where, MR is the marginal revenue, P is the price and 
E is the elasticity of demand*
Substituting the value of P from equation (A«7) into 
equation (A-10), we get
“ M g )  ( 1 - s >  <A-“ >
1/ This can be proved in the following way:
Xf P is the unit price, Q is the quantity sold, then 
PQ = R, where R is the total revenue* Differentiating 
we get A
sLS ~ dpp m p o ” p ( "t i «S ■)
dQ dO " Q*dQ “  ^ P # dQ
We know the elasticity of demand, E ~ * —7 Q dP
I-Ience, MR = |2 = P ( * _ A ) .
From equations (A-8 ) and (A-11), by equating supply 
price with marginal revenue, we get the national optimum 
export quantity, Q , as in the Following equation®
1
E
ao H  Cma)
1
E
K + E 1/
(A-12J
Dividing equation (A-1 2 ) by equation (A-9)* we get 
1
Q
r~
l
K + E
(A* 13)
Equation (A-13) gives the national optimum export 
expressed
quantity/as a ratio oF the oF the equilibrium quantity 
supplied by the growers in the absence ojf government 
regulations•
1/ When MC = MR, the quantity supplied and demanded at 
the optimum point is the same* Thus, taking the right 
hand sides oF equations (A-8 ) and (A-1 1 ), we get
2 0 2
Now by substituting the values oF the elasticity
oF demand, (E=l*5) and that oF supply, (K»0.9) in equation
(A-13)j we obtain the national optimum export quantity
oF jute as a ratio oF the quantity produced by the growers
when there is no intervention by the government. The
optimum export quantity thus comes out to be about 5^ 1
1 /
per cent oF the*Free1 market equilibrium quantity. As
over the period 1 9 5 5 - 6 2 the import price oF rice was
somewhat lower than the domestic price oF rice, the national
optimum export quantity would foe somewhat higher than
this. Nothing can be said accurately as to the ntrue,f
optimum quantity, but it should be approximately between
S M S  per cent oF the 1 Free1 market .t equilibrium
quantity. For the purpose oF illustration f we take per
cent oF the growers* Free market equilibrium quantity as
export
the possible optimum/ quantity For the country as a whole.
1/ The assumptions oF demand and supply elasticities 
are therefore very crucial as the extent oF export 
contraction depends on the magnitudes oF these two 
elasticities• Thus, the higher the value oF elasticity 
oF demand, E, and/or the lower the value oF elasticity 
oF supply, XC, the lower is the quantity that should 
be contracted (and hence larger is the ratio). On the 
other hand, the higher the value oF the supply elasticity 
and/or the lower the value oF demand elasticity, the 
higher is the quantity that should be contracted (and 
. hence, lower is the ratio)•
203
In other words, if we can determine the * free1 market
equilibrium quantity (which the growers would supply in
the absence of any intervention by the goveimment), we
can now find that the country as a whole should produce
for export about per cent of that quantity so that
the net gains from export production of raw jute are at
a maximum (where the marginal revenue from jute export
opportunity 1/
is equal to the margina1/cost relevant for the country)»
1/ In the absence of actual observation we cannot say, 
however, what will be the exact elasticity of demand 
at the optimum price for Pakistan jute* The elasticity 
of demand of 1.3 which we have calculated for Pakistan 
jute may not be the one which we observe at the ffree1 
market equilibrium point as there has always been 
some intervention in the form of export duty on jute 
by the government of Pakistan. It is reasonable to 
assume, in the absence of any special knowledge, the 
elasticity of demand to remain constant within a 
small price range. For numerical measurement most 
econometricians favour the assumptions of constant 
elasticity in the field of demand and supply analysis. 
Hansen, B., op ♦cit♦ pp. 19-20.
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4— A. 2 Regulation of Prodxxction and Effects on 
Export Price and Proceeds, etc«
   I HI *  W i ll n I im if P         III ■■mil mi l l  Wimni—     rnmn*trnM m
Having calculated the optimum export quantity of
raw jute, we are to add w to it the quantities for domestic
consumption and adjustment in the buffer stock. This
would give the projected prodxtction quantity in a particular
period. Now with the help of equation (A-3), by substituting
the values of projected production quantity (0^) and the
price of rice prevailing in the preceding season ( ^ r ( ^ ^ 9
we can estimate the appropriate producer price of jute
which the stabilisation Board would guarantee to the jute
growers in the current period• All these are calculated
and given in detail in Table 4-1 and the possible effects
of the measures taken are estimated for the period 1 9 3 6-5?
1/
to 1 9 6 1-6 2 . The various items of Table 4-1 are derived 
in the following way:
Column (l) is taken from Table (1-7); these are 
the actual domestic mill consumption of raw jute.
Column (2 ): We have calculated the average export
1/ The calculation is made for a past period instead of
a future one as it helps to compare the possible effects 
with the actual happenings*
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quantity and export price over the period 1956 - 6 1  from 
table (1-1 7 ) and the avex*age raw jute output and the 
average price received by the growers over the same 
period* Given the elasticity of demand tor Pakistan jute 
at 1 *5 and that of supply at & 0 *9 * we have estimated 
the equilibrium quantity (that would take place when 
there is no intervention by the government), bo per cent 
of which would give an approximation to the national 
optimum export quantity*
Column (3) is the actual export quantity that took 
place during the period*
Column (4) is the projected production quantity 
obtained by adding column (l) and (2). In practice,the 
projected production should be somewhat higher than this 
as we are to produce for the buffer stoclc also • But as 
there are about 4 million maunds with the private dealers, 
this could be taken, to start with, for the buffer stock 
operation. Figures in parenthesis show the actual output 
that took place*
Column (5) is the actual domestic price of rice 
prevailing in the preceding year. Thus, the price of 
rice shown against the year 1 95 6-5 7 * for example, is in 
fact the price prevailing in 1 9 5 5-5 6 •
Column (6 ) gives the producer price estimated with
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the help of* regression equation (A-3)* Thus, Tor example, 
substituting the value of 0^ as 23*9 and log of 23 Tor
^r(t-l) in regression equation (A-»3)» we a value ^
the anti-log of which is 20 (xoroducer price of jute) for 
the year 1956-3?J*
export
Column (7) gives the estimated pxudueinx/price which 
would px-evail if the projected quantity given in (2 ) 
is exported.
Column (8 ) through (10) are self explanatory as 
indicated by their respective heading.
Column (1 1 ) is calculated after adding Rs* 2 per 
maund to the growers1 price to cover the marketing cost 
of jute to be sold to the domestic mills* Rs* 4 per maund 
are added to the price given to the growers to cover the 
costs of marketing, processing, storing, etc, before the 
jute is exported* These calculations are based on the 
estimates of these costs by the Pakistan Jute Enquiry 
Commission, i9 6 0*
Column(12) is the total of domestic and export 
proceeds and finally, column (1 3 ) gives the approximate 
money balance the Board would be left with. The Stabili­
sation Board would have made, on average, an annual 
profit of Rs* 120 million, provided it did not have 
to pay any tax, fee, etc. to the government. The Pakistan
2 0  7
government, however, earned about Rs* 76 million per 
during 1958-61
yearZ.from the export duty on raw jute alone (Table 1-5) • 
Hence, after paying the taxes and fees, etc* to the 
government (i*e«, by setting aside the amount as the 
normal government revenue), the Stabilisation Board would 
be able to just operate the scheme. In other words, the 
scheme seems to be financially viable*
F inal Re mark s
Although the suggested scheme is expected to 
largely eliminate the cobweb cycle in the relative price 
and production of jute, the calculations in Table 4-1 
are tentative and little more than numerical illustrations* 
The whole analysis and calculations are based on simple 
assumptions such as constant elasticities of demand and 
supply. In practice, if the scheme were to be operated, 
the results would not be exactly as predicted. The present 
analysis merely indicates the various issues which must 
be taken into consideration when formulating such a 
stabilisation scheme. The main issues are the foreign 
demand function for rww jute, the import price of rice, 
the jute/rice growers1 price responses and the marginal 
productivity of land in jute and rice production*
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APPENDIX i-A
Statistics Concerning Jute and the Pakistan Economy
Year
July
to
June
Jute
Acreage 
(000 Acres)
Output 
(Million 
Bales )
Yield
per
Acre
Harvest 
Price 
of Jute 
Rs* per
Retail 
Price 
of Rice 
Rs* per
Estimated
Cash.
Income from 
Jute: Million
(hdle) maund maund Rupees
19^7- 2059 6 * 8 3.3 23 20 771
48 1877 5.5 2*9 30 29 832
4 9 1561 3.3 2 . 1 19 29 324
50 1711 6 , 0 3.5 35 21 838
1951 1779 6*3 3.6 33 23 802
52 1907 6 . 8 3.6 14 26 354
5 3 965 3.6 3.7 21 21 271
54 1243 4.7 3.8 22 15 333
55 1635 5.6 3.4 27 25 523
1956 1230 5.5 4*5 32 32 677
57 1563 5.7 3.7 30 29 594
58 1528 6 . 0 3.9 2? 30 476
59 1375 5.6 4.0 33 31 6o4
i960 1518 5.6 3.7 62 29 1.736
61 2061 7.0 3.4 42 27 1176
62 1723 5.2 3.0 4l 28 1065
Source: Government of East Pakistan, Agricultural Production 
Levels in East Pakistan (1947~§oy, Dacca, 196l and 
Monthly Summary of Jute Statistics.
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APPENDIX 1-B
Statistics Concerning Jute and the Pakistan Economy
Year Domestic 
T „ Use of* 
Raw 
i S S  Jute
Raw Jute Exports Prom Pakistan tp 
India U.K.
( Figures in thousand^!oils
U.S.A. European 
Common 
Markets
)
1948 ■ 'f v 1 C 698 51 53 98
1949 296 84 39 11?
1950 - \ IU * J 457 117 126 343
1951 “ 300 99 2? 285
1952 GTTi 1 ^ 266 150 93 292
1953 - p X ' * 243 125 55 312
1954 - V 3 7 220 l4i 57 338
1955 146 ' i- 246 124 70 358
1956 174 i ' 1 109 118 42 287
1957 188 113 166 88 302
1958 240 31 143 51 268
1959 314 < - •: J 111 137 57 275
i960 292 , 6 4 101 17 155
1961 298 ■ , 4. i 68 122 4-3 228
1962 305 ; t ^ 53 139 46 261
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, Industrial Fibres, 
London, and Govt, of East Pakistan, Monthly 
Jute Statistics*
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APPENDIX 1~C
Statistics Concerning Jute and the Pakistan Economy
Year Total Annual Total
July- Exports % Imports
June Rupees Change Rupees 
Million Million
Annual
%
National 
Income * 
Rupees 
Million
Annual
%
Change
1948 958 1459 •J* iJ, *J>=4 -
1949 1194 + 20 1297 - 11 17909
1950 2554 + 53 1620 -1- 20 18623 *1* 4
1951 2 0 09 - 21 2 2 3 7 4- 28 18488 - 1
1952 1510 - 25 1384 - 38 19023 4- 3
1953 a2 8SG - 15 1118 - 19 20177 4- 6
1954 1223 - 5 1103 - 1 2 0 3 4 3 4- 1
1955 1784 + 31 1325 + 17 2 0 0 8 6 1
1956 1608 - 10 2335 + 43 21377 4- 6
1957 1422 - 13 2 0 50 — 12 21471 4* 1
1958 1325 - 7 1578 - 23 2 1 8 5 8 4- 2
1959 1843 + 39 &46l -I* 36 22738 4* 4
i960 1799 - 2 3188 + 23559 4- 4
1961 ■1843 4~ 2 3109 - 3 24956 4* 6
1962 2034 + 9 3819 + 19 25510 4- 2
±  (8 ± 2.1 dr 3
Source: Govt* of Pakistan, (C.S.O.), Statistical Bulletin, 
July, 1964 Tables 1 and 25•
♦National income estimated at constant price of 1949-50 to 
1952-53 average.
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APPENDIX 1-D
Fluctuations in Exports of Pakistan Jute
Yean Export Ptfrceeds Unit Value
 w    w 8M w »  in■■ini a i i mmii in 1 1 r TiritnlTr nnmfcijnjimij mwniiLuxwjLuimiwrriiii
Source: U*N,
Rupees
Million
Annual
°/o
Change
Rupees 
per 
m* ton
Annual
%
Change
000
metric
tons
Annual
°/o
Change
1948 353 «ns 1044 338
9 250 - 29 IO63 + 2 235 - 31
1950 904 + 72 812 -24 1113 + 79
1 1208 + 25 114? H-29 1053 - 5
2 696 - 42 828 -28 84i - 20
3 571 - 18 581 -30 982 -i- 14
4 546 - 4 612 4 5 892 - 9
5 697 + 22 710 +14 982 + 9
6 751 + 7 874 + H9 859 - 13
7 782 -i- 4 996 -I-12 785 - 9
8 840 + 7 927 - 7 906 4- 13
9 680 - 19 84i - 9 809 - 11
196® 806 4- 16 1065 4*21 rp q- ry - 6
1 865 + 7 1060 - 1 816 + 7
2 795 - 8 917 *“ 14 867 4- 6
- 2 0.1+ ± 15.x 3f"i7
Year Book of* International Trade and Govt*
of* East Pakistan, Monthly Summary of* Jute Statistics*
Notes: Year begins 1 April for 1948 to 1951; 1 July for 
1952 to 1 9 6 2*
k" ^
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